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ABSTRACT 
Since Uruguay achieved its independence, it has been governed mostly by the 
Partido Colorado and a few times by the Partido Nacional, known together as the 
historical political parties. Both parties used the Armed Forces in support of the state’s 
foreign policy. Since the Cold War, both parties have committed troops to UN Chapter 
VI peacekeeping operations as a means of improving the image of the country in the 
international arena. However, neither political party has taken a strong position on 
whether to commit troops under Chapter VII operations. They decide on a case-by-case 
basis, mainly by considering the military’s interest in participating. In contrast, the leftist 
party Frente Amplio (Broad Front) believes that the use of force, allowed under Chapter 
VII operations, is against the principles of peaceful resolution of controversies and non-
intervention.  
This debate remains active insofar as the Frente Amplio took over the government 
in March 2005, and the country is still committed to two Chapter VII peacekeeping 
operations, the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Haiti. 
This thesis presents an analysis of the past and current political and military situation in 
Uruguay, and an assessment of the environment in the Southern Cone of Latin America 
in light of the current leftist regimes in power in that region. It also raises the question of 
whether or not to deploy troops in future UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations. To 
address this debate is crucial insofar as all countries in the Southern Cone are involved in 
the current UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti. Resolving this debate is essential because 
it will clarify whether or not the region will be involved in future Chapter VII operations 
and how that might affect the region’s traditional role as a peacekeeping troop “supplier.”   
This thesis argues that Uruguay should commit its Armed Forces to a broader 
spectrum of peacekeeping missions, including UN Chapter VII operations. This is 
consistent with Uruguay’s foreign policy principles of preventive diplomacy and peaceful 
resolution of controversies, and would not violate the principle of non-intervention as 
long as military intervention takes place for “humanitarian reasons.” Enhancing the 
involvement of Uruguayan troops in UN Chapter VII operations would be a strong sign 
vi 
in support of international law and multilateral institutions, of which the UN is the major 
example. By committing Uruguayan troops to UN Chapter VII missions, the leftist 
government has a unique opportunity to “spread” its ideal of solidarity to countries that 
need assistance. Moreover, from the perspective of the Uruguayan military, the 
commitment of Uruguayan troops in Chapter VII operations has a number of advantages. 
It would allow the military to train in a realistic conflict environment, enable the military 
to upgrade its equipment and improve the economic well-being of military personnel. 
Furthermore, the commitment of troops to Chapter VII operations would improve the 
international image of the country and foster the development of stronger domestic civil-
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I:  INTRODUCTION 
To love peace because we consider it wonderful and fecund. It is the 
nature of noble and strong peoples to love peace with the excellent 
willingness of those who are aware that in their strength lies their ultimate 
desire for peace.  
José Enrique Rodό (Uruguayan essayist, writer, dramatist  
and philosopher 1872-1917). 1  
 
Since Uruguay achieved its independence, it has been governed mostly by the 
Partido Colorado and a few times by the Partido Nacional, known together as the 
historical political parties. During their tenure, they used the Armed Forces in support of 
the state’s foreign policy. After the Cold War, the military has increasingly been used to 
project the image of the country in the international arena. Both historical political parties 
have used the military in this manner by committing military forces to UN Chapter VI 
peacekeeping operations. However, a debate has lately arisen regarding sending troops to 
peace operations because UN peacekeeping missions have become more coercive. As a 
result, the most recent and important UN peacekeeping operations, such as the ones in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter DRC) and Haiti, were established under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII operations have traditionally been known as 
peace-enforcement operations. Today, UN Chapter VII missions include a variety of 
duties other than peace-enforcement; and Chapter VII operations often imply that 
peacekeeping troops are allowed to use force only when necessary to fulfill the UN 
mandate. The major political parties have not taken a strong position on whether or not to 
commit troops under Chapter VII operations. They decide on a case-by-case basis, 
mainly by considering the military’s interest in participating.  
On the other hand, when a discussion on whether or not to deploy Uruguayan 
troops to UN Chapter VII missions has arisen, the left has systematically opposed 
sending troops. The left in Uruguay believes that the use of force, allowed under Chapter 
VII operations, is against the principles of peaceful resolution of controversies and non-
                                                 
1 Translation is mine. 
2 
intervention. In addition, the left thinks that some peacekeeping operations, rather than 
being a tool for ensuring peace and international security, have been used to manage 
powerful countries’ interests in certain regions. In this sense, a document prepared by the 
Defense Committee of the Frente Amplio (Broad Front–today’s governing coalition) 
argues that the government should not be willing to deploy troops under Chapter VII.2 
Because UN peacekeeping missions have evolved from Chapter VI to Chapter 
VII, the political debate in Uruguay regarding participation of its troops in Chapter VII 
peacekeeping operations remains active. This discussion now becomes more important 
insofar as the leftist Frente Amplio government took over in March 2005, and the country 
is still committed to two UN peacekeeping operations, the UN missions in the DRC and 
Haiti.  
Consequently, the question arises: should the Uruguayan Armed Forces be 
committed to UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations? This thesis argues that 
Uruguay should commit its Armed Forces to a broader spectrum of peacekeeping 
missions, including UN Chapter VII operations.  
Broadening the Uruguayan participation in peacekeeping operations is consistent 
with the foreign policy principles of preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of 
controversies. Many of today’s Chapter VII operations do not involve going to war. 
Instead they authorize a gradual use of force to fulfill the UN mandate. In addition, the 
Brahimi Report created the concept of “robust peacekeeping” in order to cope with 
violent groups which can sometimes undermine the peace process between parties in 
conflict. The main objective still is to prevent further violence and to ensure peaceful 
resolution of controversies.3  
                                                 
2 “La Política Militar del Frente Amplio,” Uruguay, Frente Amplio y Fuerzas Armadas, Red Globe, 
October 11, 2004, 
http://64.233.187.104/search?q=cache:OFG3JT22FD4J:redglobe.de/modules.php%3Fname%3DNews%26f
ile%3Dprint%26sid%3D3166++%22URUGUAY:+FRENTE+AMPLIO+Y+FUERZAS+ARMADAS%22
&hl=en (accessed  May 12, 2005).  
3 “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” Brahimi Report, (A/55/05-S/2000/809), 
United Nations, 21 August 2000, Paragraphs 48-64.  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/594/70/PDF/N0059470.pdf?OpenElement.  
3 
By broadening Uruguayan participation in peacekeeping operations, the left-
center government would collaborate in buttressing the role of regional blocs and 
multilateral institutions, of which the UN is the major example. Enhancing the 
involvement of Uruguayan troops in UN Chapter VII operations would be a strong sign 
in support of international law and institutions, and would also serve as evidence of the 
leftist government’s opposition to the power-biased approach of the hegemons. By 
broadening the Uruguayan involvement in peacekeeping operations, the left-center 
government has a unique opportunity to “spread” its ideal of solidarity to countries that 
need assistance. The Uruguayan troops, raised amongst people who know what solidarity 
means, would be the best tool for projecting the state foreign policy under the leftist 
ideals.  
The issue is that the participation of Uruguayan troops in Chapter VII operations 
would negatively affect the country’s principle of non-intervention in other countries’ 
domestic affairs. This principle, which has traditionally been embraced by Uruguay, has 
been one of the most important tenets of leftist foreign policy. Therefore, it would seem 
contrary to the leftist political discourse at international, regional or domestic levels for 
the current leftist government to commit Uruguayan troops to Chapter VII peacekeeping 
operations (whereby using force is allowed).4 However, the Responsibility to Protect 
approach outlines the moral basis for waiving the principle of non-intervention. This 
“new” approach is an international corpus of ideas by which foreign military intervention 
is “legal” and hopefully strictly regulated by the UN. Under this approach, foreign 
military intervention is authorized insofar as human rights atrocities are allowed by a 
state that is unwilling or unable to fulfill its obligation to protect its citizens from human 
rights violations.5 
Moreover, the commitment of Uruguayan troops in Chapter VII operations has a 
number of advantages from the perspective of the Uruguayan military. It would allow the 
                                                 
4 “Nuevo Gobierno Participará en Operaciones de Paz,” El Espectador, January 11, 2005, 
http://www.onunet.org.uy/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=543&mode=thread&
order=0&thold=0 (accessed May 12, 2005). 
5 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
December 2001, VII, http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp (accessed September 29, 2005). 
4 
military to train in a realistic conflict environment. Within the homeland, service 
members do not have the opportunity even to operate certain equipment because of 
domestic budget constraints. Additionally, the UN refunds the cost of military equipment 
employed during peacekeeping missions. This relieves much of the government’s burden 
in regard to upgrading military equipment. Finally, a Uruguayan officer deployed in a 
UN peacekeeping mission earns ten times his usual military salary, so peacekeeping has 
an important effect on the financial and personal well-being of military personnel.6  
Furthermore, to commit troops to Chapter VII operations would improve the 
international image of the country. Today, most UN operations are held under Chapter 
VII, and this will be the trend in the foreseeable future. The international community has 
seen Uruguay as a credible country, committed to important international affairs, such as 
peace and international security.7 In order to maintain and improve this image it is 
necessary for the country to commit troops to Chapter VII peacekeeping operations.  
Moreover, if the current leftist government does not participate in UN Chapter 
VII missions, or worse, withdraws troops currently deployed under that Chapter, the 
military will probably blame the government for having deprived them of economic and 
professional benefits. That will have negative effects on civil-military relations. 
According to Michael Desch, by committing troops to peacekeeping missions the military 
remains “externally-oriented” in a realistic mission, and strong civil-military relations are 
the result.8  
Considering the current political and military situation in Uruguay, this thesis 
proposes a policy for Uruguay’s participation in peacekeeping operations that is:  
1. Consistent with the Uruguayan traditional foreign policy principles of 
a. Preventive Diplomacy 
b. Peaceful Resolution of Controversies 
                                                 
6 “Nuevo Gobierno Participará... 
7 Yamandú Sala, “Militares Uruguayos Representan el 44% que Aporta la Regiόn a Misiones de Paz.” 
Cooperación Portal Uruguay, February 9, 2005, 
http://www.onunet.org.uy/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=564 (accessed May 
12, 2005). 
8 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, the Changing Security Environment (Baltimore 
and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 122.  
5 
2. Consistent with the current leftist government ideals of 
a. Multilateralism 
b. International solidarity 
3. Consistent with military needs in terms of 
a. Training and Re-equipment 
b. Welfare of personnel 
4. Essential to improve 
a. The image of the country in the international arena 
b. Domestic civil-military relations 
The use of a level of analysis framework helps me disaggregate the causal 
variables that explain the role the Uruguayan Armed Forces have been performing either 
in support of the foreign policy or in projecting the image of the country in the 
international arena.9 In addition, the level of analysis framework allows me to assess the 
current political and military situation in light of upcoming peacekeeping operations on 
three levels: the international level, the regional level and the domestic/bureaucratic level. 
Figure 1 shows the interaction among the three levels, composing what can be called the 
“peacekeeping arena.”  
                                                 
9 Jack S. Levy, “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War, a Levels-of-Analysis Approach,” in 
Turbulent Peace ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler and Pamela Aall (Washington DC: United States 

























Figure 1.   The Peacekeeping Arena and Its Levels of Analysis. 
 
The international level constitutes the UN sphere of influence. As part of that 
international arena, regional organizations are major actors within their spheres of 
influence or regional arenas. Finally, regional organizations are composed of nation 
states, each managing its own issues in what is called the domestic arena. Each 
peacekeeping troop contributor state considers its own foreign and defense policies, its 
approach to peacekeeping and other security issues before committing troops to 
peacekeeping operations. Those considerations become the main variables that not only 
influence the behavior of the state concerning peacekeeping but also determine the 
involvement of regional organizations in peacekeeping missions. 
Concerning the international level, this research uses three characteristic “stages” 
of the world to frame the analysis. These stages correspond to Cold War times, post-Cold 
War times and post-September 11, 2001, times. Each “stage” is characterized by a 
remarkable event, which in turn produced an effect or “trend” in the regional or domestic 
levels of analysis. The events are the World Bipolarity, the New World Order and the 
War on Terror. In this sense, this study identifies how variables from the international 
level influenced the regional and domestic levels of analysis, which in turn, affected the 
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foreign policy and the national defense policy processes. In this regard, the analysis 
shows how the role of the Uruguayan military has changed from traditional homeland 
defense to international peacekeeping, and why the current peacekeeping role is now 
under debate.  
Concerning the regional level, the study concentrates on the present time (2005), 
when an ideological confluence in the Southern Cone of South America can be noted. 
Leftist governments are in power in that region, where countries created a regional trade 
agreement called MERCOSUR during the post-Cold War era. In addition, because the 
same countries have so regularly committed troops to UN peacekeeping operations, the 
region has become known as a “peacekeeping supplier.” Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to think that MERCOSUR countries might deepen their commitment to the organization, 
broadening the scope of the treaty into other issues such as peacekeeping. At present, this 
is remarkable insofar as MERCOSUR members have been running the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Haiti. This thesis shows that despite the ideological confluence in the region, 
achieving a peacekeeping partnership seems very difficult. In this regard, it is evident that 
the Uruguayan government has most work to do in terms of establishing national defense 
and peacekeeping policies. 
Concerning the domestic/bureaucratic level, this research presents an analysis of 
the current situation in Uruguay, where a leftist government took over the country in 
March 2005, winning more than 50% of the votes in the 2004 elections. The current 
government has questioned existing Uruguayan commitments to peacekeeping (DRC and 
Haiti), insofar as those operations were established under UN Chapter VII and have been 
more coercive than the operations in which Uruguayan troops were previously 
committed. Although the domestic arena obviously represents a unique level of analysis, 
this study often uses the dual expression “domestic/bureaucratic” level. This is because in 
Uruguay, inconsistencies can be noted between what politicians in general or the 
government in particular have been arguing about an issue, in this case about 
peacekeeping, and what the military has been doing. By the same token, lags can be seen 
between military doctrine and expectations and the political power’s policies regarding 
military missions and readiness. As a result, the actions taken by the Uruguayan military 
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(in this research identified as the bureaucratic level) have not been completely consistent 
with the desires of the political powers (in this case the legitimate representatives of the 
domestic level). Consequently, at the domestic/bureaucratic level, this study sheds light 
on the many issues related to Uruguayan participation in UN Chapter VII peacekeeping 
operations, such as foreign policy, the ideals of the current leftist government, the many 
advantages those operations represent for the military and the positive effects on the 
image of the country in both the international arena and domestic civil-military relations. 
Chapter II focuses on the international level. It addresses the following question: 
what made the Uruguayan military change its role throughout time up to the 
current peacekeeping role? Causal variables from Cold War, post-Cold War and post-
September 11, 2001, times are analyzed as cornerstones for the changing role of the 
Uruguayan military. The military’s role has evolved from territorial defense to internal 
warfare against leftist groups and from hemispheric defense to international 
peacekeeping. In this regard, during the Cold War the only participation of Uruguayan 
troops overseas was in the non-UN Multinational Force in the Sinai Peninsula. The 
effects of international variables on the regional and domestic levels are also depicted. In 
this sense, the bipolar world caused Uruguay to align itself with the western “option,” 
thus joining the Hemispheric Alliance. On the domestic level, governments of the 
historical political parties embraced liberal ideas, but with a strong presence of the state 
in the design of the economic agenda. This research shows how the Armed Forces played 
two main roles. On the one hand, they were committed to hemispheric defense, so they 
enhanced their participation in training and in international exercises led by the U.S. On 
the other hand, the military was used in fighting the leftist rebel movements that 
jeopardized democracy in Uruguay and its commitment to the western alliance. This 
ended in a dictatorship, where the military played a major role in the design of the 
political and economic agenda, and leftist parties were banned. As a result, at the end of 
this stage, the left systematically opposed any military participation in U.S.-led combined 
military exercises. 
Concerning the post-Cold War era, the rise of the “New World Order” was the 
main event at the international level that caused the South American region and within it, 
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Uruguay, to embrace neoliberal ideas and regional agreements in the economic realm. 
Due to the rise of internal conflicts in many places, South America became a “supplier” 
of peacekeeping troops. The effects at the regional level show a trend away from the 
traditional U.S.-led maneuvers towards multinational peacekeeping exercises between 
regional partners under UN standards. Concerning effects of the New World Order at the 
domestic level, this stage was characterized by a systematic leftist opposition to U.S.-led 
combined military exercises. Further, this study explains how historical political parties 
in Uruguay saw this time as a window of opportunity to project (in practice) the 
traditional foreign policy of preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of 
controversies. In this case, the left supported the deployment of troops for accomplishing 
peacekeeping missions.  Finally, this thesis shows how this trend allowed the Uruguayan 
Army to use peacekeeping operations as a window of opportunity to develop its own 
doctrine on that issue. 
Regarding the post-September 11, 2001, era, the “war on terror” and the U.S. 
“interventions” in the Middle East were the main events at the international level. South 
America rejected the U.S. response to the events of September 11 and declined to go 
along with and support the U.S.-led “interventions.” Although not related to the war on 
terror, at the regional level the post-September 11, 2001, times were marked by the 
failure of the neoliberal economic model and the rise of leftist regimes in South America. 
This research argues that, on the domestic level, leftist governments seem prone to 
adopting a regional approach in regard to peacekeeping operations. In addition, this 
analysis presents the Uruguayan leftist government’s position on whether or not the 
Uruguayan Armed Forces should be deployed to UN Chapter VII peacekeeping 
operations in light of their current commitments in the DRC and Haiti. This debate, 
which will also cover many other aspects of national defense policy, could be seen as the 
end of military “laissez-faire.” This expression means that the military has gotten 
accustomed to designing their doctrine and missions with no guidance from the political 
power. This thesis shows the possible effects of this debate on Uruguayan civil-military 
relations. 
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Chapter III deals with the regional level at the present time (2005). It addresses 
the ideological confluence in the Southern Cone and the countries’ commitment to the 
current UN Chapter VII mission in Haiti. The issue is to explore whether or not 
conditions exist for the creation of a regional force or regional standards for participation 
in peacekeeping. This Chapter addresses the following question: does the rise of leftist 
regimes in the Southern Cone of Latin America create conditions for a peacekeeping 
partnership? The work depicts the historically competitive nature of multilateral 
relations among the Southern Cone countries and the importance geopolitics played in 
shaping those relations. The study includes an analysis of the situation in the ABC 
countries (named after Argentina, Brazil and Chile), in addition to a study of the 
Uruguayan situation. Competition among these countries seems to have ended and 
collaboration is what prevails. However, to create a regional force or establish regional 
standards for peacekeeping seems to be difficult. In order to explore a regional 
peacekeeping partnership, several different variables are analyzed for each country, 
including the existence of coherent foreign and defense policies, the country’s approach 
to peacekeeping and regional security issues. The analysis shows divergence and 
different interests can be noted when analyzing the majority of those variables. Therefore, 
ideological confluence in the region may be a necessary but insufficient condition for a 
peacekeeping partnership. Finally, the chapter concludes that Uruguay, although the 
country in the Southern Cone that is most committed to UN peacekeeping, is also the 
country which has the most work to do in the design of a peacekeeping policy. 
Chapter IV focuses on the domestic/bureaucratic level and states the argument, 
in which it is recommended that the current leftist government in Uruguay broaden 
participation of the military in peacekeeping operations to include UN Chapter VII 
missions. This Chapter deals with the main thesis question, although in doing so, it also 
addresses the following question: how consistent are Chapter VII peacekeeping 
operations with the current political and military situation in Uruguay? In order to 
respond to this question, this study considers two UN documents: An Agenda for Peace 
and the Brahimi Report. These documents provided details on the current peacekeeping 
trend. According to this trend, by broadening the participation of the military in Chapter 
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VII peacekeeping missions, the Uruguayan leftist government would improve the image 
of the country in the international arena without violating the traditional foreign policy 
principles of preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts. In regard to the 
traditional principle of non-intervention, which has also been a leftist paradigm, a study 
on the Responsibility to Protect approach helps clarify how that principle has evolved in 
favor of protecting human rights, another leftist concern. The bottom line is that 
participating in Chapter VII peacekeeping operations is totally consistent with Uruguayan 
foreign policy principles and with the current leftist government’s concerns. 
Furthermore, by broadening the Uruguayan commitment in peacekeeping to 
include Chapter VII missions, the government would also support its ideals of 
multilateralism and international solidarity. This thesis discusses the current Uruguayan 
leftist president’s speeches at the UN and other fora in order to show the importance the 
government places on the UN as a worldwide multilateral institution. But the Chapter 
also demonstrates that to support the UN peacekeeping role would require participating in 
Chapter VII operations. This research also deals with the ideal of solidarity. In this sense, 
references from the president and other governmental authorities’ speeches reflect 
consistency between their expressions and the Responsibility to Protect approach when 
dealing with human rights protection. This approach provides for the right of military 
intervention under UN oversight when atrocities against human beings are committed or 
allowed by a state. To intervene on behalf of preventing ethnic cleansing or genocide 
might require a UN Security Council Chapter VII resolution.   
Moreover, the chapter shows that by broadening Uruguayan participation in 
peacekeeping to include UN Chapter VII missions, the military benefits from better 
training, re-equipment and improved welfare of military personnel. Academic papers, 
mainly from the Army, demonstrate how important peacekeeping has been in improving 
training and acquiring experience. The knowledge gained through participation in 
peacekeeping missions has been transferred to other Army personnel and has been 
reflected in the readiness of the organic Army units during peacetime. The Navy’s 
evaluation of its participation in peacekeeping missions has also been positive. In this 
sense, the Navy has consolidated some of its existent skills and has incorporated new 
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ones. But most important, the Navy has valued the improvement of military jointness. 
The Air Force, albeit with less participation, considers peacekeeping essential for its 
pilot’s training in light of the current and significant domestic budget constraints. 
Quotations from the three heads of the military services in Uruguay are used in this 
Chapter to bolster the preceding argument. The issue is that because Chapter VI 
operations have become unlikely and Chapter VII operations are currently ongoing and 
predicted for the future, refusal to participate in Chapter VII missions would deprive the 
Uruguayan Armed Forces of their most important source of training.  
Military re-equipment deserves a similar analysis. Again, Army academic papers 
demonstrate the importance of the refunds made by the UN in exchange for peacekeeping 
deployments.  A Navy document also bolsters the same argument. Two counter-
arguments are presented. One comes from the same Army references and deals with the 
protracted lag between Uruguayan military expenditures and receipt of refunds from the 
UN. This situation has complicated the financial management of the services, but at the 
end of the day, the UN has made the agreed upon refunds. The other counter-argument 
comes from a leftist military advisor, who argues that the cost of a peacekeeping 
operation is higher than believed, especially when other “collateral” costs are considered, 
such as special medical care and complementary salaries (which also imply additional 
social security savings).  
On the other hand, the Chapter shows that recent UN refunds have equaled one 
third of the official budget, which for the Uruguayan military is a large sum of money. 
Besides, peacekeeping has allowed the military to incorporate specific material for 
specific duties, which have become an integral part of the military’s permanent assets 
upon mission completion. In this regard, had the military not deployed in peacekeeping 
missions, that equipment would never have been purchased by the Uruguayan 
government. Again, if Uruguay does not participate in Chapter VII operations, the 
possibility of incorporating additional assets will completely disappear. 
Additionally, the welfare of military personnel improved as a result of 
participation in peacekeeping. Evidence shows that military personnel have been able to 
improve their social condition, for example concerning housing and debt cancellation. 
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Indicators like the increasing number of volunteers for peacekeeping, even for the most 
dangerous (better paid) operations, bolster this argument. The dark side regarding 
personnel issues is that Chapter VII operations might involve a larger number of 
casualties. In response, this thesis refers to Army officers’ opinions and data whereby 
casualties among the Uruguayan contingents have been uncommon, and where former 
Chapter VI operations sometimes involved dangers similar to those experienced during 
current Chapter VII Uruguayan deployments. Besides, evidence demonstrates that traffic 
accidents have been the major cause of casualties during peacekeeping operations. Then, 
this study explains that despite the important involvement of Uruguay in peacekeeping, 
no diplomatic ties have been created between Uruguay and post-conflict countries. This 
is an issue Uruguay should improve in further commitments, which will probably be set 
up under Chapter VII. 
Finally, this thesis argues that by broadening the Uruguayan participation in 
peacekeeping to include UN Chapter VII missions, the government would improve the 
country’s image in the international arena and consolidate its power due to the 
improvement in civil-military relations. By the same token, this research argues that the 
military would improve its domestic image. Quotations from the Uruguayan Army 
Commander in Chief support this last argument. Speaking at the 194th Army anniversary 
ceremony in May 2005, the head of the Uruguayan Army highlighted how important for 
the Army it is to meet the requirements of the civil society it serves. Concerning the 
international image, a counter-argument is presented whereby foreign media criticized 
the Uruguayan Army peacekeepers deployed in Eastern DRC for its failure to use force in 
violent situations. This study explains that this happened because those Army 
peacekeeping units were not given the proper mandate, due to the inconsistencies within 
the domestic/bureaucratic level. Failure to provide adequate rules of engagement 
explaining when and how to use force posed Army peacekeepers in Eastern DRC with 
the dilemma of whether to follow the Uruguayan government guidelines or fulfill the UN 
mandate. Protracted political discussions on Uruguayan participation in ongoing 
peacekeeping operations translated into ambiguous mandates that undermined the 
efficient response of the Army in the field. However, a quotation from the DRC Force 
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Commander concerning the Uruguayan Army and Navy performance shows the opposite. 
That commander expressed his confidence in the Uruguayan troops. Again, the main 
point of discussion in Uruguay has been whether or not to deploy under Chapter VII. As 
it was said, future peacekeeping missions will be established under Chapter VII: in order 
to maintain “prestige,” Uruguay should address this issue once and for all and commit its 
troops in UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations. 
Concerning the military’s domestic image and the improvement of civil-military 
relations, this research comments on Desch’s “threat matrix.” This matrix makes it 
possible to assess civil-military relations based on the type of threat a country faces.10    
 
  External Threats 
  High Low 
Internal  High Poor Worst 
Threats Low Good Mixed 
 
Figure 2.   Desch’s Threat Matrix. Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of 
Location and Intensity of Threats (Uruguay’s assessment is highlighted) 
(From: Desch). 
 
An analysis of that matrix shows that the Uruguayan low internal-low external 
threat typology causes mixed (uneven) civil-military relations. In cases like that, 
countries should favor peacekeeping operations as a military role in order to improve 
civil-military relations.11 This Chapter also refers to Moskos, et al.’s military 
postmodernism, in which peacekeeping (sponsored by the UN) and humanitarian 
intervention (as argued in the Responsibility to Protect approach) constitute interesting 
options for today’s military.12 This study also shows that the Uruguayan Army seems to 
                                                 
10 Desch, 14. 
11 Ibid., 122. 
12 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” 
in The Postmodern Military ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 1. 
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require being considered by the government as a postmodern institution. According to 
Moskos, et al., postmodern military reflects the evolution of the western democracies’ 
military organization after the Cold War.13 The authors argue that postmodern military 
“undergoes a loosening of the ties with the nation-state.”14 A counter-argument is 
presented by a leftist military advisor, who argues that those “new” roles (I would add 
postmodern roles) denaturalize the essential role of homeland defense and undermine 
domestic military readiness.  
Finally, this thesis explains how the leftist government is now responsible for 
taking the initiative concerning military deployments and what is expected in light of the 
still pending and promised debate on national defense and security issues. Among those 
issues is whether or not the Uruguayan military should be committed to UN Chapter VII 
peacekeeping operations. In this regard, this analysis shows how this debate has been 
delayed, in part, because the leftist government has lately been dealing with the issue of 
the “disappeared people.” This is an issue that happened during the thirteen years of 
dictatorship (1973-1985) and which the left promised to address during its political 
campaign for the 2004 elections.  
Two facts give me hope in the forthcoming domestic debate on peacekeeping. 
One is that the current leftist government recently asked parliament to authorize 
participation by the Navy in the 2005 U.S.-led UNITAS operation. The other fact is that 
the majority of the leftist members of parliament gave their favorable votes on that 
account. Both facts make it reasonable to expect that the discussion about the 
participation of the Uruguayan military in UN Chapter VII missions will finally take 
place in the near future. They also make it possible to look forward to a favorable 
outcome on authorizing the commitment of Uruguayan Armed Forces to UN Chapter VII 
peacekeeping operations.  
Chapter V is the concluding chapter which contains a summary of the findings 
and recommendations. The Chapter argues that at the international level peacekeeping 
has become more coercive and the trend shows increased UN Chapter VII missions 
                                                 
13 Moskos et al., 1. 
14 Ibid. 
16 
instead of Chapter VI. At the regional level, the trend in the Southern Cone of Latin 
America shows the rise of leftist regimes in power. However, this has not yet provided 
grounded basis for a peacekeeping partnership due to differences regarding other topics 
among the Southern Cone countries. On the domestic/bureaucratic level, peacekeeping 
has become a major role for the Uruguayan military. In this regard, the Uruguayan leftist 
government promised a debate on national defense policy in order to discuss (among 
other issues) whether or not the military should be committed to UN Chapter VII 
peacekeeping operations. The chapter concludes that based on the international and 
regional levels trend concerning peacekeeping, Uruguay should broaden its participation 
in peacekeeping to include UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations. This would not 
violate the Uruguayan foreign policy principles. On the contrary it would promote the 
leftist ideals of multilateralism and international solidarity. At the domestic level, to have 
the military deployed in peacekeeping, which means to participate in Chapter VII 
operations, would improve the image the Uruguayan civil society has of the military and 
civil-military relations would benefit. From the military viewpoint, continued 
participation in peacekeeping positively affects the training, re-equipment and 
personnel’s welfare. For Uruguay as a whole, by broadening the Uruguayan participation 
in peacekeeping including Chapter VII missions, the government would insert the 
country in the real world. 
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II:   LANDMARKS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL AND THE 
URUGUAYAN ARMED FORCES’ ROLE EVOLUTION 
In order to isolate and outline the causal variables at the international level that 
made the Uruguayan Armed Forces adopt different roles in the modern era, three “stages” 
of the world political development must be analyzed.  These stages correspond to Cold 
War, post-Cold War and post-September 11, 2001, times. Each “stage” is characterized 
by a remarkable event. The events are the World Bipolarity, the New World Order and 
the War on Terror. At the international level, these events produced an effect or “trend” 
on the regional and domestic levels of analysis, which, resulted in a turning point for the 
role of the Uruguayan Armed Forces. What made the Uruguayan military change its 
role throughout time up to the current peacekeeping role? This Chapter analyzes how 
those international events influenced the political environment in Uruguay, causing the 
military to adopt changing roles. I will show that during the Cold War, the roles of the 
Uruguayan military ranged from homeland defense and border protection to ensuring a 
western lifestyle and fighting leftist armed groups; from protecting the hemisphere 
against external aggression to peacekeeping overseas. Then, with the rise of the New 
World Order, the Uruguayan military became increasingly involved in international 
peacekeeping, to such an extent that Uruguay became known as a “peacekeeping-troop 
supplier.” Finally, I will show why, after September 11, 2001, Uruguay’s peacekeeper 
role has generated a domestic political debate.  
A. THE COLD WAR AND THE URUGUAYAN MILITARY DIVERSITY OF 
ROLES 
The dictatorship was sown by two things: we were victims of a Cold War 
in which some stimulated the guerrillas and others stimulated coups d’êtat; 
but there were faults on both sides. Guerrillas existed and coups d’êtat 
occurred under the pretext of fighting the guerrillas. In the meantime, the 
country’s large democratic majorities remained prisoners of this terrible 
game. 
Julio María Sanguinetti (President of Uruguay 1985-1989; 1995-1999),                 
August 28, 2005.15 
                                                 
15 Semanario Búsqueda Sección Política, August 24, 2005. Also Diario El País Sección Nacional 
August 20, 2005. Translation is mine. 
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In Uruguay, the issue has always been how to make the Armed Forces behave in a 
manner consistent with the foreign policy principles of the country. These principles have 
evolved as a result of the lengthy process of state formation.  What today is Uruguay was 
once a disputed land between Spain and Portugal in colonial times. Once the country 
became independent, its land then became the subject of dispute between Argentina and 
Brazil. As a result, Uruguay began to reject the idea of foreign intervention in its 
domestic affairs. 
Nonetheless, this did not impede the regionalization of domestic political 
disputes, which forced Uruguay to become involved in regional struggles. When political 
parties finally separated domestic politics from the regional context by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the state formation process was almost complete. Uruguay began 
interacting with the international community as a homogeneous sovereign state, 
embracing the principles of non-intervention and self-determination.16 
Furthermore, as a small country and a member of the United Nations (UN) from 
the very beginning, Uruguay has long been committed to the preservation of international 
peace and security. Its traditional position of non-intervention in other states’ domestic 
affairs and self-determination was broadened when Uruguay adopted the UN principles 
of preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of controversies among states.17 
Uruguay has projected these principles abroad by closely observing international law and 
by supporting international institutions that work to ensure peace, cooperation and 
security among states.18 The text of the Uruguayan “law of the land” fully supports this 
argument, “Article 6.- When celebrating international treaties the Republic shall propose 
                                                 
16 Lincoln Bizzozero, “Uruguayan Foreign Policies in the 1990s: Continuities and Changes with a 
View to Recent Regionalisms" in  National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South, ed. Björn 
Hettne, András Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (Helsinki, London: United Nations University, World Institute 
for Development Economics Research, St. Martin´s Press, 2000), 177-198.  
17 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de la República Oriental del Uruguay, “La Defensa Nacional, 
Aportes para un Debate,” 30. http://www.mdn.gub.uy/paginas/libro.asp. (accessed August 15, 2005). Also 
“UN Charter,” United Nations, Art. 1, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm. 
18 Ibid. 
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a clause whereby all differences among contracting parties shall be resolved by 
arbitration or other peaceful means....”19 
Moreover, adherence to the UN Charter has also implied respect for the coercive 
measures provided in that Charter, insofar as a violation of UN principles has occurred. 
When the UN first operated its collective security system in 1950 at the onset of the 
Korean War, Uruguay expressed its support for the three Security Council Resolutions 
that dealt with that issue.20 First, Uruguay recognized that a breach of the peace had 
occurred; second, it agreed with the restoration of international peace and security 
through military measures; and third, it approved the creation of a multinational force 
under the command of the United States (U.S.).21  
Furthermore, in order to prevent the Security Council from becoming locked by 
the Soviet Union’s (USSR) veto, the U.S. promoted a mechanism for the General 
Assembly to be involved in future decisions regarding peace and international security. 
The result was General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), known as United for Peace.  The 
text of this Resolution was prepared by a group of seven countries, including Uruguay.22 
This document also established a Peace Observation Commission  
…which could observe and report on the situation in any area where exists 
international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.23  
Uruguay was one of the original fourteen members of this Commission.24 It is 
remarkable that the General Assembly, through this document, also approved by 
Uruguay, resolved that it had the duty to consider “…the use of armed force when 
                                                 
19 Poder Legislativo de la República Oriental del Uruguay, “Constitución de la República Oriental del 
Uruguay,” Art. 6. http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/palacio3/index.htm. Translation is mine. 
20 “UN Security Council Resolutions 83, 84, 85,” 1950, United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1950/scres50.htm. 
21 “UN Uruguay Documents S/1516, S/1569, S/1666,” The Permanent Mission of the Republic of 
Korea to the United Nations, http://www.un.int/korea/sc.html.   
22 “UN General Assembly Resolution 377 (V),” United Nations, http://www.un.int/korea/sc.html. 




necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”25  So, at the onset of 
the Cold War, Uruguay began demonstrating its commitment to peace and international 
security and its support for the mechanisms needed to prevent and solve future conflicts. 
However, this clear course of action was not followed by consistent defense 
policies. The military in Uruguay performed varied and changing roles during the Cold 
War. From homeland defense and border protection to ensuring a western lifestyle and 
fighting leftist armed groups: from protecting the hemisphere against external aggression 
to peacekeeping overseas. In this regard, what caused the Uruguayan Armed Forces 
to perform disparate roles under the context of the Cold War? 
In the following paragraphs, I will attempt to identify the independent variables 
which caused Uruguayan governments to make political decisions, which in turn, 
affected the roles, composition, training and readiness of the Uruguayan Armed Forces. 
We will see that the Cold War forced Uruguay to side with the western bloc. In so doing, 
Uruguay fell under the protective umbrella of the U.S. at the international level. At the 
regional level, the Uruguayan military operated under the framework of the hemispheric 
alliance. This framework also caused the military to fight against violent leftist groups, 
which might have undermined the strength of the western bloc in the region. Finally, we 
will cover the rise and fall of the dictatorship and Uruguayan participation in the Sinai 
Peninsula multinational force. The country’s participation in the Sinai mission is notable 
because, while Uruguay has long standing tradition of supporting peacekeeping missions, 
the Sinai Peninsula mission was the first time Uruguay sent troops.   
B. NEUTRALITY, THE WESTERN OPTION AND URUGUAY’S FREE 
RIDE ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
During the Cold War, the Uruguayan military was committed to the preservation 
of the values, beliefs and lifestyle the country embraced. In this sense, after World War 
II, Uruguay was a mix of a capitalistic and social welfare state.26  This allowed the 
country to maintain friendly relationships with both West and East. However, although 
Uruguay carefully managed its foreign relations based on the paradigm of neutrality, its 
                                                 
25 “UN General Assembly Resolution 377 (V),” United Nations,, A 1. 
26 Fernando Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900 (Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 2000), 50. 
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“western-like” culture made Uruguayan polity and society sympathize with the western 
viewpoint. In addition, the country’s geographical location fell under the U.S.’ sphere of 
influence. As a result, the Uruguayan Armed Forces established close links with the U.S. 
military. U.S. equipment and training under U.S. standards were common in the 
Uruguayan military in those times. The bottom line was that Uruguay, by embracing the 
standards of the western bloc, received a free ride in the stable bipolar world under the 
umbrella of the U.S. 
In this context, as an advocate of peace and conscious of its limited power, 
Uruguay avoided committing troops in foreign conflicts. As a small country, Uruguay’s 
main argument in defense of its sovereignty was the observance of international law. By 
taking such a position, the country eschewed aggression towards others and preserved 
self-determination. To respect international law and avoid aggression, albeit traditional, 
was essential for Uruguay in those times in light of the intricate South American 
geopolitics. The regional environment was characterized by disputed frontiers, boundary 
protection and expansion.27 This landscape accounted for what Phillip Kelly calls 
“checkerboards.” Checkerboards were multipolar balance of power systems, by which 
powerful states in South America aligned against their immediate neighbors.28 They 
operated under the concept of “my neighbor is my enemy, but my neighbor’s neighbor is 
my friend.”29 So, while homeland defense was the traditional role of any military in those 
times, the South American geopolitical context caused the Uruguayan military to 
consider the preservation of the nation’s sovereignty and territory a major concern.30  
During the eighties, Uruguay strengthened its alignment with the western world’s 
standards, especially in economics.31 In addition, Uruguay’s historical neutrality and 
commitment to peace and international security paved the way for an unexpected 
                                                 
27 Phillip Kelly, Checkerboards & Shatterbelts, The Geopolitics of South America (Austin: The 
University of Texas Press, 1997), 6. 
28 Ibid., 36-37. 
29 Ibid., vii. 
30 Rut Diamint, “The Military,” in Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, ed. Jorge 
I. Dominguez and Michael Shifter (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, Second Edition, 2003), 
68. 
31 Bizzozero, 177-198. 
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outcome. In 1981, the U.S. invited Uruguay to join the Multinational Force of Observers 
(MFO) to be deployed to the Sinai Peninsula. Although Uruguay had already committed 
military observers to foreign post-conflict environments, such as Chaco Boreal (South 
America, 1935) and Kashmir (Asia, 1952), the MFO represented the first opportunity for 
the country to send troops overseas.32 Because the disputing states consented to the 
mission and to the deployment of troops, MFO fit perfectly with Uruguay’s foreign 
policy principles. Uruguay’s participation could not be construed as “intervention” or 
against “self-determination.”  
On that occasion, as a sign of weak cross-boundary coordination and military 
“laissez-faire,”33 the preliminary contacts were carried out directly by the Commander in 
Chief of the Army.34 Once a principle of agreement was reached, the final draft was 
negotiated by representatives of the Army and the Foreign Affairs Ministry.35 
Accordingly, since 1982, Uruguay has uninterruptedly integrated the MFO with an Army 
Special Group composed of a transportation platoon and an Army engineer’s platoon.36  
In light of the preceding analysis, we can say that during the Cold War three 
independent variables, foreign policy principles, the inhibition to project power and the 
preservation of territorial sovereignty, caused the almost nonexistent participation of 
Uruguayan troops on the international level. Instead, the military was consigned to 
national defense as its primary role, with the sole exception of its participation in MFO.  
                                                 
32 Ejército Nacional, Ejército Nacional  - Misiones de Paz – 1935-2002, (Montevideo: Comando 
General del Ejército, 2002), 75, 
http://www.ejercito.mil.uy/dimope/es_ES/libro1/MISIONES%20DE%PAZ.pdf. 
33 In fact, at that time, Uruguay was ruled by a military dictatorship. 
34 Ejército Nacional, 75. It must be clarified that in Uruguay, each of the armed services’ head is 
appointed as “Commander in Chief.” This position is equivalent to what in other countries such as 
Argentina or the U.S. is known as “Chief of Staff.” In Uruguay, the Constitution provides that the President 
of the Republic exerts the overall command (note that text does not say he is the “commander in chief”) of 
the Armed Forces acting along with the Minister of Defense or Council of Ministers. Thus, each of the 
services’ commander in chief is under the president and the minister’s authority. It would have been 
misleading in this paper to call the Uruguayan Army, Navy or Air Force Commander in Chief as “Chief of 
Staff,” because in the Uruguayan military, each service has its own staff, an advisory organization under 
the commander in chief’s command, headed by a flag officer called “Chief of Staff.” 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 80. 
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C. THE WESTERN OPTION AND THE HEMISPHERIC ALLIANCE AT 
THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
Uruguay’s alignment with the “western option” and the inevitable influence of the 
U.S. throughout the region caused Uruguay to become part of the “hemispheric alliance.” 
The 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) created the 
framework within which the armed forces of all Americas committed to the collective 
defense of any country of the Americas, insofar as a non-American country carried out an 
armed attack against any of the American countries.37 As we know, during the Cold War, 
the enemy of the U.S. was the USSR. Consequently, in addition to considering defense of 
the homeland, the influence of the continental hegemon caused South American states to 
develop their military strategies and resources in accordance with U.S. interests.  
 Geopolitically, the region was characterized as “shatterbelt,” an expression used 
to describe a place where outside rivalries (U.S. vs. USSR) tie into local contentions.38 In 
that sense, with the assistance of the U.S., the South American military incorporated U.S. 
materiel. Often, this material did not meet the countries’ real needs for homeland defense. 
Because South American countries fell under the protective “umbrella” of the U.S., their 
armed forces learned how to be part of a huge U.S. containment mechanism against 
Soviet expansion. Instead of developing continental collective defense tactics, the various 
South American countries participated in a continuum of military exercises (principally 
among navies),39 by which everyone developed professional skills related to an eventual 
support of U.S. forces committed abroad against the USSR and its allies. 
                                                 
37 “Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty),” 1947, Organization of American 
States, Art. 3, http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../documents/eng/documents.asp. 
38 Kelly, vii. 
39 The U.S. Navy-led UNITAS Operation is the biggest regional military exercise. Since its creation in 
1959, a U.S. Navy task force has joined Latin American navies every year. With almost no interruption 
(sometimes exercises were cancelled due to budget constraints or political issues) UNITAS Operation has 
been executed in phases, one phase for each host country. During the Cold War, exercises mostly consisted 
in convoy-escort maneuvers, anti-submarine, anti-air warfare, and amphibious operations. As can be seen, 
exercises followed a WWII-style, where those naval operations were necessary to support the war effort 
overseas. 
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This trend also accounted for many sub-regional multinational military operations 
during the seventies and eighties (again, principally among navies).40 Regional 
interoperability began improving. In addition, regional exercises and domestic garrison 
training were similar to the training led by the U.S. The training and exercises also 
incorporated U.S. “allied publications.” Therefore, South American armed forces, mostly 
the navies, trained in fighting what I would call “small scale great power wars.” Yet the 
likelihood of Uruguay fighting a war overseas was extremely low.  
Despite increasing regional interoperability, there was no specific policy in 
Uruguay designed to cope with the dichotomy of “national defense/hemispheric alliance 
requirements.” In those times, following U.S. military doctrine was common. At the 
regional level, that meant the priority was the efficiency of the hemispheric alliance. 
However, U.S.-made military equipment and doctrine was not always consistent with 
Uruguayan national defense requirements. For example, the Uruguayan Navy began 
taking more seriously their responsibility for the surveillance of territorial waters. For this 
task, neither former U.S. World War II ships nor “convoy protection” tactics were the 
best tools.  Another issue was to question whether or not the Navy was capable of 
contributing to homeland defense. At that time, Uruguayan Navy ships and tactics were 
more suitable for “blue waters” operations (oceanic) than to “green/brown waters” 
operations (riverine and coastal) This is important because riverine and coastal operations 
are required for successful homeland defense. Likewise, the Army began questioning 
whether or not its conventional warfare tactics were adequate for defending the territory. 
In those times, the possibility of an invasion from neighboring Brazil was the main 
external threat.41 Any retrograde operation seemed futile because the Uruguayan land 
lacks important natural obstacles. In the absence of any true guidance from the 
                                                 
40 For example, the Navies of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay scheduled bilateral and trilateral 
exercises every year, known as “Cimarrόn,” with Argentina and “Fraterno,” with Brazil during the 
seventies and “Amigo” with Brazil during the eighties. 
41 In July 1971, a Brazilian plan to invade Uruguay was revealed by the Uruguayan media. Its code 
name was “Operación 30 Horas” (Operation 30 Hours), because that was the time the Brazilian military 
calculated it would take to control the Uruguayan territory. The plan was designed in the event the new 
leftist political party called Frente Amplio (Broad Front) won the 1971 Uruguayan elections. That operation 
was planned in the context of the increasing fighting against leftist violent groups in the region. But, it 
demonstrates how vulnerable Uruguay was in that geopolitical environment, 
http://uruguay.indymedia.org/mail.php?id=15257. 
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government, military officers became de facto “policymakers.” Devoted practitioners of 
geopolitics, a permanent analysis of the regional map allowed them to predict sources of 
conflict or cooperation.42 Because of the influence of geopolitics and the duty to serve the 
country, the military came to see the survival of the state as its “raison d’etre.”43  
The commitment to the survival of the state and to the hemispheric alliance 
caused the military in Uruguay and other South American countries to fight against the 
violent leftist movements which arose in the late sixties, following the successful Cuban 
revolution. Those movements were seen as threats; on the one hand, to the survival of the 
state, at least regarding the so called “Uruguayan way of life;” and on the other hand, to 
the ideological homogeneity of the hemispheric alliance. Then, the emergence of U.S.-
USSR proxy wars on the continent led to the National Security Doctrine, which was 
sponsored by the U.S. and used by the Latin American military. This was the beginning 
of the involvement of Uruguayan Armed Forces in internal security issues.  
Therefore, two independent variables, geopolitical ideas and commitment to the 
hemispheric alliance, caused the military in South America and within it, Uruguay, to be 
used in the fight against violent leftist movements and to train in overseas conventional 
warfare. In some cases, this occurred under the provisions of democratic governments, as 
happened in Uruguay. In other cases, military dictatorships were already ruling the 
country, as in the case of Paraguay. In any case, by fighting those leftist movements, I 
argue that governments used the armed forces to demonstrate their commitment to the 
ideology of the western bloc, represented in the region by the hemispheric alliance. 
Finally, in defense of the UNITAS and the sub-regional operations, it must be 
said that once the Cold War became even “colder,”44 South American navies “upgraded” 
their traditional exercises to fulfill each country’s training requirements. In the late stages 
                                                 
42 Kelly, 16. 
43 Ibid., 17, 21. 
44 For Latin American countries, the expression “Cold War,” meaning that conflicts will not be solved 
by the employment of nuclear weapons, also known as “hot weapons,” sounded as a euphemism; because 
for them, the Cold War implied high levels of “heat,” fighting against leftist armed groups. This opinion -
given by former Uruguayan president Julio Maria Sanguinetti during his second term in the late 1990s- 
reveals how the “heat” of the war was channeled to peripheral regions of the world, far from the great 
powers’ interests. 
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of the Cold War, South American countries began thinking about domestic and regional 
security issues, which made possible a transformation from the U.S.-led UNITAS to the 
concept of a host country-led UNITAS. 
D. THE 1973 COUP, THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE 
MILITARY LAISSEZ-FAIRE ON THE DOMESTIC/BUREAUCRATIC 
LEVEL 
In Uruguay, the defeat of the armed group called Tupamaros (the leftist armed 
movement which threatened the continuity of the constitutional government) at hands of 
the military caused a deep cleavage in the political parties. Historical political parties 
were committed to preserving the “Uruguayan way of life.” Doing so was consistent with 
western bloc standards, which in the region, was tantamount to taking sides with the U.S. 
Uruguayan leftist parties and other groups, which later formed a coalition called Frente 
Amplio (Broad Front), challenged that trend by taking sides with the USSR. Although the 
Frente Amplio did not take an “official” position of alignment with the USSR, one of its 
most powerful groups was the Communist Party, which was closely linked with the 
Communist Party of the USSR. In addition, in its foundation declaration, the Frente 
Amplio stated that its goal was to fully participate in national politics on a daily basis, and 
to be actively involved in the electoral process (by taking part in future elections) in order 
to take the nation out of the hands of the “oligarchy” and “foreign capitalist influences.”45 
The cleavage between the historical political parties and the Frente Amplio facilitated the 
polarization of Uruguayan society and brought discredit to the politicians. The process 
ended with the rise of a military dictatorship that lasted eleven years (1973 to 1984).  
For the military, devoted to the state’s survival, two things undermined the 
progress and economic growth of the country during those times: the threat of violent 
leftist movements and the endless parliamentary debates of the democratic system. 
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Tupamaros’ defeat and shortly before the coup, the 
president considered allowing the military to participate in the government based on two 
arguments. First, the military was responsible for the victory against the Tupamaros and 
the government could have done nothing without their help, therefore, the real power 
                                                 
45 “Declaraciόn Constitutiva del Frente Amplio,” February 5, 1971, Qué Hacer, 
http://www.quehacer.com.uy/Uruguay/frente_amplio/declaracion_constitutiva.htm. 
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resided with the military. Second, the military pressured the Executive branch of the 
government to make concessions allowing them participate in the government concerning 
national security issues; hence, if development relied on security provided by the armed 
forces, the armed forces actually constituted a “power.”46 The bottom line of this pseudo-
syllogism is that the president considered the military to be the owner of the “real” power 
in governance. Nothing could be done without the support of the military.  As a result, 
the military became increasingly involved in domestic development affairs. A famous 
motto of those times was that “the armed forces provided the security required for the 
country to achieve progress and economic growth.”  
When democracy was peacefully recovered in 1985, the military in Uruguay went 
back to the barracks. There were no immediate threats to face within Uruguay’s borders 
and the most important frontier issues with neighbors had been solved many years ago. 
Almost by inertia, the armed forces kept their links with the U.S. military. The 
Uruguayan Navy continued to participate in the hemispheric UNITAS operation. 
However, it became harder to get parliamentary authorization to operate with the U.S., 
because leftist parties reappeared in the domestic political arena.47 Not only was the U.S. 
seen as a former supporter of the dictatorship, but it was also criticized for its 
                                                 
46 Miguel Angel Campόdonico, Antes del Silencio, Bordaberry, Memorias de un Presidente Uruguayo 
(Montevideo: Linardy y Risso, 2003), 119-120, 202. 
47 Poder Legislativo de la República Oriental del Uruguay, “Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de 
Senadores de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Operación UNITAS XXVI: De acuerdo con lo aconsejado 
por la comisión de Defensa Nacional, se resuelve el archivo del proyecto,” Segundo Período Ordinario de 
la XLII Legislatura, 61ª Sesiόn Ordinaria, 17 de Setiembre de 1985, 162. 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/SESIONES/PDFS/SENADO/19850917s0061.pdf. In fact, in 1985, the 
Senate decided to shelve all discussion on the UNITAS, following the recommendation of the Defense 
Committee of the Senate. In this case, the majority of the historical parties’ senators agreed with the 
recommendation. Hence, the 1985 UNITAS was not executed. Among other reasons, leftist members of the 
parliament argued that Uruguay’s land would not be used as training field for the U.S. invasion to 
Nicaragua, which at that time, was ruled by the Sandinistas.  
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interventions in Central America. Consequently, the left systematically opposed any 
military participation in U.S.-led combined military exercises.48 
Although Huntington’s third wave of democracy49 had landed in Uruguay, the 
military continued to be involved in domestic issues. Based upon Huntington’s typology, 
I argue that their continued involvement occurred because the Uruguayan restoration of 
democracy was a “transplacement” case, whereby democratization occurred as a result of 
joint action taken by government and opposition groups.50  Due to the lack of well 
defined political terms concerning defense policy, the armed forces found themselves 
trying to reformulate their commitments. They slowly started to create a national defense 
doctrine with no political orientation, so each service acted independently. Lack of 
jointness was common. In the end, it seemed that the new democratic government 
permitted the military “laissez-faire” as a way to avoid embarrassing civil-military 
relations at the onset of the third wave of democracy.  
However, in order to demonstrate control over the armed forces, the government 
merely reformed the basic articles of the existent military legislation. In doing so, the 
democratic government emphasized the “classic” homeland defense role of the armed 
                                                 
48 Poder Legislativo de la República Oriental del Uruguay, “Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de 
Senadores de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Operación UNITAS XXVII: Autorización para hacer 
escala en Montevideo a tres Unidades de la Armada de Estados Unidos de América. En consideración,” 
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49 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
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“waves of democracy.” The first began in 1828, when the right to vote was extended to a large mass of the 
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50 Ibid., 114. According to Huntington, transplacement transitions occur from joint action by 
government and opposition groups. In fact, the Naval Club Pact was the agreement achieved in 1984 
between the military and political parties by which a peaceful transfer of power from “de facto” authorities 
to democratically elected ones was possible in 1985.  
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forces and their commitment to the defense of the Constitution and the rule of law.51 In 
regard to the traditional relationships the Uruguayan military had with its regional 
counterparts, the government tried to respect the compromises with the almost dying 
hemispheric alliance. In this sense, while the left systematically opposed the UNITAS 
operations, the historical political parties gave their support. Finally, the country’s 
commitment to the MFO was not interrupted, insofar as this mission was seen as 
beneficial for projecting a new democratic image of Uruguay in the international arena. 
At the beginning of the third wave of democracy, the MFO mission, although small in 
size and not very “publicized,” was almost the only issue whereby politicians from all 
extractions felt pride in the military. 
Therefore, three independent variables, the defeat of the violent movements, the 
period of dictatorship and a peaceful restoration of democracy, caused the Uruguayan 
Armed Forces to adopt the role of guarantors of the country’s survival, protagonists of 
the country’s progress and economic growth and supporters of the state foreign policy, 
respectively. In the last case, this was done by ensuring Uruguayan participation in 
combined regional or hemispheric military exercises and maintaining the troops deployed 
with the MFO. 
E. SUMMARY 
The Cold War forced the Uruguayan Armed Forces to adopt different roles 
according to the level of commitment needed to address international, regional and 
domestic concerns. At the international level, foreign policy principles such as non-
intervention and self-determination, the inhibition to project power and consolidation of 
the state’s sovereignty, caused the military to be isolated from overseas conflicts.  
On the regional level, geopolitics and commitments to the western world caused 
the military to operate under the dichotomy of national defense/hemispheric alliance 
requirements. The rise of violent leftist movements seemed to solve this dilemma. The 
armed forces felt they were guarantors of the state’s survival and protectors of the 
                                                 
51 Poder Legislativo de la República Oriental del Uruguay, “Ley 15808,” Art. 2. 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/Leyes/Ley15808.htm. This article stated the armed forces’ commitment to 
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succinctly stated as to provide external and internal security. 
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“Uruguayan way of life” (national defense). At the same time, they opposed the 
“intromission” of “alien” ideologies in the region (hemispheric alliance). Regional 
exercises on conventional warfare developed, which increased interoperability. 
At the domestic/bureaucratic level, two periods should be noted. In dictatorship 
times (1973-1985), the armed forces became fully involved in domestic affairs, having 
designed the country’s progress and economic growth agenda. After the restoration of 
democracy (1985), the military did not disappear from the internal scene. Lack of 
governmental guidance caused the military laissez-faire on national defense policy. 
Former hemispheric commitments remained alive (with leftist opposition). Operations on 
behalf of “peace,” such as the MFO, did not elicit controversy because they were 
consistent with Uruguayan foreign policy principles and with the new image the country 
was trying to project in the international arena. 
The following section deals with post-Cold War times. We will see how the 
“peaceful” use of the armed forces overseas became a matter of consensus among all 
political parties. 
F. POST COLD WAR TIMES AND URUGUAY’S PARTICIPATION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 
Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is 
the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston 
Churchill, a ‘world order’ in which ‘the principles of justice and fair play 
... protect the weak against the strong ...’ A world where the United 
Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic 
vision of its founders.”                                                                                       
George Herbert Walker Bush (U.S. President, 1989-1993), March 6, 
1991.52  
The rise of the “New World Order” in the aftermath of the Cold War was the 
main event that caused the South American region and within it, Uruguay, to demonstrate 
its commitment with the democratic changes taking place in the world, unfettered by the 
constraints of the Cold War. World Bipolarity was substituted for liberal ideals such as 
democratic peace, economic interdependence and the importance of international 
                                                 
52 George Herbert Walker Bush. “New World Order, President Bush’s Speech to the Congress,” Arab 
Gateway, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm. 
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institutions.53 For Uruguay, which had become accustomed to following the “western” 
agenda, those ideals represented the country’s coherence with its traditional domestic and 
foreign policy. Uruguay had already restored democracy and had embraced the liberal 
economic option before the end of the Cold War. Besides, Uruguay had long been an 
unconditional supporter of the UN.  
In those times, Uruguayan democracy had already surmounted many difficult 
obstacles faced by the country. A law of amnesty had been passed to free political 
prisoners and ordinary convicts from jail (1985). Furthermore, a referendum (1989) had 
ratified a formerly approved law (1986), in which the state declined its right to prosecute 
the military and police for violations of human rights during the dictatorship. Some years 
later, while the “New World Order” was establishing roots in the international 
community, Uruguay was being ruled by its second elected government since the 
restoration of democracy (1990-1994). 
The rise of the New World Order made it possible for the UN to fully enjoy its 
peacekeeping role. The context was clearly “painted” by U.S. President George Herbert 
Walker Bush  
This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made great progress 
in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We have before us the 
opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world 
order -- a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs 
the conduct of nations. When we are successful -- and we will be -- we 
have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible 
United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and 
vision of the U.N.'s founders. 54 
The Uruguayan government saw the New World Order as a window of 
opportunity to improve the image of the country in the international arena. The military 
became the government’s major partner through its participation in peacekeeping 
missions. Despite the discredit the armed forces had suffered because of the dictatorship, 
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54 George Herbert Walker Bush, “Address to the nation on the Invasion of Iraq (January 16, 1991),” 
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especially from the left, they were supported in their role as peacekeepers. In this 
regard, what caused the right and the left in Uruguay to achieve consensus 
concerning the Uruguayan Armed Forces’ commitment to peacekeeping operations? 
The following discussion will show consistency between the awakening liberal ideas and 
the foreign policy principles of Uruguay; thus, illustrating why peacekeeping operations 
were used as a tool to project the country’s image in the international arena. Then, the 
analysis demonstrates that peacekeeping became a point of common interest amongst the 
countries in the region. Regional exercises between the military were the result of that 
shared interest. Finally, the study will show how Uruguayan politicians from all 
extractions agreed to support the UN’s role as guarantor of peace and international 
security; thus, explaining why the Uruguayan military became increasingly involved in 
peacekeeping operations. 
G. THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND PEACEKEEPING AS A TOOL FOR 
INSERTING THE COUNTRY ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
One of the consequences of the New World Order was the occurrence of internal 
conflicts and state collapse in many third world and former Soviet-bloc countries. When 
the number of UN peacekeeping operations rose after the Cold War, Uruguay saw the 
increasing requirement for troops as an opportunity to “show” the international arena the 
consistency between the discourse and practice of Uruguayan foreign policy 
At that time, the Army already had some experience in peacekeeping due to its 
participation in observers’ missions, but especially because of its commitment to the 
MFO. Although there was no specific policy for dealing with peacekeeping operations, 
the underlying idea was to “insert” the country into the New World Order, the same way 
the country had been “inserted” into the “western side” of the bipolar world in the past. 
But under the new circumstances, there was just one side: the side of promotion of 
democracy and international rule of law under the sponsorship of international 
institutions, of which the UN was the major exponent. This New World Order also meant 
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that the UN, without constraints other than its foundation charter, would be in a position 
to preserve peace and international security all over the world.55 
Based on its traditional foreign policy principles, Uruguay has always been 
concerned about the neutrality of its troops and the eventuality of using force while 
embarked in peacekeeping operations. UN Chapter VI missions seemed to fit the 
Uruguayan foreign policy principles of preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of 
controversies among states. This was because Chapter VI operations, which Alex 
Bellamy, et al., call “traditional peacekeeping,” enjoy “the ‘holy trinity’ of consent, 
impartiality and minimum use of force.”56 However, nobody in Uruguay foresaw that a 
problem would arise. Conflicts began to take place among factions within the same 
country. This trend accounted for what Bellamy, et al., call a “post-Westphalian 
conception of peacekeeping.”57 This concept implies that besides maintaining order 
between states, peacekeeping has to ensure peace and security within states. Therefore, 
insofar as a Uruguayan force was involved in another country’s peace process, the 
traditional foreign policy principle of non-intervention in another state’s domestic affairs 
would be systematically “violated.” This post-Westphalian issue was surmounted by 
obtaining expressed consent from the country under a peace process. In doing so, the 
observance of the principle of non-intervention was guaranteed.58 Under these 
circumstances, these “new types” of Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, although they 
took place within a state, fit the Uruguayan foreign policy principles.59  
Accordingly, Uruguay committed troops in three important missions: Cambodia 
(1991-1993), Mozambique (1992-1994) and Angola (1995-1999). Those were UN 
“managing transition” missions established under Chapter VI. Following Bellamy, et al.’s 
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argument, “traditional peacekeeping” had evolved into “managing transition” operations. 
These operations aimed to “manage and oversee a process of transition from violence to 
stable peace within states,”60 as happened in Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola. In all, 
6488 Uruguayan troops served in those missions.61  
Mozambique is considered a successful case, where democracy was installed after 
elections. Since the installation of democracy, the country has been peacefully ruled by 
democratic regimes. The role of the UN, as an international institution, made possible the 
instauration of democracy as a means of ensuring lasting peace.  
The Cambodia case is different. The UN went there to practically rebuild the 
entire institutional infrastructure and bureaucracy of the country. Uruguayan troops 
(Army and Navy) demonstrated high professionalism in supporting UN tasks. The Navy 
took over as the Phnom Penh port authority and created the Cambodian Navy from 
scratch.62 The Army relieved the French troops in areas where the local population 
resisted Europeans because of their imperial past. The Uruguayan troops gained the trust 
of the locals and in so doing, more successfully carried out their duties in fulfilling the 
UN mandate than the French.63 Although it is also considered an example of a successful 
transition from UN participation to an indigenous democratic regime, further instability 
has undermined the consolidation of democracy.  
Angola presents a distinct case. When the UN mission ended after supervising 
elections in 1992, democracy lasted a very short time due to the reoccurrence of 
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(Club Naval del Uruguay, September 2005), 8-9. 
63 Antonio Palá, “Peacekeeping and its Effects on Civil-Military Relations, The Argentine 
Experience,” in International Security and Democracy, Latin America and The Caribbean in the Post-Cold 
War Era, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 149.  
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rebellions and civil unrest. After a ten-year struggle, the president elected in 1992, who 
had remained in power all those years, promised to hold elections in 2006. 
In the following years, UN peacekeeping operations set up under Chapter VI 
would evolve into Chapter VII due to the activities of armed resistance groups working 
against the peace processes. This trend rendered Chapter VI operations inadequate for 
accomplishing the given UN mandate. Under these circumstances, the UN Security 
Council changed the original Chapter VI approach for Chapter VII mandates. These 
operations became known as “Chapter Six and a Half” operations because they had 
characteristics of both Chapter VI and Chapter VII. On the one hand, the mission must 
have the parties’ consent and peacekeepers must demonstrate impartiality (Chapter VI). 
On the other hand, the mission has to accomplish an array of transitional roles, such as 
disarmament, providing security to key personnel and supporting elections. Because 
peacekeepers are deployed in an “environment that may be volatile” with no available 
buffer zone, they are authorized a minimum use of force besides self-defense to fulfill the 
mandate (Chapter VII). Bellamy, et al., consider this type of operation to be “wider 
peacekeeping,” but the authors are cautious in not considering them to be full Chapter 
VII operations.64 To cope with the increasingly “volatile environments” the Brahimi 
                                                 
64 Bellamy, et al., 128-133. In my opinion, this is the DRC case. Also “UN Security Council 
Resolution 1291,” 2000, United Nations, 8, http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.The UN Security 
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considered a “six and a half” peacekeeping mission, in Bellamy et al.’s words, a wider peacekeeping 
operation. Also, “UN Security Council Resolution 1484,” 2003, United Nations, 4, 
http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm. In order to prevent further events like the massacre of 2002, the 
UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowed the implementation of an 
Interim Emergency Multinational Force in the Eastern Congo city of Bunia which was authorized to use 
“all necessary means” to fulfill its mandate (emphasis added). Also, “UN Security Council Resolution 
1493,” 2003, United Nations, 3, http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm. The UN Security Council made 
another change in MONUC’s mandate through Resolution 1493, 2003. In doing so the resolution 
authorized MONUC “…to use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate…” (emphasis added) in north-
eastern and eastern provinces.  
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Report outlined the concept of “robust peacekeeping,”65 whereby it is recommended that 
peacekeeping forces be “robust” in order to deter spoilers or in the event that it is 
necessary to use force to fulfill the UN mandate. In these cases, UN missions would be 
established under Chapter VII, ordinarily known as peace enforcement. 
For the Uruguayan government, the problem with Chapter VII mandates was that 
its troops could be seen as non-neutral or non-impartial.66 Furthermore, using force might 
be seen as a violation of the Uruguayan foreign policy principle of non-intervention, 
which had also been one major component of the leftist discourse.67 Thus, it seems that 
the Uruguayan authorities were caught by the restrictions imposed by the country’s 
foreign policy, compounded by an increasingly leftist political opposition. The 
international aphorism “Chapter six and a half” operations was the leitmotif which 
allowed Uruguayan troops to be deployed in zones where the UN mandate, although set 
up under Chapter VII, had characteristics of Chapter VI. In this regard, the parties’ 
consent, impartiality and minimum use of force made it possible for Uruguay to achieve 
consensus among all political parties when making the decision to deploy Army, Navy 
and Air Force troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).68  
                                                 
65 “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” Brahimi Report, (A/55/05-S/2000/809), 
United Nations, 21 August 2000, 1, 9, 
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treat like breaches in similar ways.” Also Diehl, 64. When the author says that neutrality is one 
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67 “Defensa Nacional y Fuerzas Armadas en la República Oriental del Uruguay,” (Montevideo, 
Comisión Permanente de Defensa del Frente Amplio, Ámbito de Trabajo, 2004, e-mail communiqué on 
July 11, 2005), Parte II, Art. 13.  
68 Poder Legislativo de la República Oriental del Uruguay, “Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de 
Senadores de la República Oriental del Uruguay, Proyecto de Ley por el que se autoriza la salida de 
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Ordinario de la XLV Legislatura, 1ª Sesiόn Ordinaria, 6 de Marzo de 2001, 18-21, 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/sesiones/pdfs/senado/20010306s0001.pdf. Also see footnote 59. 
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Therefore, two independent variables, the spread of democratic peace ideals and 
the revived role of international institutions in preserving peace and international 
security, enabled the new Uruguayan liberal democracy to reach a consensus on 
deploying the military to peacekeeping operations. Doing so allowed the country to 
participate in the world agenda. 
H. NEOLIBERALISM AND THE PEACEKEEPING SUPPLIER ROLE ON 
THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
After the Cold War, many South American countries embraced two remarkable 
policies in order to demonstrate their willingness to participate in the world agenda: the 
neoliberal economic model and the commitment of military forces in peacekeeping 
operations. The former policy failed in the entire region and would pave the way for the 
rise of leftist regimes.69 The latter caused the South American region to be considered a 
traditional “supplier” of peacekeeping forces.70 This peacekeeper “role” led to the 
development of regional peacekeeping exercises, which, in turn, led to an incipient 
regional interoperability concerning international peacekeeping operations.71 In this case, 
although the traditional U.S.-led maneuvers continued to be executed, military training 
evolved towards multinational peacekeeping exercises between regional partners under 
UN standards. 
In 1995, the armies of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (along with the U.S.) 
participated in a combined peacekeeping planning exercise. In 1996, different services of 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (again, along with the U.S.) joined efforts and carried out 
another peacekeeping planning exercise.72 However, a highlight occurred the same year, 
when the armies of Argentina and Brazil undertook a joint exercise called Operaciόn 
Cruz del Sur (Operation Southern Cross). Military observers from Chile, Paraguay and 
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Uruguay were invited.73 This exercise consisted of planning and executing a UN 
peacekeeping operation involving around 1300 troops. The Chilean observer pointed out 
that the exercise had been “one of the most important events he had ever witnessed in the 
field of regional security.”74 
In the 1997 version of Operaciόn Cruz del Sur held in Brazil, Uruguayan troops 
joined the exercise. Further, in 1998, the Argentine Army hosted a combined Uruguayan-
Argentine peacekeeping exercise. This constituted an important landmark, at least for 
Uruguay, because the exercise was based on a UN Chapter VI situation, which then 
evolved into a sort of Chapter VII operation.75 In addition, the South Atlantic phase of 
the traditional U.S.-led UNITAS operation (among navies) was planned and executed. 
This exercise dealt with providing support to a peacekeeping operation from the sea.76 
Although these exercises were repeated, new ones were incorporated into the military 
regional agenda. The interesting point was that in 2000, Operaciόn Cruz del Sur was 
joined for the first time by all MERCOSUR state-members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay), and also Chile.77 Since then, many of the combined military exercises 
which have taken place in the region have been related to peacekeeping, natural disaster 
assistance and humanitarian relief.78  
Therefore, two independent variables, the “peacekeeper role” and the regional 
integration through economic blocs, caused the development of multinational 
peacekeeping exercises, which in turn, improved regional interoperability.  
I. SUPPORT TO THE UN AND A NEW IMAGE FOR THE ARMY ON THE 
DOMESTIC/BUREAUCRATIC LEVEL 
Although bipolarity ended after the Cold War, the left in Uruguay felt that it 
should form its own profile against the hegemony of the U.S., the only remaining                                                  
73 “Durante 2004 Se Incrementaron...,” 3-7.  
74 Carlos Escudé and Andrés Fontana, “Argentina’s Security Policies, their Rationale and Regional 
Context” in International Security and Democracy, Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War 
Era, ed. Jorge I. Domínguez. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 60-61, 69. 
75 Ejército Argentino, “Operaciόn Ceibo ’98 Ganar la Paz,” Guía de los Uniformados, No. 14, 1998. 
http://www.uniformados.com.ar/Ejercito14.html.  
76 “Durante 2004 Se Incrementaron…,” 4. 
77 Ibid., 5. Chile is separately treated because it was not a MERCOSUR full member. 
78 Ibid., 5-7. 
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superpower. In this sense, the left rejected the emergent U.S. role as “world police.” In 
regard to defense and security issues, not only did the left systematically oppose the 
participation of Uruguayan forces in U.S.-led combined military exercises, but it also 
voiced its disagreement with the U.S.-led meetings of Ministers of Defense of the 
Americas.79  
Meanwhile, the historical political parties80 used the moment as a window of 
opportunity to project the country’s traditional foreign policy of preventive diplomacy 
and peaceful resolution of controversies. Besides, Uruguay had already experienced its 
“third wave” of democracy, which caused it to embrace the democratic peace principles. 
Accordingly, the country adhered to the so-called “democratic clause,” whereby 
MERCOSUR members promised a commitment to democracy.81 Belief in these 
democratic peace ideals, emphasized in support of the restored liberal democracy, and 
adherence to the Uruguayan traditional foreign policy principles caused the government 
to support the role of the UN as guarantor of peace and international security. In this case, 
because the government, and especially the leftist opposition, considered participation in 
peacekeeping a backup for the UN, the left supported the deployment of troops 
committed to peacekeeping missions. 
In response to the increasing participation of Uruguayan troops in peacekeeping 
operations, the Uruguayan Army created an agency to manage the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces. This agency, called SINOMAPA82 (Peacekeeping Operations 
National Support System), has operated under the Minister of Defense and supervised the 
deployment of troops of the three services (Army, Navy and Air Force).83 Then, the 
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Army created its own assessment unit called CECOMAPA,84 developed its own doctrine 
on peacekeeping operations following UN standards and created a training center to 
support the readiness of peacekeeping troops and observers.85 These developments 
indicated the increasing importance the Army had placed on peacekeeping as its primary 
role.  
In the past, peacekeeping was considered a subsidiary mission, although Uruguay 
had had a long standing tradition of supporting peacekeeping operations. But, except for 
the participation in MFO, it was military observers who carried out this type of mission. 
By contrast, during the boom of peacekeeping, the Uruguayan Army had one fifth of its 
personnel constantly committed to those operations.86 For example, at the same time the 
country was running the UN operation in Cambodia, which involved Army and Navy 
forces,87 it began running the operation in Mozambique. Immediately after Mozambique, 
it deployed troops to Angola.88 For a small country with a small army, which was not yet 
used to deploying military forces overseas, this represented much more than a secondary 
mission. For the different governments, peacekeeping operations had increasingly 
become a tool for projecting the state foreign policy in order to improve the image of the 
country in the international arena. For the military, especially for the Army, peacekeeping 
also became a way to change the “repression paradigm,” internalized by many sectors of 
Uruguayan society. 
Therefore, two independent variables, political support for the UN role as 
guarantor of peace and international security (as opposed to a U.S. world police role) and 
the Army’s need to find a “credible” and “respectful” mission after the Cold War, caused 
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Uruguay to increase its commitment to peacekeeping operations. As a result, the Armed 
Forces became an important part of the state foreign policy. 
J. SUMMARY 
After the Cold War, political consensus was achieved in Uruguay on the issue of 
deploying troops in peacekeeping missions. The New World Order paradigm, 
characterized by liberal ideas such as democratic peace, economic interdependence and 
international institutions, was in tune with Uruguayan foreign policy principles. At the 
international level, this New World Order was taken as an opportunity to use the military 
as a tool to project the country’s image in the international arena, and in doing so, to 
participate in the world agenda.  
On the regional level, similar political processes resulting from the consolidation 
of the third wave of democracy caused the regional countries to participate in 
peacekeeping operations. This convergence allowed the development of regional 
peacekeeping exercises among the countries, which in turn, improved military 
interoperability in peacekeeping operations. 
At the domestic/bureaucratic level, political consensus on supporting the UN role 
as guarantor of peace and international security, increasing rejection of U.S. hegemony as 
world police and the reinvention of the Army’s mission in the aftermath of the Cold War 
caused Uruguayan governments in general and political parties in particular to agree on 
sending troops to peacekeeping operations. As a result, the military became the 
government’s partner in projecting the country’s image in the international arena. 
The following section deals with post-September 11, 2001, times. We will see 
how the existent consensus on committing troops to peacekeeping evolved into 
disagreements between historical parties and the left, to the extent that Uruguay’s role as 
“peacekeeping supplier” has come under discussion. 
42 
K. POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, TIMES AND URUGUAY’S DEBATE ON 
FOREIGN AND NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY 
 
…On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war 
against our country…All of this was brought upon us in a single day -- and 
night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under 
attack… 
…Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped 
and defeated…  
George W. Bush (U.S. President 2001-present), September 20, 2001.89 
The war on terror launched by the U.S. after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, without the consent of the UN Security Council, represented a backslide in the 
liberal discourse which had dominated the scene after the Cold War. However, former 
U.S. President George Herbert Walker Bush had left an open door for those who 
advocated for the power of realism. In his speech to the Congress at the end of the First 
Gulf War, after having developed the paradigm of the New World Order, he finally said, 
“Even the New World Order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring 
peace must be our mission.”90 
For the U.S., the New World Order proved to be short-lived. In 2003, when the 
U.S. demanded approval for the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s regime, the UN’s 
strength (particularly the Security Council) seemed to have declined. During the bipolar 
times of the Cold War, the Security Council was often characterized by a deadlock 
brought about by Council members’ veto power. This traditional deadlock evolved into a 
short period of “efficiency” during the New World Order. After September 11, 2001, the 
UN Security Council seems to have evolved into an inability to enforce UN guidelines.   
First, the Council was not able to compel Saddam Hussein to comply with UN 
inspections requirements. Then, when the UN inspectors were finally deployed to Iraq, 
they were not always allowed full access to military installations. Under these 
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circumstances, the UN Security Council did not achieve consensus on how to cope with 
Hussein’s regime. While the U.S. was demanding permission to use force, other members 
argued for allocating more time to UN inspectors to determine whether or not Hussein 
was hiding weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the U.S. developed its almost 
unilateral approach to dealing with the Iraqi issue. When the U.S., the world’s sole 
superpower, by-passed the Council’s role as guarantor of peace and international 
security, the New World Order ended. The end of the New World Order rendered 
obsolete one of the major statements former U.S. President George Herbert Walker Bush 
had made ten years before 
We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future 
generations a new world order -- a world where the rule of law, not the 
law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.91 
In the meantime, traditional peacekeeping continued to decline. The UN’s 
approach was more prone to Chapter VII missions than before. On that account, 
Uruguay’s commitment to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations (Cambodia, Mozambique 
and Angola) evolved into “Chapter Six and Half” (DRC and Haiti - although they were 
set up under Chapter VII). In Uruguay, this evolution became a matter of debate.92 If the 
rule of law weakened after September 11, 2001, why has Uruguay, whose 
“protecting shield”93 relied on the observance of international law, questioned its 
commitment to peacekeeping, a clear tool in support of international law and order? 
Why did Uruguay lose its traditional consensus on that issue? The War on Terror, which 
has been the main event at the international level since September 11, 2001, allows us to 
see that Uruguay has taken refuge behind its traditional foreign policy principles as a 
means to reject “unilateral” interventions and buttress the role of international 
institutions. We can see that this approach, along with the rise of leftist regimes in South 
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America, caused the Uruguayan government to include security issues in the regional 
agenda. Finally, we will see that it has been difficult for Uruguay to understand the 
evolution peacekeeping has experienced, especially in light of the increasing “de facto” 
interventions. These issues explain why political consensus was not achieved Uruguayan 
participation in recent UN missions. 
L. THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LOSS OF CONSENSUS IN 
URUGUAY ON PEACEKEEPING AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
The Uruguayan government condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Indeed, a Uruguayan citizen died aboard one of the crashed planes.94 In this regard, 
the Cámara de Representantes (House of Representatives) approved a declaration of 
solidarity with the people of the United States and their government.95 On the same day 
(September 11, 2001), the Cámara de Representantes also received two bills passed by 
the Senate related to defense and security issues. One authorized an increment in the 
number of peacekeeping troops deployed in the DRC. The other authorized the Navy to 
take part in the U.S.-led UNITAS naval operation. Both were favorably sanctioned by the 
Senate.96 
Nevertheless, when U.S. President George W. Bush announced the “war on 
terror” and carried out the “reprisal” against Afghanistan, the Uruguayan people 
reinforced their beliefs in the principle of non-intervention. For instance, once the 
operation in Afghanistan began, a survey conducted in Uruguay indicated that 77% of the 
populace thought the U.S. should have chosen a different approach for dealing with the 
problem.97 Only 15% of the people agreed with the use of force. But most important, 
93% of the leftist sympathizers disagreed with the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan. Among 
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them, 73% thought that former U.S. policies in the region were part of the underlying 
causes of the conflict.98 
One month later, another survey indicated that 81% of the Uruguayan people 
thought that the world was no safer than before the campaign in Afghanistan was 
launched.99 Of these people, 87% were residents of the capital city, where a majority of 
60% were leftist sympathizers. In addition, 78% of Uruguayans disagreed with the 
possibility of launching further U.S. military operations in other countries to fight 
terrorism.100 
Furthermore, when the U.S. decided to bypass the UN Security Council and 
intervene in Iraq, the Uruguayan government (at that time ruled by the Partido Colorado, 
which was based on the traditional foreign policy principle of non-intervention) did not 
support the use of force by the U.S. Uruguay might have supported the use of force if the 
intervention had been directed by the UN Security Council. Indeed, Uruguayan military 
observers to the UN mission on the Kuwait-Iraq border, installed after the First Gulf War, 
were withdrawn at the onset of the operation Iraqi Freedom. Hitherto, there had been no 
disagreement between the Uruguayan government and the left. 
So, one independent variable, U.S. interventions by-passing the UN Security 
Council, caused the Uruguayan government to take refuge in its traditional foreign policy 
principles of peaceful resolution of controversies and non-intervention. 
Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping was becoming somewhat “coercive.” The left had 
already voiced its disagreement with the increasing use of force in UN missions. For the 
left in Uruguay, the issue was then to decide whether or not the country should still be 
committed in the DRC in light of the changing UN approach. However, in this case, the 
use of force was restricted to fulfill the UN mandate.101 That meant that UN troops would 
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not carry out attacks or offensive operations to achieve control of geographical areas or 
population. That meant the troops must be able to accomplish the UN mandate. In doing 
so, the troops would contribute to enforcing the prescriptions of the ceasefire or the peace 
agreement signed by all antagonist parties. This “new” UN approach, by which 
peacekeeping troops were increasingly allowed to use force to fulfill the mandate, began 
eroding the political consensus Uruguay had previously enjoyed on peacekeeping. 
The problem with today’s peacekeeping missions is that sometimes armed 
factions undermine the peace process. Using force may be the only means of coping with 
those factions. By not allowing the use of force against those who undermine the peace 
process, violence does not stop and peacekeeping missions become endless. If the UN 
refuses to permit the use of force in upcoming missions, it will not be able to accomplish 
the desired goals of ensuring peace and international security.102 As a result, the UN will 
lose credibility. For example, when bootstrapped by the inability to use force, 
peacekeeping forces witnessed the occurrence of ethnic cleansing, genocide and masses 
of refugees (Rwanda, Srebrenica). As a result, the trend concerning UN peace operations 
seems to be moving towards the acceptance of using force if needed to fulfill the UN 
mandate. Again, the issue is not to impose a peace process by force. It is to support the 
management and consolidation of a peace process among parties that have agreed to 
work towards a peaceful solution. 
After reading the Brahimi Report, it is easy to deduce that Chapter VI 
peacekeeping operations are no longer suitable for today’s post-Westphalian world, 
where conflicts take place within a state among non-state actors.103 Current and future 
UN missions will need some type of enforcement capacity, which is tantamount to saying 
that they would be set up under Chapter VII. The “fall” of traditional peacekeeping 
constituted a landmark that Uruguay should consider when discussing future 
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engagements in UN missions.104 The military’s interest in continuing to participate 
played an important role. However, the political parties’ viewpoint will surely consider 
the impact of public opinion. In this sense, the Army is aware of that impact, as stated in 
the white defense book.105 When the change in the DRC’s mandate opened the debate in 
Uruguay on whether or not to keep troops on the ground, consensus was not achieved. 
However, at the end of the day, a majority of votes from the historical political parties 
allowed Uruguay to remain committed in the DRC.106 Because the debate had already 
been set up in the political realm, a similar situation occurred in regard to the Uruguayan 
participation in the UN mission on Haiti.107 
Hence, two independent variables, the “new UN approach” in regard to 
peacekeeping as expressed in the Brahimi Report and the military’s interests, caused the 
Uruguayan government to remain committed in places where the use of force was 
partially allowed by the UN. 
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Nevertheless, the left views the UN’s increasing the use of force to ensure peace 
as a tool related to third parties’ interests, such as the U.S.108 In addition, the U.S. 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced the left’s rejection of the increasing U.S. 
hegemony at the expense of UN strength. The unilateral trend which began showing in 
the international order after September 11, 2001, was at odds with the leftist political 
discourse in Uruguay. As a result, while the current Uruguayan leftist government, which 
took over in March 2005, might support peacekeeping in the traditional sense, they are 
unlikely to expand participation in Chapter VII operations or to support any deployments 
that might be associated with the consequences of U.S. intervention in the Middle East. 
Besides, in order to raise its own profile, the leftist government expressed its interest in 
deepening the regional integration and in closing links with the European Union (EU) 
and Asia.109 
M. THE RISE OF LEFTIST REGIMES: EXPLORING A PEACEKEEPING 
PARTNERSHIP ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
The rise of democratically elected leftist regimes in South America is a new 
phenomenon that marked the beginning of the twenty-first century in the region. South 
Americans accepted the market reforms of the 1990s as an unavoidable risk needed to 
cope with the poor economic performance of the 1980s. Although the size of the state 
apparatus in South American countries diminished, the welfare of ordinary people did not 
improve. After a decade of economic frustration, South Americans appeared to lose faith 
in the neoliberal promise, choosing to move left politically.110 
The rise of leftist regimes in the Southern Cone of Latin America (Kirchner in 
Argentina; Lula in Brazil; Lagos in Chile; Vázquez in Uruguay) made possible the 
formation of an ideological bloc in the region. Because it was the first time such a 
confluence had occurred, leftist leaders expressed their willingness to forge links between 
the countries and adopt regional standards on many issues, such as economic policy.  
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Due to historical tensions between the left and the armed forces in South America, 
it is possible that the new leftist regimes may produce a change in defense policy. Insofar 
as peacekeeping missions were first adopted as a military role under the previous 
neoliberal governments, this might lead the Uruguayan leftist government to reduce or 
change its level of participation in peacekeeping, especially due to the increment in 
Chapter VII-type operations. At least, in Uruguay, the left has emphasized that Chapter 
VII operations violate the principle of non-intervention in other countries’ domestic 
affairs.  
When the left took over the government in March 2005, it proclaimed the 
importance of regional integration, based on the Uruguayan Constitution.111 In this 
regard, a document prepared by the Defense Committee of the Broad Front called 
Defensa Nacional y Fuerzas Armadas (National Defense and Armed Forces) stated that 
MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone regional trade agreement) should include the 
integration of defense policy and cooperation among the regional armed forces.112 Today, 
this approach can also lead to a discussion concerning peacekeeping, insofar as the region 
has been a traditional contributor of UN peacekeeping troop. For example, by December 
1996, nearly 10% of the UN peacekeeping troops came from Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay (all MERCOSUR members).113 Almost nine years later, in June 2005, 
MERCOSUR contributions were slightly above 8%, although the numbers of UN 
peacekeeping troop increased almost three times1 during the same time period.114 
Additionally, regional peacekeeping exercises begun during the nineties continued during 
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the twenties, and regional interoperability concerning peacekeeping operations improved 
over time. 115 
Although the regional impact on UN missions had increased, the current leftist 
government of Uruguay questioned the appropriateness of still being committed in Haiti, 
where Uruguayan troops were deployed with Argentineans, Brazilians and Chileans.116 
What happened was that the Uruguayan leftist government inherited this mission from its 
predecessor. At that time, leftist members of parliament opposed the deployment of 
troops to Haiti, arguing that the Haitian conflict was a result of the U.S. having deposed a 
democratically elected president.117  
From a Uruguayan perspective, post-September 11 times have to be divided into 
two stages: before and after the left took over the government in March 2005. Before the 
takeover, the traditional role of regional peacekeeping supplier allowed the Southern 
Cone military to improve regional interoperability through peacekeeping exercises. After 
March 2005, two independent variables, ideological identities in the region and advocacy 
for regional integration, caused the Uruguayan leftist government to include national 
defense and foreign policy issues in the regional agenda. This implies that a debate is 
needed to discuss regional consensus on peacekeeping standards. 
N. THE URUGUAYAN LEFTIST GOVERNMENT AND THE NEED FOR A 
NATIONAL DEBATE ON THE DOMESTIC/BUREAUCRATIC LEVEL 
On account of its role as a “peacekeeping supplier,” Uruguay created a 
specialized agency and the Army developed its own doctrine in accordance with UN 
standards. However, this doctrine has no close connection with the Uruguayan foreign 
policy in bureaucratic terms. When the Partido Nacional was in power, and the 
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SINOMAPA was created in 1994, the government determined that the country would 
participate in peacekeeping operations insofar as a set of conditions were fulfilled: the 
parties in conflict had reached a peace agreement and had consented to the presence of 
UN troops, a UN Security Council Resolution was established and the peacekeeper 
countries were free to decide whether or not to send troops. According to Paul F. Diehl, 
all those conditions are characteristics of typical peacekeeping operations.118 Also, if all 
those conditions are satisfied, Bellamy, et al., consider those operations to be Chapter VI 
missions.119 Thus, Chapter VI operations were consistent with the traditional Uruguayan 
foreign policy.  
However, years later, the Army went beyond those criteria when it included its 
viewpoint in the Uruguayan defense white book in early 2005. The Army seemed to be 
concerned with and interested in the evolution of peacekeeping. In the defense white 
book, the Army commented and made suggestions regarding the Brahimi Report.120 As 
previously discussed, this report recognized a remarkable evolution of traditional 
peacekeeping and encouraged a drastic change in the concept by creating what became 
known as “robust peacekeeping,” which means using a “robust” force to make it possible 
to distinguish “victim from aggressor.”121 In particular, the Army has agreed that it is not 
currently conceivable to set up a UN peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI without 
considering its implications regarding Chapter VII.122 In this sense, the Army recognized 
that Uruguayan military forces deployed in future peacekeeping operations will face less 
restrictive rules of engagement regarding the use of force.123 As a result, today’s Defense 
White Book does not seem to be a “state” document. Rather, it resembles the viewpoint 
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of the military. Although the Minister of Defense of the time prepared the preface of the 
book, neither he nor the Partido Colorado’s government attempted to call the book the 
“Defense White Book.” Instead, the book was considered the basis for a national 
debate.124  
Furthermore, when the new leftist government took over the country in March 
2005, it voiced its plan to hold a debate on national defense policy. Indeed, this is the first 
attempt to discuss military issues in a broader sense. That would mean the “end” of the 
military “laissez-faire,” which had somehow become the tacit policy that marked 
Uruguayan civil-military relations under the historical parties’ rule, and which had 
allowed the military to develop its own strategy for national defense in general and for 
peacekeeping in particular. In the matter of peacekeeping, the historical parties’ 
governments did not formulate or debate an official “state policy” -they simply followed 
the suggestions made by the military. Additionally, the governments’ reliance on what 
the military was willing to do accounted for a certain degree of politicization of the 
armed forces. In the past, this had caused a “clash” between the military and the left. This 
clash might worsen insofar as the Defense White Book includes an analysis on 
peacekeeping that is inconsistent with leftist political discourse. Even so, the book does 
not necessarily reflect the Partido Colorado’s government approach. 
Consequently, the new leftist government wants to promote a national debate on 
national defense in order to establish a public or “state” policy. This position is 
established in the document prepared by the Defense Committee of the Frente Amplio.125 
The document also states that the armed forces should not be politicized, but rather, 
professionalized.126 Perhaps the most important statement made in the document with 
regard to the military “laissez-faire” prohibits “parallel” friendships among the military in 
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the international arena. In these cases, the government will establish with whom and what 
type of relationship will be allowed.127  
When the document deals with peacekeeping, opposing points of view between 
the leftist government and the military can be noted.  If the government follows the 
guidelines on defense issues established in its party’s document, it will not allow the 
military to be deployed in future peacekeeping operations. When dealing with 
peacekeeping, the document prepared by the Defense Committee of the Frente Amplio 
stresses the importance of observing the principles of non-intervention and self-
determination.128 As seen in the Brahimi Report, the UN foresees that future 
peacekeeping missions will be held under Chapter VII, whereby using force is authorized 
to fulfill the UN mandate. We also saw that the Uruguayan Army agreed with that 
approach and included this point of view in the Defense White Book. The leftist 
government has inherited that book, which clearly does not represent the “state” policy 
on that issue. Therefore, inconsistencies between the Army’s approach (based on the 
Defense White Book) and the Frente Amplio’s approach (based on the Defense 
Committee document) are noted. To clarify the leftist approach, the president of the 
Defense Committee said that the government would not be willing to participate in 
Chapter VII operations.129  In addition, the current government itself also said that 
Uruguay would only take part in Chapter VI operations.130  
If the leftist government does not participate in UN Chapter VII operations, or 
worse, withdraws the troops which are now deployed under that chapter (DRC and Haiti), 
the military will probably blame the government for having deprived them of economic 
and professional benefits, which will have negative effects on civil-military relations. 
Following Desch’s argument, Uruguay would be classified as a country under low 
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internal and low external threats.131 This means that civil-military relations should not 
necessarily be bad, but they usually are unstable. Although peacekeeping is a way to 
make the military “externally-oriented,” which contributes to good civil-military 
relations, the determining factors that influence the relationship seem to be the different 
viewpoints concerning the use of force. Indeed, Desch argues that the divergence 
regarding the use of force and the nature of the international system undermine civilian 
control of the military.132 Therefore, analyzing the Uruguayan threat environment under 
Desch’s criteria, we find that in order to avoid embarrassing civil-military problems, the 
leftist government should support the deployment of troops under Chapter VII 
operations.133 
Recapitulating this analysis, during the historical parties’ governments, two 
independent variables, the evolution of peacekeeping and the military “laissez-faire,” 
caused the government to authorize the deployment of troops under Chapter VII. Now, 
under the current leftist rule, a debate on these issues was promised and is still pending. 
However, relying on the principles of non-intervention and self-determination “strictu 
sensu,” suitable for a “Westphalian world,” may make the current government restrict 
future participation of Uruguayan troops in peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the 
left may also disapprove of the commitment of forces to UN missions whenever it 
considers those missions inconsistent with its domestic discourse. If so, the left will need 
to weigh to what extent such a decision might undermine civil-military relations. This is 
important insofar as other points of the leftist political agenda, such as the investigation 
of human rights violations that took place during the dictatorship, are already eroding 
civil-military relations.  
So, variables such as grass-roots foreign policy principles, the former military 
“laissez-faire” and the domestic discourse might influence the decision making process of 
the leftist government regarding the roles that Uruguayan armed forces should perform, 
especially concerning peacekeeping operations in support of the state’s foreign policy. 
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Depending on the values those variables are given, different scenarios will represent the 
options the government can choose. Some of these options might develop into a “clash” 
of interests; others might be taken as a window of opportunity for both the government 
and the military to work together for the image of the country, to satisfy their goals and 
improve civil-military relations.  
O. SUMMARY 
The Brahimi Report had already been produced when the attacks of September 
11, 2001, occurred. This report constituted a landmark for further peacekeeping 
operations, and made the UN adopt a new approach. The Army tried to be “in tune” with 
the main ideas outlined in the Brahimi Report. The possibility of using force was what 
most worried the Uruguayan authorities. In this regard, having considered the new UN 
approach and the Army’s willingness to be deployed, the Uruguayan government sent 
troops to missions where limited use of force was authorized. This issue resulted in the 
loss of domestic consensus on peacekeeping, especially between the historical political 
parties and the left. 
At the regional level, Uruguay’s traditional role as supplier of peacekeeping 
troops facilitated the development of regional peacekeeping exercises. Once the left took 
over the government in March 2005, ideological affinity caused the leftist government to 
include defense and security issues in the regional agenda, with the possibility of 
achieving a consensus on peacekeeping.  
At the domestic/bureaucratic level, during historical parties’ rule, the evolution of 
peacekeeping expressed in the Brahimi Report was closely followed by the Uruguayan 
military, especially the Army. This allowed the government to continue sending troops to 
further peacekeeping operations. Once the left took over, a debate on this issue was 
posed, but is still pending. The domestic political discourse and the traditional military 
“laissez-faire” will surely be the variables which influence the promised debate, which 
may have significant effects on civil-military relations. The issue might represent a 
window of opportunity for both the government and the military to work together 
towards achieving the desired goals.  
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Because the Uruguayan Armed Forces have been employed according to the 
“trend” (international and regional and domestic), they are now facing two separate 
options. On the one hand, it seems unlikely that the Uruguayan government will support 
the “international war on terror,” at least by committing forces to military operations 
overseas. On the other hand, the regional leftist trend opens a window of opportunity to 
create a regional approach towards peacekeeping. The issue is to what extent ideological 
affinity in the region will trump rooted nationalism, which traditionally has undermined 
the integration process. Thus, the possibility of creating a regional force or agreeing on 




























III:   ARMED FORCES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN SOUTHERN 
CONE - FROM CHECKERBOARD PIECES TO PEACEKEEPING 
PARTNERS? 
The peoples of South America are closely united by links of nature and 
reciprocal interests.  
General José Artigas (Father of the Independence of Uruguay)134 
 
The ideological affinity in the Southern Cone of Latin America (Kirchner in 
Argentina; Lula in Brazil; Lagos in Chile; Vázquez in Uruguay) can be seen as an 
opportunity to agree on common interests to include in the regional agenda. The purpose 
of such agreement should be the formation of a bloc in other areas of interests, besides 
economics. The region has already created an economic arrangement (MERCOSUR). 
After more than ten years of life, it seems that the agreement should extend to other 
issues to reinforce the position of the bloc in the international arena. One of those areas of 
interest is peacekeeping. This chapter analyzes to what extent political bases exist in the 
region for a peacekeeping partnership. Although Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay 
have been working together on a UN mission in Haiti, the current leftist government of 
Uruguay questions the appropriateness of still being deployed in that mission, insofar as 
the economic aid to Haiti promised by the UN has not yet been delivered.135  
Does the rise of leftist regimes in the Southern Cone of Latin America create 
conditions for a successful peacekeeping partnership? I argue that the current political 
“trend” in the region may have created an opportunity for the countries to become 
peacekeeping partners, but conditions are not currently sufficient to bring about such an 
agreement. Other issues such as coherent foreign and defense policies are extremely 
important. Although peacekeeping seems to be the common point on the regional security 
agenda, there have been no decisive steps taken towards the creation of a “regional force” 
or even a consensus about common standards or criteria regarding the commitment of 
troops to peacekeeping operations. The primary issue is whether or not to deploy troops                                                  
134 Translation is mine. 
135 “Uruguay Podría Abandonar Misiόn de Paz en Haití,” El Observador, April 9, 2005, page 25.  
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under Chapter VII operations. Different approaches and different interests can be noted in 
the Southern Cone of Latin America in that regard. The remainder of this Chapter 
explores whether or not Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay enjoy compatible 
conditions, besides common ideology, either to create a regional peacekeeping force or to 





Figure 3.   Countries of the Southern Cone. 
  
A. THE SOUTHERN CONE ANALYSIS 
Historically, Argentina, Brazil and Chile (what became known as the “ABC” 
countries) have tried to balance one another. They were the most powerful countries in 
South America in military terms. After a decades-long arms race and a search for balance 
of power among the ABC countries, Philip Kelly’s “checkerboards” weakened. 
According to Kelly, checkerboards were geopolitical arrangements whereby powerful 
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states aligned against their immediate neighbors.136 Checkerboards were multipolar 
balance of power systems that provided regional equilibrium.137 Figure 3 shows that 
during the Cold War, this model allowed Brazil, Chile and Colombia to align against 
Argentina, Peru and Venezuela.138 Checkerboards avoided escalation to violence thanks 
to the presence of “buffer states” (Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador), which were 





















Figure 4.   Phillip Kelly’s Checkerboards (After: Kelly). 
 
This model began to decline when the “third wave of democracy” swept across 
the region. After the Cold War, confidence measures seem to have substituted former 
rivalries among the ABC countries. In addition, Uruguay was no longer seen as a “buffer 
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state.”140 Instead, it was considered essential to any integration process due to its 
geographic situation, its observance of international law and its democratic tradition. 
Accordingly, Uruguay and the ABC countries are members of the MERCOSUR trade 
agreement (although Chile is not yet a full member). 
Participation in peacekeeping has had two important effects on consolidation of 
democracy in the region. On the one hand, peacekeeping has allowed “third wave” 
democratic countries to improve their images in the international arena, showing 
commitment to the observance of international law, peace and international security. On 
the other hand, peacekeeping has kept the military from being involved in domestic 
affairs.141 Currently, the Southern Cone’s picture shows that all ABC countries and 
Uruguay are committed to peacekeeping and all share leftist ideals. They are now the 
Latin American countries that contribute the most to UN peacekeeping. In fact, 86% of 
the Latin American contribution to peacekeeping comes from Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile.142 Therefore, these countries have sound reasons to discuss common 
peacekeeping concerns. Indeed, they are important stakeholders in the UN peacekeeping 
system and its evolution.  
In order to explore the political bases for a peacekeeping partnership in the region, 
we should analyze each country’s approach in light of specifically selected variables. 
These variables are 1) coherent foreign and defense policies, 2) approach to peacekeeping 
and 3) regional security issues. Indicators such as the pursuit of the country’s interests 
versus the importance placed on regional integration, and working towards improving the 
country’s leverage in the international arena reflect coherent foreign and defense policies 
on both regional and international levels. In addition, an expressed commitment to peace 
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and international security, a willingness to participate in Chapter VII peacekeeping 
operations and acceptance of the primary tenets of the UN documents An Agenda for 
Peace and the Brahimi Report clarify each country’s approach in regard to peacekeeping. 
Finally, compliance with decisions made on regional security issues (such as presidential 
declarations) and participation in multinational military exercises and Ministers of 
Defense meetings are indications of each country’s willingness to explore possibilities 
related to a peacekeeping partnership. Figure 5 shows how the three main variables 
interact in the regional arena, the domain of regional organizations. It can be seen that 
intersection of the three variables creates a small shared area, which can make a 

















Figure 5.   Criteria for a Peacekeeping Partnership. 
 
This Chapter presents a detailed analysis of the Southern Cone countries, 
highlighting the variables that might make a peacekeeping partnership possible. 
B. COHERENT FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES 
1. Brazil 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Brazilian defense policy reflected a deep 
concern about domestic affairs.  In 1992, an Army General said, at the Escuela Superior 
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de Guerra (Superior War School), that his country did not have enemies among its ten 
neighbors. He expressed that what worried the Brazilian Army was taking care of the 
needs of the 150 million Brazilians.143 This means that the Army was committed to the 
development of the country. A little more than ten years later, in 2003, President Lula 
launched his government plan, known as Fome Zero.144 
Since Lula took over, Brazil has been trying to improve its role as a regional 
leader.145 However, this feeling of “manifest destiny” is not new. Two things account for 
today’s Brazilian predominance: first, the end of the Cold War and second, Argentina’s 
retreat from the “race” at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Since the constraints 
of the Cold War disappeared, and once Argentina took a back seat in the region following 
the 2001 economic crisis, Brazil has felt free to build its own destiny. In this regard, it has 
argued for the improvement of MERCOSUR economic outcomes before making any 
further attempt to increase the range of the treaty. By leading the regional economic 
integration, Brazil has tried to act as a “consensus builder” between North and South.146 
Moreover, Brazil has experienced great coherence between foreign and defense 
policies. 
Concerning foreign policy, its traditional principles have been non-intervention, 
defense of equal sovereignty of states and respect for the international legal system.147 
Regarding defense policy, Brazil does not have a “Defense White Book.” Instead, Brazil 
has created a “White Paper” outlining the main aspects of its defense policy. One of the 
objectives stated in this paper is to “enable the country to become more involved in the 
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international decision-making process.”148 Further, the defense policy emphasizes the 
importance of improving Brazilian negotiating capability in the international arena.149 
Finally, Brazil is also concerned with the preservation of international peace and 
security.150 Hence, foreign policy principles, in addition to national defense objectives, 
have allowed Brazil to claim a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In this sense, 
aside from Japan, Brazil has been the longest serving UN Security Council non-
permanent member (eight years).151  
In short, Brazil favors regional integration; but it does so as a means to achieve its 
most important interests, the improvement of the country’s leverage in the international 
arena. 
2. Argentina 
The Argentine “honeymoon” with the U.S. during the 1990s allowed the country 
to enjoy the privileges of being considered a “major non-NATO U.S. ally.”152 In those 
times, Argentina developed its Libro Blanco de la Defensa (Defense White Book). In this 
document, Argentina stated the importance of integrating defense and security issues into 
the MERCOSUR agenda.153 Nevertheless, during the economic crisis that occurred 
between 2001 and 2003, Argentina allowed Brazil to become the regional leader. For 
example, while Argentina had decommissioned its aircraft carrier due to budget 
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constraints, Brazil incorporated a large new aircraft carrier, which made possible the 
“rebirth” of its fixed-wing naval aviation component, suppressed half a century ago.154  
When the political change occurred in 2003, because of the failure of the 
neoliberal economic model, Argentina reviewed its Defense White Book. Politicians, 
military representatives and scholars debated foreign and national defense policies.155 
One of the objectives was to identify what role the armed forces and the national defense 
policy should play in support of a democratic Argentina. Among the most relevant input 
from the former Defense White Book was the commitment to regional integration and the 
importance of being inserted into the current world context by non-confrontational 
means.156 A concluding statement from the Defense White Book expresses that the 
current context constitutes an opportunity for improving Argentina’s leverage in the 
region, both in the southern hemisphere and in the international arena. 157 
Through these levels of commitment, Argentina developed three strategies. On 
the regional level, the country is willing to incorporate cooperative security issues in the 
realm of MERCOSUR. 158 This means that each MERCOSUR member should play a 
specific role in the regional security agenda, all working towards the “common good.” It 
also means that MERCOSUR members should agree to adopt standard military 
equipment, thereby taking advantage of regional military industrial capabilities. For 
instance, Brazil-made tanks might be the ones adopted by MERCOSUR members’ 
armies. The same thing would occur with Argentina-made light aircraft. In this regard, a 
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survey conducted in Argentina in 2002 indicated that 48% of the population and 55% of 
the opinion leaders were willing to create a military alliance in the realm of 
MERCOSUR.159 Indeed, as part of the 2004 “State of the Nation,” the Ministry of 
Defense stated that one of its objectives was to promote and develop a regional defense 
system as a means to “boost” national capabilities. The end goal is to design a common 
defense policy for the region.160 This approach could serve as the basis for a consensus 
on similar criteria for peacekeeping. 
Argentina is willing to strengthen and reframe the hemispheric defense system, 
which includes the TIAR, the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American 
Ministers of Defense meetings.161 This approach is inconsistent with the Argentine 
domestic political discourse. However, it demonstrates that the country has been slowly 
changing its position about Brazil’s leadership. In my opinion, for Argentina, strong and 
reframed inter-American institutions could operate as “buffers” against Brazilian efforts 
to become the Latin American hegemon. In any case, the reasons for this expressed 
commitment to the hemispheric organizations are unclear in light of the domestic 
political trend. 
At the international level, Argentina has stated the importance of preserving peace 
and international security.162 Preserving peace and security means supporting the UN 
collective security system, which implies participation in peacekeeping operations. In 
short, Argentina wants to improve regional integration in a broader sense than Brazil 
because this goal will not compete against the country’s interests. 
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3. Chile 
In the case of Chile, the current Minister of Defense stated that Latin Americans 
have been capable of cooperation when common criteria were established. 163 This 
statement was made in a seminar about “strategic opportunities,” in which defense and 
security issues were considered as possible areas of cooperation within the region. 
Chile’s concept of cooperation on security issues is similar to the Argentine approach. 
But, if we follow the Chilean argument, the problem is identifying common criteria. For 
example, Chile emphasizes the creation of complementary security regimes rather than 
reframing the TIAR.164 Moreover, compared to other MERCOSUR members, in its Libro 
de la Defensa Nacional de Chile (Defense White Book), Chile considers itself at risk of 
experiencing future border conflicts. In this sense, Chile still analyzes the geopolitics of 
the region to determine how it can improve its power in the region in defense of its 
interests. It developed a geopolitical approach applied to the sea, known as 
Oceanopolítica (Oceanpolitics), which considers the sea as a space where the coastal 
state should expand and project its influence.165 In this regard, Chile designed its theory 
of Mar Presencial (Presence Sea), by which the country claims the right to monitor what 
happens in an area extended to 450 nautical miles off the Chilean coast.  
Although Chile expresses its desires to maintain a peaceful status quo with its 
neighbors, a review of the country’s Defense White Book makes it clear that this 
situation remains peaceful only insofar as no one tries to challenge the Chilean border 
argument.166 Chile has unsolved issues with Argentina in the southern region. In the 
north, the boundary of the economic exclusive zone, beyond the territorial sea, has been a 
source of disagreement between Chile and Peru. 
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Following the same approach, Chile stated in its Defense White Book that it “does 
not hold any aggressive intentions towards any country in the world.”167 However, if we 
compare this statement with Argentina’s stated policy, and as we will see, with the case 
of Uruguay, there is a clear difference. While Argentina’s expressed policy consists of 
inserting the country in the current context by “non-confrontational means,” Chile’s 
policy states that it has no aggressive “intentions” towards anyone. The problem in 
dealing with “intentions” is that they can be interpreted in different ways. Perception is 
what matters about intentions. What Chile considers a non-aggressive action in defense 
of its interests may not be viewed in the same light by its neighbors. Thus, it is not 
enough to merely say that Chile has no aggressive “intentions.”  Neighboring countries 
will determine whether a Chilean action is aggressive based in their perception of that 
action. I think this subtle difference arises from the ambiguity in the text and from 
Chilean historical antecedents.168 
Amongst the ABC countries, Chile does not demand important structural changes 
in the international security or regional organizations. In contrast, Brazil is claiming a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its relationship with the U.S. has seen 
better moments. Argentina seems to have decided not to let Brazil become the 
unquestionable regional leader and to recover its influence in the region by demanding 
changes in the hemispheric security arrangements, while still enjoying its status as a 
major non-NATO U.S. ally.169 Chile, which maintains very healthy relations with the 
U.S., still hesitates to fully join MERCOSUR. According to Fernando Thauby García, 
Chile should find its role as a “pivotal state” capable of being the link between the region 
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and the rest of the world.170 As a result, Chile is headed towards achieving one of its 
national objectives: to enhance the country’s “international projection.”171 In short, 
Chile’s interests are enhanced above regional integration and it does not want to be 
constrained in that regard. 
4. Uruguay 
In Uruguay, the leftist government has not yet made any “official” attempt to 
modify the current situation regarding coherent foreign and defense policies. Traditional 
Uruguayan foreign policies of non-intervention, self-determination and peaceful 
resolution of controversies still apply. A distinct process of state formation (compared to 
the rest of Latin America) laid the basis for those principles. Open to international trade 
since its independence and unwilling to participate in the regionalization of domestic 
conflicts,172 Uruguay used to withdraw from the regional context.173 By avoiding 
participation in neighboring countries’ domestic affairs and interacting with the rest of 
the world as an independent actor without regional constraints, Uruguay has projected a 
peaceful image to the international arena, an image supported by the observance of 
international law. Uruguayan foreign policy principles of non-intervention, self-
determination and peaceful resolution of controversies have characterized the country 
throughout time, regardless of which political party was in power. By contrast, no 
national defense policy had been developed, except for a few academic works nobody 
ever seriously considered, and some interesting proposals, which did not prosper due to 
political or economic reasons. As a result, the Uruguayan Armed Forces have operated 
under the traditional foreign policy principles, but without any guidance on what role 
they should play as a useful tool in support of the country’s foreign policy. 
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However, shortly before the 2004 elections, the Defense Committee of the Frente 
Amplio prepared a document on national defense and the armed forces. When the Frente 
Amplio took over in March 2005, that paper became the basis for a national defense 
policy. The document declares that Uruguay does not have enemies among any people or 
state. It also states that Uruguayan foreign affairs are based on cooperative relationships 
with other states, in particular within the Latin American region.174 In addition, the paper 
favors the strengthening military links within the South American region, in direct 
opposition to the hegemonic vision of the U.S. and its hemispheric defense system.175 
Then the paper adds that the Frente Amplio opposes the U.S.-led Inter-American military 
system.176 Although the Uruguayan government has not yet taken any important step 
regarding policy-making on those issues, these statements represent the Frente Amplio’s 
position on foreign and defense policy issues.  
 Compared to the ABC countries, the Uruguayan approach appears to be the most 
radical of the Southern Cone, although the Brazilian approach seems to be stronger due to 
its greater power and the implications of its demands. The Argentinean approach is more 
cautious and the Chilean approach is at odds with the Uruguayan. 
Moreover, the Frente Amplio’s document promotes the inclusion of military and 
security issues within the MERCOSUR agenda, pursuing cooperation among the armed 
forces of the region.177 In addition, the document refers to the Uruguayan Constitution 
when it promotes integration among Latin American states, all of whom would benefit 
from coordinated and integrated development of public services in the region.178 These 
statements are wholly consistent with the Argentine approach towards cooperative 
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security and somewhat consistent with the Chilean argument about successful 
cooperation when common criteria are agreed upon. But, while Argentina is promoting a 
cooperative security system by reframing the existent regional organizations (TIAR, 
OAS, MERCOSUR), Chile is less clear and seems to demand the creation of 
complementary defense and security organizations.  
One of the problems in the Southern Cone region about including security issues 
in MERCOSUR is that Chile has not yet become a full MERCOSUR member. Brazil 
argues that before moving towards regional military agreements, consolidation of 
economic integration through MERCOSUR is required. However, while the Uruguayan 
document demands regional integration, it also argues that each country has the right to 
establish its own defense agenda based on its interests and threat perception.179  
According to Helio Jaguaribe, the success of MERCOSUR depends, among other 
factors, on each member’s autonomous project.180 This approach conspires against any 
“supra-national” effort. Although this concept was discussed in 2002, we can find 
similarities with the Frente Amplio’s 2004 document concerning defense and security 
issues. In this particular case, the Uruguayan “independent” viewpoint about establishing 
its own defense agenda is similar to the Chilean viewpoint. Hence, we see that all 
countries have different perspectives about the same problem. Although they all talk 
about some kind of integration of defense and security issues, it is difficult to establish 
regional standards to achieve that goal. 
Moreover, a book written under the historical parties’ rule called La Defensa 
Nacional, Aportes para un Debate (Defense White Book) states that Uruguay’s objective 
is to deepen cooperative relations among MERCOSUR members and to contribute to 
peace and international security.181 However, because the new Uruguayan government 
has been in power for only six months, they have not yet had time to review the Defense 
White Book, as Argentina was able to do in 2004, when a large number of stakeholders 
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(if not all) took part in the discussion. Although the Uruguayan Defense White Book is 
still considered a “working paper” and is open to debate, it was written by a narrow circle 
of military elites who did not always work together. A national debate on defense policy 
has not yet occurred. In the past, leadership of the historical parties did not seem very 
interested in dealing with national defense policy. Today, the current leftist government is 
more worried about investigating human rights violations that occurred during the 
dictatorship than in debating national defense policy. 
Furthermore, one of the key differences between the leftist government and its 
political party and the historical parties concerning national defense and security issues 
emphasizes the existence of two “parallel diplomacies”: one is the formal “political” 
diplomacy and the other is the informal “military” diplomacy. For the leftist government, 
years of military laissez-faire under the historical parties’ rule allowed them to establish 
close links with other militaries in the region and with the U.S., which, most of the time, 
occurred without any guidance from civilian authorities.182  
In short, because this is the first time such a political change has occurred in 
Uruguay, the country has not yet made a clear connection between traditional foreign 
policy and the new approach the leftist government is willing to embrace regarding 
defense policy. Concerning regional integration versus national interests, it seems that 
Uruguay wants to go back to its former “buffer” role in the region because it has not yet 
assigned clear priorities between regional integration and the domestic agenda in defense 
and security issues. Figure 6 summarizes the regional situation concerning coherent 
foreign and defense policies. 
                                                 


















Figure 6.   Main Objectives of the Foreign and Defense Policy. 
  
 
C. APPROACH TO PEACEKEEPING 
1. Brazil 
Although Brazil is also concerned with the preservation of international peace and 
security,183 its policy after the Cold War was to refrain from participating in Chapter VII 
operations.184 These missions were considered at odds with the traditional foreign policy 
principles of non-intervention, defense of equal sovereignty of states and respect for the 
international legal system.185 According to the “White Paper on National Defense,” 
Brazil has weighed its participation in peacekeeping in light of its interests,186 especially 
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concerning the improvement of MERCOSUR.187 Because of its leadership in the region 
and its role as a consensus builder, addressing peacekeeping under a regional approach 
implies that Brazil would play the “major power” role.  
Belief in its bargaining skills is one of the arguments Brazil cites in support of its 
bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Brazil believes its participation on 
the Council would improve the diplomatic and peaceful means for preserving peace and 
international security and could shift the focus away from the coercive approach the 
Council seems to have taken lately.188 In this regard, Brazil has been worried about the 
increasing number of peacekeeping operations established by the UN under Chapter 
VII.189 Because it was critical of both UN documents An Agenda for Peace and the 
Brahimi Report, Brazil has chosen to not participate in peacekeeping efforts when they 
seem to go along with the “hegemonic interests” of other powers.190 
Nevertheless, to buttress its aspirations, Brazil has had to resume committing 
troops to peacekeeping missions as it is doing now in Haiti, where a Brazilian general 
commands the UN military forces. In this sense, if we analyze the latest operations in 
which Brazil participated, it is possible to infer that Brazil always wanted command of 
the peacekeeping missions, as happened in Angola, Mozambique and in the current 
operation in Haiti. Brazil seems to be less interested in sending troops, although it has 
done so. With fewer troops on the ground than other countries, either within or outside 
the region (Uruguay, India), Brazil usually has access to better command positions when 
it becomes involved in peacekeeping operations. Brazil achieves these positions by 
pressuring the UN bureaucracy.191  
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For Brazil, commanding the UN multinational peacekeeping force deployed in 
Haiti is a sign of commitment to regional security issues. In that regard, Brazil also 
accepts the involvement of regional organizations to ensure peace and security within a 
region, as in the case of the OAS in Latin America. Brazil is willing to do so as long as a 
mission is established in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.192 This is 
because Brazil is concerned about the increasing involvement of regional organizations 
without the consent of the UN Security Council. In my opinion, this position can be 
interpreted in two ways. First, Brazil does not want to undermine the UN Security 
Council’s role in these affairs (an organ Brazil is trying to join). Second and most 
important, it is likely that any OAS involvement in regional security issues will depend 
on Brazilian participation.  
In this sense, Evergisto De Vergara193 claims that many Latin American countries 
lack sufficient resources to carry out peacekeeping. If that is an accurate assessment, 
extra-regional aid would be needed. However, according to De Vergara, this aid must not 
derive from the involvement of an extra-regional power playing a leading role within the 
region.194 As a result, for peacekeeping to succeed within the Latin American context, it 
is required that the major regional power be involved. In short, Brazil does not want to 
participate in Chapter VII operations, although it is increasing its commitment to 
peacekeeping to support its claims for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. As a 
regional leader, Brazil pursues the commands of UN missions, so it is against any extra-
regional leadership in peacekeeping. 
2. Argentina 
Argentina used to have a more daring approach. It collaborated with the U.S. in 
the First Gulf War in 1990-1991 and in the operation in Haiti in 1994. Then, in 1992, 
Argentina sent a battalion to the UN protection force (UNPROFOR) sent to the conflict 
                                                 
192 Herz, 12. The main point here is that Chapter VIII prescribes the involvement of regional 
organizations to preserve peace and security under UN Security Council’s authorization. 
193 Evergisto De Vergara is a retired general, who was the first Argentine military officer to have an 
entire UN "blue helmet" mission force under his command (UNFICYP, UN mission in Cyprus). 
194 Evergisto De Vergara, “¿Sumados, o divididos?, Intereses Regionales o Intereses Globales en la 
Implementación de la Paz.” Club de Graduados Argentinos del Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos de 
Defensa –CHDS- y de los Restantes Centros de Estudios Superiores de la U.S. National Defense 
University, 5-6, http://www.uniformados.com.ar/indice-14.html. (accessed May 12, 2005). 
75 
in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, Argentina still has troops committed to the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) and to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the Balkans. Despite this 
support, Argentina has stepped back and allowed Brazil to become the regional leader. 
While Argentina has deployed troops to many places for peacekeeping, Brazil, as we 
saw, exerts strong pressure on the UN bureaucracy to be recognized as the regional 
leader,195 asking for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.  
According to Vigliero, Argentina should capitalize on its experience in 
peacekeeping as a means of upgrading military equipment and gaining economic 
resources to develop modern armed forces.196 That was what Argentina did during the 
1990s. In fact, Argentina increased its experience by developing a training center for 
peacekeeping operations (CAECOPAZ)197 where not only nationals, but also military 
personnel from neighboring countries have received peacekeeping training. U.S. military 
personnel also attended peacekeeping courses at CAECOPAZ.  
By contrast, Antonio Palá argues that border problems undermine Argentinean 
aspirations of becoming the regional referent on peacekeeping.198 However, I think that 
today Argentina has solved most of its important border issues, especially with Chile, and 
has abandoned the concept of seeing its neighbors as potential enemies, as was common 
in South America many years ago. Argentine “dreams” of becoming the equivalent of 
Canada in the Southern Cone are vanishing, not because it has border problems with its 
neighbors (which it does not) or because it lacks experience or commitment to 
peacekeeping (it has a great deal of both), but because it does not have the diplomatic 
leverage in the UN that Brazil has.  
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Moreover, a 2004 study conducted by Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoría199 
showed that Argentine Armed Forces increased their participation in military exercises 
with foreign countries. Having analyzed a period of eleven years (from 1993 to 2004), the 
findings make it possible to analyze the number of exercises in which peacekeeping was 
the core topic. In 1995, the first regional peacekeeping “planning” drill took place in 
Argentina. The turning point can be found in 1996, when the first combined 
peacekeeping exercise, called Operaciόn Cruz del Sur, was executed between Argentina 
(the host country and sponsor of the exercise) and Brazil. Since then, an average of two 
“international” peacekeeping exercises have taken place between Argentina and other 
countries, especially Brazil, the U.S., Uruguay and Chile (listed in order of number of 
participations).200  
Furthermore, Argentina has invited regional countries to join the Argentine UN 
task force deployed in Cyprus.201 Uruguayan and Chilean commissioned and non-
commisioned officers joined that force; in 2003, Chile also sent troops.202 Without 
hesitation, it can be said that Argentina led the way towards regional peacekeeping 
integration. 
These facts demonstrate that although Argentina experienced a backslide in its 
political life in 2001 (the president left office before the end of his term because of high 
social unrest), and despite the rise of a left-center government in 2003, its approach 
towards peacekeeping has not changed very much. One change that should be mentioned 
is the governmental initiative to re-state parts of the Defense White Book. One of the 
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main statements made in the Defense White Book indicates that Argentina anticipated 
sending troops in support of Chapter VII operations.203  
In addition, an analysis of the Argentine participation in MINUSTAH,204 the 
current UN mission in Haiti, expresses allegiance with the Brahimi Report and its “stand-
by” forces concept, based on regional availability.205 Not only does Argentina consider 
the commitment to peacekeeping important in order to keep the military externally-
oriented (which benefits civil military relations), it also considers participation in 
peacekeeping to be a means of reducing neighboring countries’ perception of the 
Argentine military as a threat.206 In this regard, Argentina and Chile are now studying the 
possibility of sending a “joint bi-national peacekeeping unit” to Haiti in 2006.207 
In short, Argentina has made many efforts to increase its peacekeeping 
experience. In so doing it provides a deepening regional integration among the military, 
especially in peacekeeping, as a means to improve the influence of the region in the 
international arena as well as to build trust between neighbors. Although Argentina 
recognizes Brazil’s leadership, it considers itself a regional leader in regard to 
peacekeeping. 
3. Chile 
Chile created a peace operations policy based on the increasing UN requirements 
and on its participation as a UN Security Council non-permanent member during 2003-
2004.208 In any case, Chile is willing to contribute to peacekeeping according to its 
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interests.209 Chile has already participated in what Bellamy, et al., call “wider 
peacekeeping.” These operations, known as “Chapter Six and a Half,” are usually 
established under Chapter VII. The problem is that wider peacekeeping implies the 
observance of the main characteristics of traditional peacekeeping (impartiality, consent 
and minimum use of force) “in an environment that may be volatile,” most times within a 
state, where there is no “buffer zone” to occupy and where belligerents are non-state 
actors.210  
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Chilean academic papers argued that 
regional peacekeeping exercises should pave the way for military cooperation or 
integration.211 Consistent with this trend, Chile, like Argentina, created a training center 
for peacekeeping called CECOPAC.212 Chile knew that both peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement would become areas of military cooperation in the region.213 Two years 
later, the most outstanding evidence of Chile’s new approach to peacekeeping operations 
was made by Michelle Bachelet, former Chilean Minister of Defense, on the occasion of 
the inauguration of the National University academic year 2002.214 Among other 
concepts, she said that Chile would be willing to participate in Chapter VII operations.215 
This announcement was later included in the Defense White Book. 
It seems that Chile, by its commitment to “full” Chapter VII operations (peace 
enforcement), is trying to support its foreign policy objectives, such as the improvement 
of its leverage in the international arena and its questionable role as regional “pivotal 
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state.” Accordingly, the current Minister of Defense expressed that Latin Americans have 
been capable of cooperating when common criteria were established. He mentioned the 
execution of peace operations as tools for improving cooperation in the region.216 In this 
sense, Chilean participation in Haiti deserves attention. The country was involved in Haiti 
before MINUSTAH was deployed. At that time, Chilean troops integrated into the 
multinational force that was in charge of the overall security of the country. Then, when 
MINUSTAH deployed, the UN Secretary General appointed a Chilean diplomat as his 
representative. This diplomat is responsible for running the “political command” of the 
mission. 
It is remarkable to note that left-center President Lagos and his Minister of 
Defense, Michelle Bachelet, strongly support the Chilean commitment in Haiti. Both 
have encouraged the evolution of Chilean participation from traditional peacekeeping 
into an “updated” commitment to Chapter VII operations. In so doing, both the President 
and the Minister believe that Chile will improve its leverage in the international arena, 
which as we saw, is one of Chile’s main foreign and defense policy objectives.217 
Paradoxically, General Pinochet, as Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army in 1997, 
had firmly expressed his opposition to involving the Army in peacekeeping, especially in 
Chapter VII operations.218 
However, Chile is willing to participate in Chapter VII operations with some 
limitations. The most remarkable limitation establishes that Chilean forces will not be 
used to search and/or capture criminals, belligerents or war criminals.219  
Another interesting point made by President Lagos is his belief in the use of the 
military to project the country’s foreign policy. In this case, by participating in UN 
missions, Chile expresses (in practice) its support for international law and institutions, 
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its commitment to multilateralism and most important, its accommodation of the current 
global context. For Chile, participating in Chapter VII operations does not necessarily 
mean full use of force.  President Lagos understands that in order to influence the world 
agenda, each country should try to participate in the decision-making process, in this case 
through support of UN decisions by taking part in Chapter VII operations.220 
It is important to realize that Chile was the only country that modified its 
traditional position on peacekeeping after a left-center government took over. As we saw, 
Brazil remains resistant to accepting (at least in its political discourse) participation in 
Chapter VII operations. Argentina is maintaining its approach, under which it took part in 
“full” Chapter VII operations (peace enforcement). Uruguay, as we will see, is now ruled 
by a leftist government whose political party has expressed (in documents and in 
parliamentary debates) its resistance to using force as a means to achieve peace. 
In short, Chile adopted a more daring approach towards peacekeeping while it 
was ruled by a leftist government. However, it did so in pursuit of its own interests, 
which are not always in tune with the region, insofar as Chile is not yet a full 
MERCOSUR member. Its spectrum of participation in Chapter VII operations is more 
limited than Argentina’s because Chile has clearly established limitations regarding 
Chapter VII peacekeeping participation. Further expectations are posed on the ambitious 
Argentine-Chilean project to send a “joint bi-national peacekeeping unit” to Haiti in 
2006. 
4. Uruguay 
Today, Uruguay is the regional country with the highest percentage of troops 
committed to peacekeeping operations in different areas of the world. With a share of just 
3% of the total military in the region, Uruguay accounted for 44% of the South American 
commitment to peacekeeping.221 The leftist government, which took over in March 2005, 
has announced that Uruguay will continue to participate in peacekeeping operations, but 
                                                 
220 Tripodi, 126. 
221 Yamandú Sala, “Militares Uruguayos Representan el 44% que Aporta la Regiόn a Misiones de 
Paz.” Cooperación Portal Uruguay, February 9, 2005, 
http://www.onunet.org.uy/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=564 (accessed May 
12, 2005). 
81 
not in those operations established under Chapter VII.222 During a media interview, the 
president of the Defense Committee of the Frente Amplio argued that the government 
should not be willing to deploy troops under Chapter VII.223  
The document prepared by his committee - previously cited in this work- 
establishes that Uruguayan participation in peacekeeping must be in accordance with the 
country’s traditional foreign policy principles of respect for people’s self-determination 
and non-intervention in other state’s domestic affairs.224 The same document states that 
for future commitment of troops to peacekeeping, on a case-by-case basis, Uruguay will 
analyze whether or not the mission effectively contributes to achieving peace, has the 
consent of the parties, is compatible with the principles of self-determination and 
supports Uruguayan interests.225 
In contrast, the Defense White Book considers the possibility of engaging in 
Chapter VII operations insofar as the evolution of traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping is 
taken into account. In this sense, the White Book notes that the latest peacekeeping 
operations have included Chapter VII tasks towards peacebuilding.226 According to 
Boutros Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace, “post-conflict peace-building” occurs once 
peacekeeping efforts achieve their goals. The objective of peacebuilding is to prevent the 
recurrence of a crisis by addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, such as 
economic, social and humanitarian problems. At the tactical level, the argument follows, 
peacebuilding may imply disarmament, repatriation, training of security personnel, 
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institution building and support for elections.227 As Bellamy, et al., point out, 
“Peacebuilding activities focus on two main objectives: preventing the slide back to war 
and creating a peace that does not require external support.”228  This concept leads us to 
what Pauline Baker, et al., call “sustainable security,” which they define as “the ability of 
a society to solve its own problems peacefully without an external administrative or 
military presence.” 229  For Baker, et al., sustainable security is achieved through 
“stability operations,” and peacebuilding is the last stage of those operations. 
Consequently, we can infer that the Uruguayan white defense book, although using 
different expressions, foresees participation in peacebuilding as a step towards 
accomplishing sustainable security. To achieve sustainable security, recent UN missions 
have required peacekeeping operations set up under Chapter VII.230  
The political debate in Uruguay arises when addressing this issue in terms of 
Chapter VI or Chapter VII operations. As we saw, the leftist government is not willing to 
deploy Uruguayan troops under Chapter VII. Nonetheless, it has not yet considered that 
current operations have what I would call “dual mandates.” That means that a UN 
mission includes traditional peacekeeping tasks along with other peace enforcement 
duties, as long as a certain degree of force may be necessary to fulfill the mandate. 
Therefore, some UN missions (MONUC in DRC, MINUSTAH in Haiti) have been 
operating under Chapter VII, although that does not mean that the UN force has gone to 
war or “invaded” a particular country to “impose” peace. As Paolo Tripodi231 argues, 
Chapter VII operations have become common, because if the forces have to face a focus 
of violence, they should not need to wait until another UN Security Council resolution 
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changes the mandate.232 This is the context under which many of today’s and surely 
future Chapter VII operations should be considered. This approach is also consistent with 
Brahimi’s recommendation for “robust peacekeeping.”233  
The Brahimi Report, which is cited in the Uruguayan white defense book, is 
directly related to “peace-support operations.” The final goal of these operations is to 
establish liberal democracies as a means to preserve peace and international security - the 
military is just one among many components.234 However, for peace-support operations 
to succeed, peacekeeping forces must be robust. The idea is to deter spoilers from 
undermining the peace process, and thus force can be used without losing impartiality. 
This means that consent, which is one the pillars of peacekeeping, is malleable.235  
If some degree of force can be used besides self-defense, the UN mandate falls 
under Chapter VII. The Uruguayan white defense book reveals the fact that Uruguay has 
lately been committed in Chapter VII operations, such as those in the DRC and Haiti.236 I 
would add that Uruguayan troops have already taken part in missions, which, although 
they have not yet fallen into the category of peace-support operations, may likely evolve 
into such. First, UN mandates have increasingly incorporated tasks related to the 
establishment of a democratic government and its supporting bureaucracy.237 Second, 
peacekeeping troops in the DRC have been augmented throughout the life of the mission 
(although never to the required size); similarly, authorization for the use of force has been 
incrementally increased – from “as needed” to protect key personnel and civilians from 
“imminent threat” to “use of all necessary means” to fulfill the UN mandate. Indeed, 
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MONUC was mandated to conduct “cordon and search” operations.238 In the words of 
the UN Force Commander in the DRC, Senegalese Lt. General Babacar Gaye, “It may 
look like a war but it’s peacekeeping.”239 The current mission in Haiti is another example 
of wider peacekeeping, which, based on today’s mandate, I think could evolve into a 
peace-support operation.240  
The fact is that Uruguayan military and civilian personnel have kept up with the 
evolution of peace operations. Referring to Bellamy, et al.’s classification,241 Uruguay 
has participated in “traditional peacekeeping” (MFO, Cyprus), “managing transition” 
(Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique), “wider peacekeeping” (DRC), and arguably, in 
“peace-support operations” (currently the DRC, Haiti in the future). Increasing 
Uruguayan participation in peacekeeping compelled the Army to create a peacekeeping 
training center called EOPE.242 Besides, the Army has foreseen future Uruguayan 
participation in peace-support operations as stated in the white defense book.243  
The problem is that the current leftist government disagrees with this approach. 
For example, in 2003, when the Frente Amplio was the opposition, a change in the UN 
mandate for the DRC occurred.244 Because force was expressly authorized to fulfill the 
UN mandate, the Frente Amplio passed an updated bill in the Senate by which the 
Uruguayan troops would not be allowed to use force. The bill did not get enough votes to 
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be approved.245 In the case of Haiti, the Frente Amplio did not support deployment of 
Uruguayan troops because MINUSTAH was a Chapter VII mission. Then, when the UN 
requested an increment of Uruguayan troops in Haiti, the Frente Amplio voted favorably. 
However, its senators stated that their favorable vote had to do with the support of a “fait 
accompli” (Uruguayan troops were already deployed in Haiti), and did not mean a change 
in the contrary position they still held regarding Chapter VII deployments.246  
In the same session, a senator argued that Uruguay should imitate the way other 
regional countries had addressed peacekeeping operations and how beneficial they had 
been in many aspects.247 Consistently, in a regional academic forum, General Heber J. 
Fígoli248 argued that for Uruguay, peacekeeping operations were a tool of the foreign 
policy. In addition, Uruguayan scholars suggest that a nation’s power is composed of 
several elements or “factors,” such as political, economic, military, psychosocial, 
geographic and scientific-technological. Because peacekeeping operations (military 
factor) enable a country to project a positive image into the international arena, Fígoli 
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argued that the economic factor and the political factor should underpin the Uruguayan 
commitment to peacekeeping.249 
In 2005, the current Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs (a former Frente 
Amplio senator when the historical parties were in power) expressed before the 
Committee of Foreign Relations of the Chamber of Representatives that the commitment 
of troops to the mission in Haiti had finally been approved by the Senate, because 
MINUSTAH was a Latin American peacekeeping mission set up after a UN Security 
Council resolution was approved.250 This is inconsistent with what really happened 
because, as we saw, the mission in Haiti did not have the favorable votes of the Frente 
Amplio senators, although later, they gave their votes for the requested increment of 
troops. However, the Minister’s explanation showed a change in his traditional position 
against the mission in Haiti. It seems to me that the Minister tried to draw a distinction 
between UN authorized missions and other “interventions” conducted without the UN’s 
consent. 
Until a decision is reached on the domestic debate, Uruguayan participation in 
future peacekeeping operations may not be guaranteed. At present, the government has 
expressed its refusal to take part in Chapter VII operations. While politicians and the 
military are waiting for the expected debate (a wait which seems to have gone on for so 
long), an update of the white defense book is needed in order to bridge the gap between 
discourse and practice. 
In short, Uruguay is still discussing how to engage in a broad discussion on its 
future participation in peacekeeping. Traditionally rooted principles of foreign policy 
seem to lag behind the more advanced approach to peacekeeping developed by the 
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military during the historical parties’ rule. While the current leftist government has not 
yet defined an official position on peacekeeping, the military has been participating in an 
array of peacekeeping operations, the latest of which was established under Chapter VII. 











Figure 7.   Approaches to Peacekeeping. 
 
 
D. OTHER REGIONAL APPROACHES 
1. Presidential Declarations 
South American Southern Cone countries have shared common interests since the 
third wave of democracy began in the region. MERCOSUR countries are bound by the 
Asunciόn Treaty, which includes an addendum known as the “democratic clause,” by 
which MERCOSUR members declared their commitment to democracy.251 According to 
Russet, et al., it is unlikely that democracies will fight against democracies.252 To be 
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more specific, democratic governments reduce conflict because they are generally more 
peaceful.253 Because they share common values and interests, it is likely that 
democracies will cooperate with each other.254 For example, in 1986, under democratic 
rule, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (among other South Atlantic coastal states) 
sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution which declared the South Atlantic Ocean a 
“zone of peace and cooperation.”255  
Furthermore, in 2004, the region still enjoyed democracy although it is arguable 
how consolidated each country’s democracy was. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argued in 
1996 that only Uruguay was a consolidated democracy, albeit prone to crisis due to a 
difficult political economy.256 By contrast, the ABC countries demonstrated important 
weaknesses. Chile was far from consolidation due to ongoing military prerogatives.257 
Argentina demonstrated separation of powers flaws and unclear constitutional reforms.258 
Brazil has not been able to deal with social inequality, a fragmented multiparty system 
and the rule of law/political accountability issue.259 However, Samuel Huntington argues 
that a democracy can be considered consolidated as long as it passes the “two-turn over 
test.” This means that the political party that won an election when the transition to 
democracy began was able to peacefully transfer the government to a different elected 
party in the subsequent election, which in turn, peacefully turned over to another winning 
party in a further election.260 That was the situation in the Southern Cone of South 
American countries in 2004.  
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The same year, MERCOSUR members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay) and Chile and Bolivia261 declared MERCOSUR, Chile and Bolivia a “zone of 
peace and free of weapons of mass destruction.”262 In this sense, this declaration refers to 
the countries’ support of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which declared Latin America a zone 
free of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the document reaffirms the effectiveness of the 
1991 Mendoza Commitment for the Total Prohibition of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons. The leitmotif of this declaration was to strengthen confidence measures and 
cooperation among the countries in order to avoid an arms race under the context of 
integration.263  
2. Multinational Peacekeeping Exercises 
One of the strengthened areas of cooperation was military interoperability. 
Increased participation in regional exercises has also been credited with improving 
confidence measures among the countries. 
 A study conducted by Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoría from 1993 to 2004, 
based on Argentine participation in military exercises with foreign countries, is useful in 
illustrating the increasing military cooperation and interoperability in the region. A 
thorough analysis of the study shows participation in an increasing number of 
peacekeeping exercises. Since Operaciόn Cruz del Sur (the first peacekeeping regional 
exercise) took place in 1996, there have been at least fourteen peacekeeping exercises in 
which more than one of the countries analyzed were involved. This represents roughly 
two peacekeeping exercises annually, in which Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay 
(besides the U.S.) participated most, both in terms of frequency and level of 
involvement.264  
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Figure 8 below shows an uneven trend concerning the number of multinational 
military exercises in which Argentina participated. However, the study conducted by 
Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoría shows that the number of peacekeeping exercises 
remained nearly the same throughout the years.265 The maximum (2000) and minimum 
(2003) and the “recovery” (2004) were due to an increase or decrease in military 
exercises other than peacekeeping. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Evolution in the Number of Military Exercises Carried Out with Foreign 
Forces (1993-2004). (Base=Argentina). (From: Centro de Estudios Nueva 
Mayoría). 
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Figure 9.   Countries’ Participation in Combined Exercises (1993-2004). 
(Base=Argentina). (From: Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoría). 
 
Figure 9 deals with Argentine participation in military exercises with foreign 
armed forces. This Figure makes it possible to appreciate which regional countries 
participated. Findings show that the regional countries with the highest level of 
participation in exercises with Argentina were Brazil (57), Uruguay (41) and Chile 
(32).266 It is easy to conclude that geographical factors played an important role when it 
came to selecting with whom Argentina was prone to participate in military exercises. As 
a result, interoperability among the Southern Cone of South American countries has 
improved. 
Although not considered for the purpose of this paper, these graphics also allow 
us to see the presence of the hemispheric hegemon. The U.S. had one of the highest 
levels of participation (56).267 According to Mearshimer, the U.S., as the regional 
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hegemon in the western hemisphere, does not want peers.268 Hence, the U.S. participated 
in almost the same number of exercises as Brazil. It seems that the U.S. was trying to 
keep an eye on its eventual regional competitor. Brazil and Argentina are the countries 
whose militaries have most interacted. As traditional competitors, it seems that two 
factors led to this interaction. On the one hand, each country felt the need to take part in 
what its peer had done. On the other hand, each party felt the need to invite its peer to 
participate in what it had done. Further, in decreasing order in terms of participation in 
exercises is Uruguay, a close neighbor and Southwestern Atlantic Ocean partner. After 
Uruguay is Chile, a Pacific Ocean country separated by the Andes mountain chain and a 
former rival with whom Argentina still has some border concerns, though both are trying 
to improve relations. 
 As shown, the Southern Cone of South America seems to be moving towards 
better inter-state relations, of which military interoperability is one of the improved areas. 
Nonetheless, Ricardo Runza argues that South American armed forces are not 
prone to operate collectively.269 Runza conducted a thorough analysis on the organization 
and deployment of each of the ABC countries’ military to identify similarities which 
would make a cooperative security arrangement possible. One area of military 
cooperation he foresees is peacekeeping. He points out that MERCOSUR is the forum 
where the ABC countries should improve military cooperation.270 In light of what has 
already been analyzed, I would add that despite incipient regional interoperability, what 
has been absent is the political will needed to make military collaboration work. 
 In this sense, the fact that the ABC countries and Uruguay each have their own 
peacekeeping training centers demonstrates a lack of cooperation. Besides, each country 
“opened the doors” of their centers to regional and extra-regional interested countries 
(especially Argentina and Chile). As a result, there has been competition instead of 
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cooperation in this area. It is clear that for basic peacekeeping training, each country 
needs its own facilities. But for specialized training like mine clearing, riverine 
operations, staff and force commander positions and so on, it would be better to 
centralize training. 
3. Ministers of Defense Meetings 
Assistance to the America’s Ministers of Defense meetings has been common. 
These fora began in Williamsburg in 1995, and discussed a variety of hemispheric 
security issues. At that time, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay participated and 
agreed with the points under discussion. Notable among them was the promotion of 
cooperation in regard to UN peacekeeping.271 Furthermore, in the Bariloche meeting in 
1996, the countries of the Americas encouraged the hemisphere to participate in UN 
peacekeeping operations.272 The Cartagena meeting in 1998 arrived at similar 
conclusions.273 At Manaus in 2000, since the region had already been involved in many 
UN missions, the meeting encouraged the countries to train in peacekeeping. At the same 
time, it established that each country was free to determine its own defense 
requirements.274 Then, in Santiago de Chile in 2002, meeting attendees stated that each 
country had the right to participate in UN peacekeeping according to its interests and 
domestic law. Additionally, discussion of regional approaches for future participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations275 was encouraged. Finally, the 2004 meeting in Quito 
reaffirmed support for the UN role as peacekeeper. In this regard, the Quito declaration 
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also foresaw cooperation among the countries according to their interests, highlighting 
the participation in MINUSTAH.276 
It is clear that regional cooperation has been enhanced no matter the relative 
power of the stakeholders. Indeed, Russet, et al., argue that instead of power, “ideological 
affinity is more important for democracies.”277 If so, today’s political “picture” in the 
Southern Cone of South America fits Russet, et al.’s argument and presents a window of 
opportunity for deepening cooperation.  
However, the Ministers of Defense meetings analyzed in this Chapter occurred 
before the Frente Amplio took over in Uruguay in March 2005. The next Ministers of 
Defense meeting will be held in 2006. At present, there has been no “public” government 
declaration on whether or not the Frente Amplio is willing to participate; and if so, what 
approach Uruguay will take. The only known position is the document prepared by the 
Defense Committee of the Frente Amplio shortly before the 2004 elections. On that 
account, the document states that the Uruguayan Armed Forces “…will not be employed 
under the hemispheric security statements encouraged by the Williamsburg 
Meeting…”278 Moreover, the document negatively describes the array of U.S.-led 
hemispheric defense organizations and their related activities and considers that the main 
mission of the military is to ensure the sovereignty of the state in its territory. In fact, the 
document states that in the region 
…an autonomous Pan-American military system has been created, not 
always in tune with the country’s foreign policy, within a frame of 
absolutely no transparency, absent of parliamentary checks and without 
citizens’ awareness. In this regard, a constellation of military 
organizations and activities of any sort have been developed, which have 
negatively influenced upon our country’s military doctrine. Consequently, 
the U.S. has been imposing its own vision and doctrine on what the 
missions and organization our Armed Forces should be.279  
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Then the document adds that “The Uruguayan Army, Navy and Air Force, whose 
fundamental mission is to ensure the full exercise of sovereignty upon the diverse spaces 
under the republic’s jurisdiction…”280 
The current leftist government has not yet “opened” the promised debate on 
national defense policy. In part, this is because the government has been very busy 
dealing with the “disappeared people” issue, which the current leftist government 
promised to investigate. The disappeared people were people captured by security forces 
during the dictatorship. After being held in captivity for some time, they have not yet 
been found anywhere. However, they were neither freed nor held in prison. As a result of 
this paradox, those people became known as the “disappeared people,” although the most 
probable scenario is that the security forces killed them. Human rights advocates and 
leftist parties have demanded accountability from military and civilian officials since the 
restoration of democracy took place in 1985. Legislative solutions entered into force and 
a truth commission worked to shed light on the final destiny of the disappeared people. 
Nevertheless, some cases remain open and the leftist government is now investigating 
this issue. The ongoing procedure includes excavations on military installations to find 
the remains of the disappeared people, based on information provided in Commanders in 
Chief’s reports. These tasks have taken more time than originally anticipated. 
Meanwhile, the military continues to enjoy its “laissez-faire” in national defense 
policy.281 The government has not yet taken time to re-assess Uruguay’s existing 
commitments, which were made during regional security meetings held before the Frente 
Amplio took over the government. As a result, it is highly probable that the leftist 
government will be represented at the next Ministers of Defense meeting. This is 
important because the absence of Uruguayan representation at the meeting would leave 
Uruguay isolated from the regional security agenda.  
E. SUMMARY 
It seems that some sort of checkerboards still underlie the Southern Cone region 
in Latin America, although the political discourse sometimes indicates the opposite. In                                                  
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the past, checkerboards were multipolar balance of power systems whereby neighbors 
were seen as enemies and neighbors of neighbors as friends.282 They provided regional 
equilibrium. Buffer states operated as “cushions” between the large countries, which 
minimized the possibility of escalation. Today, the main difference between the old 
concept of checkerboards and the ongoing “new wave” of checkerboards is that ABC 
countries do not create local alignments to balance one another. What is happening today 
is that each country, despite economic integration, is trying to increase its leverage in the 
international arena independently. Although each country operates in the same 
checkerboard (the Southern Cone of South America), each one acts as if it were a piece 
of a different set of checkerboard pieces.  
However, political declarations have made the military think about increasing 
cooperation and deepening integration. The problem is that “declarations” are not legally 
binding documents. Therefore, the military in the Southern Cone of South America still 
waits for politicians to lead the process of military integration, as democracy mandates. 
In this context, Uruguay cannot play the “buffer” role anymore because there is no 
regional conflict to prevent between its large neighbors.283  
Argentina has always had desires of being an influential country at the 
international and regional levels. Although Argentina had already published its Defense 
White Book, a 2003 revision attempted to reflect the leftist viewpoint. In particular, the 
academic meeting created to deal with that issue was guided by a democratic approach. 
Almost two hundred people from different extractions, such as governmental officials, 
politicians, scholars, policymakers, political scientists, civil and military academic 
institutions and members of the armed forces participated in the first round of discussions 
about national defense policy and armed forces in the context of a democratic Argentina. 
Commitment to democracy, regional integration and preservation of peace and 
international security were stated goals. Additionally, participants discussed how 
important it was for Argentina to recover its influence in the region, thus acknowledging 
how a strong Argentina could have a positive effect on insertion of the region into the 
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international arena. Finally, the meeting analyzed the importance of cooperative security 
within the region and Argentina’s commitment to both Chapter VI and Chapter VII 
peacekeeping missions. 
Although its traditional rivalry with Brazil seems to have ended, Argentina will 
not follow the Brazilian approach. In fact, Argentina considers itself the most 
experienced country in terms of security issues due to its involvement in the 
Malvinas/Falklands War, the First Gulf War, the U.S. intervention in Haiti, its 
participation in Bosnia and its category as “major non-NATO U.S. ally.” Besides, by 
allowing Chilean troops to be part of its task force in Cyprus and foreseeing the 
commitment of an Argentine-Chilean joint peacekeeping unit to Haiti in 2006, Argentina 
has demonstrated its willingness to improve trust and cooperation in the region. As a 
result, it seems that Argentina is waiting for another “window of opportunity” to regain 
the prestige it enjoyed not so long ago. 
Brazil is still trying to consolidate its hegemony in South America. Based on its 
Portuguese heritage of diplomacy and foreign relations, it is trying to convince everyone 
of the advantages of supporting its approach. While there is not yet a “formal” white 
defense book in Brazil, from its “white paper” it is clear that it does not want to be 
constrained by other regional countries. What Brazil really wants is regional support of 
its role as “leader,” which arose again under Lula’s rule. In this sense, it does not support 
Chapter VII operations although it demands a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. As stated in the Brazilian white paper, Brazil wants to enhance the role of 
preventive diplomacy. 
Chile is still considering pending border issues and wants to exert influence in the 
international arena without constraints. Its Socialist government is pursuing the 
achievement of national objectives as a state policy, above partisan ideologies. Indeed, 
Chile outlined its defense policy and related topics of foreign policy in its white book 
under the current Socialist party rule. For Chile, the defense policy constitutes a tool for 
the projection of power and support of its diplomacy.284 In this regard, Chile now accepts 
participation in Chapter VII operations. Further expectations rest on an eventual                                                  
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Argentine-Chilean joint peacekeeping unit’s deployment to Haiti in 2006. If successful, 
this effort will contribute to strengthening trust between the two countries.  
Uruguay is a question mark in regard to regional security issues. The leftist 
government has not yet provided clear-cut definitions in that regard, although its political 
advisors harbor distrust and skepticism about participation in peacekeeping, especially 
when use of force is required. As opposed to Chile, the leftist government in Uruguay 
“received” a non-published white defense book, whose statements on peacekeeping do 
not appear to be in total accordance with what the current government believes, 
especially if we consider the arguments that leftist members of parliament made when 
discussing peacekeeping issues. Besides, the Uruguayan white book still is considered a 
“working paper” and is open to debate. This document was created by a narrow circle of 
military elite, who did not always work together. The book does not necessarily reflect 
the military’s approach and it definitely does not reflect the current leftist point of view. 
So, there is not yet a state policy on peacekeeping in Uruguay. If the leftist 
government finally embraces its advisors’ recommendations, Uruguay’s approach will be 
closer to Brazil’s than to any other country in the region. Both countries have stated their 
objection to Chapter VII operations and to having extra-regional countries involved in 
Latin American security issues. 
The Southern Cone of South America is not yet prepared for a peacekeeping 
partnership. The ABC states have different approaches about peacekeeping and 
competitive objectives on regional leadership. Regional cooperation seems to be a means 
to achieve individualistic ends. Brazil is the “natural leader” and is now leading this 
“race.” But Argentina and Chile do not want to be considered “secondary actors.” 
Argentina shows the most “integrationist” approach but is viewed as so “risky” by other 
countries. Chile does not adhere to all polices specified in MERCOSUR, although it still 
tries to close links with Argentina on peacekeeping 
 Uruguay fears deviating from its rooted principles. Although political discourse 
promotes a form of military cooperation, the ABC countries and Uruguay are not yet 
prepared to deepen the existent level of commitment. Neither do they seem willing to 
yield sovereignty to a “regional peacekeeping force” or to give up rooted foreign policy 
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principles in favor of achieving regional standards for peacekeeping. The exception might 
be the Argentine-Chilean project for a joint peacekeeping unit to be deployed to Haiti in 
2006. However, this would be an “ad hoc” bi-national (Argentina and Chile) unit and not 
a regional (ABC plus Uruguay) “permanent” one. 
Moreover, for the Uruguayan leftist government, regional security arrangements 
such as TIAR, the Inter-American Defense Board and Ministers of Defense meetings are 
seen as systems to accomplish the U.S.’ interests, which are not in tune with regional or 
domestic interests. Besides, the Uruguayan government policy advisors still see the main 
role of the armed forces as defense of the territory. But, at the same time, they have not 
yet defined against whom defense is needed. In this “picture,” Uruguay might be left 
isolated by the ABC countries concerning peacekeeping. At least, other countries have 
clear ideas about what to do in that regard. Uruguay continues debating this issue, and 
worse, has no state policy.  
Figure 10 summarizes the whole chapter. By highlighting each country’s 
independent agenda in light of the variables analyzed, it can be seen how difficult it is 






















Figure 10.   Independent Agendas in the Southern Cone. 
 
The following diagram summarizes the main arguments the Southern Cone of 
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Figure 11.   Assessing a Peacekeeping Partnership. 
 
An analysis of Figure 11 shows divergent interests among the Southern Cone 
countries concerning Foreign and Defense Policy. The “Approach to Peacekeeping” 
variable shows two blocs, one composed of Argentina and Chile and the other composed 
of Brazil and Uruguay. Regarding security issues, although there is coincidence regarding 
the democratic clause, each country is running its own peacekeeping training center and 
is offering courses overseas. The countries appear to be in competition with each other. 
Finally, all Ministers of Defense support their country’s participation in peacekeeping, 
except for the Uruguayan Minister of Defense, who is discussing that issue. However, 
this will also be part of an expected broader debate on national defense policy. The final 
assessment for a peacekeeping partnership illustrates the bottom line resulted from the 
combination of the three variables’ main arguments of the Southern Cone countries. The 
regional landscape is not yet appropriate for a successful peacekeeping partnership.  
Therefore, should Uruguay again play the “buffer” role it used to play in the past? 
I do not think so. Insofar as the ABC countries are trying to improve their leverage in the 
international arena, Uruguay’s position is stronger if it becomes part of the region’s 
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approach. With the highest contribution to peacekeeping in the region, Uruguay should 
not be left without a voice, despite being the least powerful among its eventual 
peacekeeping partners. It is clear that Uruguay cannot play the “buffer” role in discussing 
regional peacekeeping standards.285 
By the same token, in light of the Argentine-Chilean closeness on Chapter VII 
peacekeeping and the Uruguayan-Brazilian similar abidance by Chapter VI, do Kelly’s 
checkerboards take place between these two “blocs”? Again, I do not think so. In the long 
run, each of the ABC countries is pursuing its own interests and Uruguay, as a former 
“buffer” state, has no experience in playing the checkerboard role. However, ongoing 
regional facts are evidence of a “new wave” of checkerboards in the region.  In this sense, 
Chile still has border issues with Argentina. Brazil did not support the Uruguayan 
candidate as Chair of the World Trade Organization.286 Uruguay, on the one hand, did 
not support the Brazilian candidate for the Inter-American Development Bank;287 on the 
other hand, it does support Brazilian claims for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council.288 Argentina does not support the Brazilian claim.289 In addition, Argentina has 
conflicts with Uruguay about the installation of two cellulose plants on Uruguayan soil, 
arguing environmental degradation.290 
As a result, it seems that nationalism is still strong enough to undermine a steady 
integration process. That happened during the independence war, and has been happening 
throughout the countries’ independent existence. The end of the Cold War afforded 
regional integration for economic prosperity. Yet integration on issues which involve the 
concept of sovereignty and nationality, such as the creation of a regional force for 
peacekeeping, seems to be unlikely in the short run. During the last decade, the countries 
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have agreed on a variety of “new threats” and declared that confidence measures should 
continue to be taken to diminish the perception of the neighbor as a threat. That was a 
political decision. By the same token, peacekeeping does not involve rivalry in the sense 
that those who participate by no means constitute a threat to their neighbors. That is 
because UN missions are “open” to all who want to participate, insofar as they are in 
“acceptable shape” to do so.291  
Luis Tilibetti argues that MERCOSUR is more than an economic agreement. In 
support of this argument, he presents the declaration of MERCOSUR as a zone of peace 
made in Ushuaia and then recognized by the OAS and the UN.292 I would argue that a 
peacekeeping partnership is another political decision ABC countries and Uruguay might 
make. The four countries analyzed are now sharing a peacekeeping mission in Haiti. This 
can be considered a “window of opportunity” to find similar approaches concerning other 
peacekeeping operations.  
The ideological convergence in the region constitutes a basis for establishing a 
dialogue on this issue. However, the creation of a “regional peacekeeping force” sounds 
complicated. The first step should be to agree on regional standards for participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations. This alone will demand a lot of time. Once this step is 
achieved, the region can think about creating a regional force under the command of any 
of the involved countries. Argentina and Chile are now moving towards a joint 
commitment to Haiti in 2006. But this would be an “ad hoc” effort tailored just to that 
mission. Brazil is not concerned about the creation of a regional force or the adoption of 
regional peacekeeping standards because as regional leader, it has already achieved its 
goal of commanding the peacekeeping forces deployed to the UN mission in Haiti. 
Compared to the ABC countries, Uruguay is the only one which is not competing for 
regional leadership; likewise, its leftist government is the one which has to work the most 
in designing a peacekeeping policy. Chapter V details why the Uruguayan Armed Forces 
should be committed to UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations. 
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IV:   REASONS WHY URUGUAY SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN UN 
CHAPTER VII PEACKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Does anybody believe, and is anybody seriously arguing, that in six 
months we should cease to participate in Unitas, discuss and eventually 
withdraw from the Congo and Haiti, investigate the fate of the 
disappeared, modify the promotion system for general officers,  reorganize 
the intelligence services with direct oversight by the presidency, legislate 
on the right of civilians to occupy the highest positions in the Ministry of 
Defense, discuss, modify, and reorganize the deployment of forces over 
the national territory, review the military education system and the 
military justice system, the role of the merchant marine, reform military 
pensions, analyze the relationship of the military health system and the 
future national health system, approve the budget, and engage in another 
long list of tasks? It seems altogether obvious to us that the answer to 
these questions is ‘no.’ 
Senator Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro (Tupamaro Leader,           
former guerrilla fighter and current Chairman of the                        
Defense Committee of the Senate).293  
 
To discuss the Uruguayan Armed Forces’ participation in future peacekeeping 
operations is something new for politicians and policymakers. The leftist government has 
promised to allow an open debate on national defense policy.  The issue of Uruguayan 
involvement in peacekeeping operations would be one part of this larger discussion. In 
fact, such a debate would be the first attempt to discuss military issues in a broader sense. 
That would also mean the “end” of the military “laissez-faire,” which was the tacit policy 
that marked Uruguayan civil-military relations under the historical parties’ rule. That 
“policy” accounted for a certain degree of politicization of the armed forces, which, in the 
past, caused a “clash” between the military and the left. Today, an analysis of the 
Uruguayan threat environment under Desch’s criteria (low internal threat and low 
external threat) finds that in order to avoid embarrassing civil-military problems, the 
leftist government should support the deployment of troops to international 
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peacekeeping.294 This is tantamount to saying that Uruguayan troops should be deployed 
under Chapter VII. 
Politicians and people in general have become accustomed to accepting the 
commitment of Uruguayan troops in international peacekeeping operations. Indeed, we 
saw that at the domestic level, this role has improved the image the Uruguayan people 
have of the military. But traditionally, Uruguayan troops were deployed to Chapter VI 
missions. Today, the major Uruguayan commitments take place in the DRC and Haiti, 
both missions established under Chapter VII.  The previous Chapter mentioned the 
extensive parliamentary debate that took place regarding whether or not to send troops to 
those countries. Political and ideological arguments framed that discussion. In March 
2005, the left took over the government. The left, accustomed to behaving as the 
opposition, is now responsible for taking the initiative to prepare and submit requests to 
parliament regarding authorizing the commitment of troops for overseas peacekeeping. 
Should the Uruguayan Armed Forces be committed to UN Chapter VII 
peacekeeping operations? I argue that Uruguay should commit its Armed Forces to a 
broader spectrum of peacekeeping missions, including UN Chapter VII operations. In my 
opinion, the pending debate on whether or not the Uruguayan Armed Forces should be 
deployed to UN Chapter VII missions represents a window of opportunity for both the 
leftist government and the military to improve civil-military relations. It is a win-win 
situation in which both could achieve their “goals.” Peacekeeping is one of the military 
missions Desch recommends for a threat environment similar to the current situation in 
Uruguay (low internal threat and low external threat). The issue is to ensure civilian 
control of the military by developing an adequate military doctrine.295 Political support of 
Chapter VII missions would allow the military to continue and improve its participation 
in peacekeeping operations and to enjoy the benefits of doing so. The leftist government 
would consolidate its power without violating the traditional foreign policy principles of 
preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts. In addition, the government 
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would also support the ideals of multilateralism and international solidarity. The trade-off 
for the government would be to abandon its rigid adherence to the ideal of non-
intervention, which is closely tied to the principle of self-determination.  
In this regard, how consistent are Chapter VII peacekeeping operations with 
the current political and military situation in Uruguay? We will see that future 
Chapter VII peacekeeping missions will not necessarily mean a violation of the 
Uruguayan foreign policy principles and leftist ideals, but instead are a different approach 
for coping with the dilemmas posed by today’s post-Westphalian world. We will also see 
that the military has a unique opportunity to train its personnel in conflict environments 
and can obtain economic benefits for doing so. However, the military should be willing to 
suffer more casualties than it has been used to. On the one hand, the country would 
improve its status as a member of the international community, whereas the government 
could consolidate its power by enjoying stable civil-military relations. On the other hand, 
the government should be ready to succeed in managing disagreements between its 
parties and constituencies. Finally, both the military and the government would 
collaborate in projecting an image of Uruguay as a stable country, committed to ensuring 
peace and international security. 
 Therefore, I propose a policy for Uruguay’s participation in peacekeeping 
operations that is:  
1. Consistent with the Uruguayan traditional foreign policy principles of 
a. Preventive Diplomacy 
b. Peaceful Resolution of Controversies 
2. Consistent with the current leftist government ideals of 
a. Multilateralism 
b. International solidarity 
3. Consistent with military needs in terms of 
a. Training and Re-equipment 
b. Welfare of personnel 
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4. Essential to improve 
a. The image of the country in the international arena 
b. Domestic civil-military relations 
The following analysis will show why UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations 
are consistent with each of the preceding arguments. 
A. UN CHAPTER VII OPERATIONS, URUGUAYAN FOREIGN POLICY 
PRINCIPLES AND LEFTIST IDEALS 
There have been breaches to peace and international security which have resulted 
in non-coercive UN actions. Traditionally, those breaches have been Chapter VI 
operations or, according to Bellamy, et al., traditional peacekeeping.296 These types of 
operations exactly fit the Uruguayan traditional foreign policy principles of preventive 
diplomacy, non-intervention, self-determination and peaceful resolution of controversies 
among states because they rely on consent, impartiality and minimum use of force.297 In 
addition, they attempt to contribute to peaceful resolution of conflict through the use of a 
peacekeeping force operating as deterrent to further engagements between the parties.298 
This deterrent characteristic is what today resembles former UN Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskold’s preventive diplomacy approach of the sixties. Up to this point, 
Uruguayan traditional foreign policy principles of preventive diplomacy and peaceful 
resolution of conflicts have not been violated at all. 
But the world has changed. UN peacekeeping operations began deploying within 
state borders to stop domestic conflict. The result was the evolution of the traditional 
peacekeeping of Chapter VI to different forms of operations under Chapter VII. These 
operations were needed to allow peacekeepers to fulfill the UN mandate. Thus, although 
using force is authorized, the ultimate goal is to create a safe environment for an agreed 
upon peace process. The aim is to contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflict. In this 
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regard, only violent spoilers are targeted.299 The following analysis will show how UN 
Chapter VII operations can fit both the Uruguayan traditional foreign policy principles of 
preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts and the leftist ideals of 
multilateralism and non-intervention. 
Boutros Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace foresaw an increasingly coercive UN 
approach when it expressed that “Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations 
presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally 
involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as 
well.”300 
 We note that the highlighted words elicited controversy in the international 
community concerning the abandonment of rooted peacekeeping principles such as 
consent and the UN’s “monopoly” on ensuring peace and international security. 
Furthermore, we saw that the Brahimi Report created the concept of “robust 
peacekeeping,” allowing an increasing use of force to fulfill the UN mandate in order “to 
distinguish victim from aggressor.”301 We have seen that the UN has lately increased its 
involvement in Chapter VII operations because failure to use force has frequently 
resulted in mass killings, genocide and other atrocities against humanity, as occurred in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo. In this regard, a specific approach, known as 
“humanitarian intervention,” has evolved in the realm of the UN as a means to cope with 
similar situations in the future.  
Accordingly, the issue for Uruguay is to reassess what non-intervention in other 
States’ domestic affairs and state sovereignty mean for the international community 
today, because as we saw, the principle of non-intervention has traditionally been 
embraced by Uruguay. This leads our discussion to the Report of the International 
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Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whereby an independent international 
commission appointed by the UN Secretary General tried to achieve a consensus on how 
the international community should respond to massive violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law.302  This study relied on two core basic principles: first, state 
sovereignty implies responsibility for the protection of its people; and second, when a 
state is unwilling or unable to stop the harm caused to its population by internal violence, 
the “international responsibility to protect” trumps the principle of non-intervention. This 
concept implies that the international community has an obligation to militarily intervene 
within a state for humanitarian purposes, regardless of whether that state’s leaders 
consent to such intervention.303 As the report states 
What is at stake here is not making the world safe for big powers, or 
trampling over the sovereign rights of small ones, but delivering practical 
protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are 
unwilling to protect them.304 
In light of the “responsibility to protect” (humanitarian intervention) approach, 
what has been done either in Uruguayan academic discussions or in the sphere of the 
current leftist government? According to Felipe Paolillo, former Uruguayan ambassador 
to the UN (2000-2005), the problem of dogmatically sustaining the principle of non-
intervention does not solve the “humanitarian intervention dilemma.”  This is because all 
countries have demanded an end to atrocities against humanity, but without explaining 
how to bring about such an end.305 During a September 2005 visit to the U.S., Dr. Tabaré 
Vázquez, the current Uruguayan President, spoke at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) and commented on the controversy addressed by Paolillo 
regarding the intervention dilemma. The President stated that Uruguay should design its 
foreign policy based on traditional rooted principles, among them the principle of non 
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intervention. But he also said that Uruguay has to recognize the indivisible character of 
all human rights.306 This concept of indivisibility is consistent with the Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. In this regard, the 
report recognizes that because human security is indivisible, “gross human rights 
violations can constitute a risk to people everywhere.”307 What the Uruguayan president 
did not address was how to reconcile his concerns for the universal indivisibility of all 
human rights with the principle of non-intervention. This is more remarkable when we 
analyze the speech the Uruguayan president gave on the occasion of the UN General 
Assembly 60th Session in September 2005. In addition to expressing the same ideas he 
had previously addressed at the CSIS meeting, he added that no one can be passive 
witness or unconcerned about what seem to be someone elese’s problems.308 
The international community is still in the process of discussing the 
“humanitarian intervention” issue, although the concept is now called “the responsibility 
to protect.” The dilemma has also been tackled in terms of preventing the commission of 
humanitarian atrocities by addressing the root causes of internal conflicts.309 But 
according to Paolillo, once the problem is apparent, it is clear that the preventive 
approach was unsuccessful.310  
The solution, according to Paolillo, seems to rely on having a Chapter VII 
resolution approved in advance by the Security Council. Without this approval, the 
dilemma will remain unsolved because the international community still has to figure out 
how to put an end to gross human rights violations. In this event and in order to avoid a 
possible UN Security Council veto, only an ex post facto legitimization might solve the 
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dilemma of humanitarian intervention, as long as certain conditions are fulfilled: the 
intervention is the response to a “just cause,” it should never be unilateral but collective, 
its only purpose should be to put an end to humanitarian atrocities, and finally, military 
intervention must be considered a last resort.311 The issue is to figure out who will 
legitimize military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The UN Security Council is 
the appropriate entity to do so, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  However, if 
the veto were used, the dilemma would remain unsolved. The “default” option might be a 
UN General Assembly legitimization under the United for Peace resolution, which, as we 
discussed in Chapter II, was created with the participation of Uruguayan representatives. 
However, this would not be a compulsory solution insofar as the UN General Assembly 
has no binding powers. 
What is clear is that this type of military intervention is unrelated to old concepts 
of intervention, especially concepts from the beginning of twentieth century, at which 
time the great powers intervened in other countries to collect debts or promote 
commercial interests.312 These old-style military interventions forced weak countries to 
abide by the principle of non-intervention. In doing so, weak countries acted in defense of 
their sovereignty, and its partner, the principle of self-determination.313 But humanitarian 
intervention, or the responsibility to protect approach, relies on state sovereignty, 
understood as a state’s responsibility for its population’s security and welfare with its 
dimension on human rights. Understanding state sovereignty as responsibility ensures a 
state’s domestic and international accountability concerning human rights.314 This is 
consistent both with President Vázquez’s expressions in the UN General Assembly 60th 
Session and with the Uruguayan leftist political and social platforms.  
What other consistencies can we find between the Uruguayan leftist foreign 
policy arguments and the responsibility to protect approach? When the left took over the 
government in March 2005, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated before the Committee 
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of Foreign Relations of the Chamber of Representatives that Uruguay would emphasize 
multilateralism as a necessary element in addressing important international issues.315 
Furthermore, speaking at the opening meeting of the UN General Assembly 60th Session 
in September 2005, President Vázquez argued that peace and international security rely 
on universal multilateralism and he repudiated any unilateral action to achieve the UN 
Charter goals.316 Moreover, when the Uruguayan president spoke in the UN General 
Assembly 60th Session following debate, he mentioned seven principles of Uruguayan 
foreign policy. Related to my argument, he talked about solidarity and multilateralism, 
besides non-intervention, emphasizing the essential role of the UN in addressing the 
world’s agenda.317  
In today’s international context, to demand solidarity and multilateralism is 
completely in tune with the responsibility to protect approach. In this regard, the Report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty foresees military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes based on the following principles: the just cause 
threshold, the precautionary principle, right authority and operational principles.318 The 
just cause threshold refers to large-scale loss of life or “ethnic cleansing,” which implies 
solidarity with suffering peoples. In this sense, the current Uruguayan Under-Secretary of 
Defense made an “unofficial” press declaration in which he argued that in the event of 
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ethnic cleansing, the leftist government might be willing to send troops under Chapter 
VII.319  
Moreover, the precautionary principle deals with right intention (to put an end to 
human suffering through multilateral operations),320 that again implies solidarity and 
multilateralism; military intervention as a last resort (to deploy military forces only when 
non-military efforts fail), proportional means (scale, duration and intensity of the 
minimum military intervention needed to achieve the human protection objective) and 
reasonable prospects (reasonable chances of success in ending people’s suffering),321 
which also implies solidarity. Furthermore, the right authority principle empowers the 
UN Security Council to authorize military intervention for humanitarian purposes,322 
which enhances multilateralism. I would add that a Council’s decision in that regard 
would require a Chapter VII resolution, because as Martha Finnemore points out, “What 
used to be simple atrocities are now understood as threats to international peace and order 
in ways that were not true during previous eras.”323 
Finally, the operational principles are very similar to the ones which rule today’s 
peacekeeping.  Among those principles are limitation and gradualism when using force 
(the goal is to protect the population, not to defeat the state) and maximum coordination 
with humanitarian organizations.324 
International solidarity and broad participation in defense of human rights are 
arguments that have always characterized the left in Uruguay. A domestic example 
illustrates how important “multilateralism,” “solidarity” and what I would call “foreign 
intervention” concerning human rights are today for the Uruguayan left. The leftist 
government has allowed excavations in military installations in order to find the remains 
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of the “disappeared,” those illegally abducted and killed when Uruguay was ruled by a 
dictatorship (1973-1985). In doing so, Argentine scientists and political authorities have 
been working alongside Uruguayan partners. Not only did those foreigners work on 
Uruguayan soil to contribute to accomplishing Uruguayan goals, but they also made 
media statements.325 
So, we find important similarities between the Uruguayan traditional foreign 
policy principles, the political and social platform of the leftist government, its most 
recent discourse in the international arena and the new approach that military 
interventions began taking in the sphere of the UN and the international community. We 
might argue that Uruguay participated in humanitarian interventions before the 
responsibility to protect approach was documented. According to Finnemore, the primary 
goal of the 1991-1993 UN mission in Cambodia, where Uruguay played a prominent 
role, was neither strategic nor territorial. It was humanitarian.326 At present, the two 
peacekeeping operations in which Uruguay is involved with troops (DRC and Haiti) have 
a humanitarian protection component. It is foreseeable that in regions experiencing the 
ongoing process of internal conflicts and state collapse, human suffering will be common. 
Either by means of a peacekeeping operation or by means of a military humanitarian 
intervention, the UN Security Council may be called upon to act. If so, it is highly 
probable that the Council will pass a Chapter VII resolution allowing some type of 
military intervention.  
However, it is also highly probable that the UN-led forces will “intervene” to 
contribute to the prevention of further violence and to help create a peaceful environment 
for conflict resolution. In so doing, peacekeeping forces would be demonstrating support 
for the ideals of multilateralism and international solidarity. Therefore, Uruguayan troops 
could participate in those operations because traditional foreign policy principles and 
leftist ideals will not be violated at all. For the domestic discourse in Uruguay, the only 
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arguable point might be the issue about the principle of non-intervention. But, as we saw, 
this principle has evolved into a very limited, constrained, specific and accountable form 
of humanitarian intervention, based on the concept of responsibility to protect. Its 
ultimate goal is to alleviate people’s suffering, which, at the end of the day, has been a 
traditional leftist banner. 
B. UN CHAPTER VII OPERATIONS AND URUGUAYAN MILITARY 
NEEDS 
1. Training 
 Peacekeeping has represented an invaluable opportunity for the military to train 
its personnel in a more realistic environment than any field exercise. In this regard, in his 
Master’s thesis on National Strategy, Uruguayan General Hebert Fígoli argued that 
“Peacekeeping forces develop their duties in an operational environment extremely more 
authentic than the homeland’s peaceful training scenarios, in the absence of immediate 
real or potential threats.”327 Fígoli attempted to scientifically identify how beneficial 
peacekeeping operations had been for army personnel. The goal was to determine to what 
extent army personnel (the enlisted men) were more skillful and willing to fulfill their 
duties once reassigned to their units of origin upon completion of the peacekeeping 
mission.328 This was the first scientific study on the effect of peacekeeping operations on 
army personnel training; and it was conducted after the Army participated in its first three 
“major” peacekeeping missions, Cambodia (1991-1993), Mozambique (1992-1994) and 
Angola (1995-1999).329 This framework allowed Fígoli to analyze enough information 
and experience because more than 6000 Uruguayan Army troops had taken part in those 
missions, representing roughly 50% of the Army’s strength.  
Fígoli compared two similar groups of enlisted men (same rank, skills and units of 
origin): the sole difference was that one of the groups was composed of people who 
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participated in peacekeeping operations and the other group was composed of people who 
lacked that experience.330 By means of distributing questionnaires to both “testing 
groups” and to their units’ officer corps, and by personally interviewing the commanders 
of the same units, Fígoli focused his study on the following topics: self-confidence, fear, 
tension and leadership; technical-tactical performance, and sergeant/corporals’ command 
skills. The necessary data processing was conducted by a private statistics and survey 
firm, which strengthened the professional quality of the analysis. 
The study results demonstrated that participation in peacekeeping operations was 
beneficial for army personnel training, either collectively or individually.331 The findings 
were summarized in six major areas. First, the enlisted men who participated in 
peacekeeping demonstrated good performance in conflict areas and kept their individual 
equipment and weapons in a high degree of readiness. Second, the officer corps 
positively qualified the soldiers’ readiness and willingness to fulfill their duties and to 
improve their personal care once those who participated in peacekeeping returned to their 
units of origin. Third, leadership skills were remarkable among the people who took part 
in peacekeeping missions compared to those who did not. Fourth, former peacekeepers 
demonstrated better physical training, readiness for field exercises and concentration at 
work once they returned to their units of origin. Fifth, personnel with specific skills, such 
as corpsmen, radio-operators and drivers, returned significantly better prepared than those 
who did not take part in peacekeeping missions. Sixth, former peacekeepers shared their 
newly gained knowledge and improved technical-tactical skills with others, and were 
viewed by their peers as examples of soldiers to emulate.332 Other works have also come 
to the conclusion that peacekeeping missions have beneficial effects on army personnel 
training, but Fígoli’s work is still considered the masterpiece in this field and is used as a 
reference for related studies.  
The Uruguayan Navy, which has become increasingly involved in peacekeeping 
operations, also analyzed the effects on training. In this regard, the Navy emphasized the 
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importance of strengthening corps spirit among both deployed personnel and members 
from all military services. For the Navy, this “multi-service” interaction is one of the 
most remarkable outcomes of peacekeeping, because efforts have recently been made to 
improve military jointness in Uruguay.333  
Like Fígoli, the Navy appreciated the importance of operating in environments at 
odds with the safety of the homeland scenario.334 The Uruguayan Navy analyzed its most 
important peacekeeping area of commitment: riverine operations. In Cambodia in 1991-
1993, the Uruguayan Navy had the opportunity to operate in riverine areas alongside 
other components. Ten years later, when the UN Security Council authorized the 
deployment of a peacekeeping mission in the DRC, it included in the mandate that the 
Congo River should be reopened as major line of communication.335 In fact, that mission 
was assigned to a Uruguayan Riverine Company, which includes two fast patrol boats. At 
present, Uruguay is the only country which has contributed to the UN with a naval 
contingent.336 Having become accustomed to operating in riverine environments, the 
experience of the Uruguayan Navy components has been fully appreciated by the UN.337 
A Navy document reported that the DRC experience in riverine environments will 
improve the Navy’s already existent skills in domestic riverine operations.338 
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Moreover, for the Uruguayan Navy, peacekeeping operations have constituted 
opportunities to deploy naval infantry units (marines) and to make choices for testing 
command and control structures and leadership.339 The important effect that 
peacekeeping missions have had on Uruguayan Navy training was noted by its 
Commander in Chief in November 2004, on the occasion of the 187th Navy anniversary: 
The participation in peacekeeping missions, absolutely voluntary, has 
constituted an extremely positive element with fundamental incidence on 
the personnel’s moral, training and experience.340 
Furthermore, the Uruguayan Navy has recently accomplished two additional tasks 
related to the importance of international peacekeeping, besides still being committed in 
the DRC and Haiti. First, in April 2005, the Navy incorporated a command and 
control/general support ship. Among its various missions, this ship will be used as 
freighter to deliver logistical support for a peacekeeping force.341 Second, in June 2005, 
the Navy participated in a multinational peacekeeping exercise. It was a “cabinet” 
exercise co-organized by the U.S. Naval War College and the Escuela de Guerra Naval 
del Uruguay (Uruguayan Naval War College). The exercise, called “Peacekeeper 05,” 
took place in Newport, Rhode Island, home of the U.S. Naval War College. The exercise 
simulated peacekeeping situations for a force deployed in Haiti. Among other tasks, 
“peacekeepers” were called upon to act as a “humanitarian intervention” force.342 This 
approach is consistent with the “responsibility to protect” concept, which was previously 
analyzed in this Chapter. 
Although it has participated to a lesser degree in peacekeeping deployments 
compared to the Army and the Navy, the Uruguayan Air Force has integrated personnel 
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into the other services’ components. Most important, since 2003 the Uruguayan Air Force 
has been managing the UN Medevac (medical aero-evacuation) unit on the Ethiopia-
Eritrea border, where it operates its own helicopters. This has allowed the Air Force to 
keep its pilots and personnel trained in one of the tasks usually carried out in Uruguay, 
which is especially important given current budget constraints.343  
2. Re-equipment 
Upgrading military equipment has always been an issue in Uruguay, a developing 
country with a small economy. Today, keeping military gear from becoming obsolete and 
useless is even more difficult in light of the need to satisfy other essential social needs. 
The current leftist government prepared the country’s budget with no consideration for 
military re-equipment.344 In doing so, the government tried to assign 4.5% of the GDP to 
education.345 
For the military, although lack of sufficient funding for re-equipment has been 
common in the last decades, today’s “picture” seems even worse. In this sense, since the 
Uruguayan military began participating in peacekeeping operations, UN refunds for wear 
and tear and loss or destruction of equipment have constituted an “extra-budget” source 
of income. According to Army Major Alfredo Fulloni, UN reimbursement has allowed 
the Uruguayan Army to provide for gear maintenance, refurbishment and 
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modernization.346 The Army created its own internal “UN money” distribution system, 
whereby it established the amount to be distributed to each peacekeeper according to his 
rank and responsibilities. In doing so, the Army has saved approximately USD 50,000 
monthly, which has allowed the institution to cover some essential needs created by the 
shortage of government funding.347 As Lieutenant General Angel Bertolotti, Commander 
in Chief of the Army, pointed out in March 2005 during his discourse commemorating 
the 194th Army anniversary 
The task which has been carried out [peacekeeping] not only demonstrated 
the Armed Forces usefulness as proper tool in support of the state foreign 
policy but also has constituted a considerable source of income either at 
the individual level, for the servicemen who have volunteered for those 
missions or at the institutional level, for accomplishing gear maintenance 
and re-equipment.348  
UN refunds have become more important for the Army than before, insofar as the 
UN changed its refund process to a new, more “beneficial” (albeit stricter) system. For 
example, for the deployment of peacekeeping contingents, the Uruguayan Army may be 
refunded as much as twice what it would have received under the old UN refund 
system.349  
Moreover, the Uruguayan Navy is being refunded for the operation of riverine 
crafts in the DRC at approximately twice their original value because this equipment is 
considered “special gear” and is being operated under “extreme environmental 
conditions,” “intensified operational conditions,” and because it is subjected to “hostile 
action.” 350 The most remarkable argument illustrating the importance that peacekeeping 
has had on Navy re-equipment comes from the Naval Staff Peacekeeping Logistics 
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Department, “The Navy has palliated the difficult economic situation thanks to the 
expenses received from the UN, which operated as lungs under the ongoing budget 
constraints.”351 
The Air Force may be the service which most depends on UN refunds. As 
mentioned previously, although its participation in peacekeeping is less than the Army 
and the Navy, the high cost of aircraft maintenance and flight training paired with budget 
cuts has placed the Uruguayan Air Force’s efficiency in jeopardy. Therefore, if the Air 
Force is inhibited from receiving UN refunds due to a lack of involvement in further 
peacekeeping operations, its already minimal readiness will collapse. The extent to which 
Air Force readiness has been undermined by the lack of adequate funding was 
summarized by the leftist Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Senate, “The flying 
assets are out of order in a very high percentage. If a drastic change is not made in the 
budget the Air Force disappears.”352 
However, UN refunds have not always been received “on time.” This has caused 
a lag between investment of money by the military (which is tantamount to saying by the 
state) to equip and supply a peacekeeping force at the early stages of its deployment and 
receipt of the UN refunds. Many times this lag has lasted more than a year. For example, 
in 1995, the Uruguayan Army had invested a total of nearly USD 11 million for its 
commitments in Cambodia (1991-1993, USD 2 million), Mozambique (1992-1994, USD 
8 million) and its ongoing deployment in Angola (1995-1999, USD 800,000 just in 
1995). By the end of 1995, when the Army was still deployed in Angola, the UN still 
owed refunds for about USD 7 million.353 Concerning the Navy, recent numbers reflect 
that the initial cost of equipping a DRC-type riverine company (including the purchase of 
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two fast patrol boats with machineguns and ten rubber boats with overboard engines) 
requires almost USD 4 million. Further, troop replacements are cheaper because the 
“heavy” gear has already been incorporated - this cost involves a little bit less than USD 
3 million.354 
In March 2003, ten years after the mission in Cambodia ended, the Uruguayan 
delegation before the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations voiced its 
concerns over UN financial problems and their effects on peacekeeping refunds. At that 
time, the UN still owed Uruguay refunds for its participation in the UN mission in 
Cambodia. What most worried the Uruguayan representatives was the continuity of that 
situation in light of ongoing commitments, especially in the DRC, where the country had 
deployed nearly 1700 troops (almost 10% of the total Uruguayan military).355 
Furthermore, in May 2003, the UN had already canceled part of the payment for troop 
commitment, but it still owed refunds for equipment wear and tear. The Uruguayan 
delegation emphasized its concerns on that account and demanded alternative 
solutions.356 In this sense, Army Major Rivera Elgue argued in 1999 that an option might 
have been to exchange the UN debt for UN assets and equipment of interest to the 
Uruguayan Army.357  
Based on the UN refund lag argument, Julián González, a leftist advisor in 
defense and military issues,358 argued in 2002 that the government (at that time under the 
Partido Colorado) should have studied whether or not it was beneficial for the military 
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and for the state as a whole to take part in increasing numbers of costly peacekeeping 
operations.359 González demanded information transparency, because for him, faced with 
budget cuts, to assemble and prepare a peacekeeping force required large sums of state 
money. In this regard, he argued that in addition to the necessary equipment, the troops to 
be committed also consume other “goods” that are not always analyzed. These goods 
include specific medical care before and after deployment, training and the additional one 
and a half salary required by law to be paid to all military personnel deployed 
overseas.360 The point González made was that the cost of a peacekeeping mission is 
higher than believed due to other “collateral” costs. The “real” cost of preparing a 
peacekeeping mission, in conjunction with the UN refund lag, has resulted in a “ceiling” 
regarding the commitment of troops to peacekeeping, which is also related to the 
minimum force needed to cope with domestic missions and duties.361  
However, this problem has not yet been seriously addressed by the Uruguayan 
government, either the historical parties or the current leftist one. Also, academic papers 
and “open” documents show only the “visible” costs of a peacekeeping mission, but do 
not allow us to see what I would call the “hidden” costs. As González pointed out three 
years ago, those hidden costs have not always been calculated. In my opinion, this is 
because some of those expenditures fall under the general services provided by the 
Ministry of Defense as a whole (such as medical care and food) and other goods (such as 
training and uniforms) fall under the ordinary duties of each service. Nevertheless, to 
train, equip, care, feed and dress peacekeepers requires additional resources. 
Despite the UN refund lag, peacekeeping operations still seem to be the solution 
to the Uruguayan military’s budget problem. At the end of the day, the UN eventually 
refunds the country. According to Rial, between 1991 and 2002, the Uruguayan Armed 
Forces received USD 129 million, which constituted nearly the entire annual Defense                                                  
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budget during the same time period.362 Rial also points out that since 2002, in light of 
the important Uruguayan commitment to the UN mission in the DRC, the military has 
received approximately USD 20 million annually. Considering the Uruguayan currency 
devaluation of the same year in regard to the U.S. dollar and the 2004 budget cuts, USD 
20 million represented almost one third of what was assigned by the government to the 
defense budget.363 In addition, the UN refunds the Uruguayan military almost USD 400 
monthly in additional payments for each serviceman deployed on a peacekeeping 
mission, to cover individual equipment, ammunition and as a premium for sending 
special-skills personnel.364 This “parallel” income has kept the Uruguayan military 
“alive.” This is why the Army is now assessing the commitment of a peacekeeping force 
to Sudan, which would be bigger than the one deployed in the DRC. In this regard, 
although the Army is almost on the edge of being able to deploy more troops overseas, 
additional UN peacekeeping efforts are seen as the only viable solution for remaining 
operative in light of the extremely negative budget situation.365  
3. Welfare of Personnel and Other Externalities 
The welfare of personnel was another area that benefited from the Uruguayan 
commitment to peacekeeping operations. According to Army sources, an officer usually 
earns ten times his regular Army salary when engaged in UN peacekeeping missions.366 
The direct consequence of these improved wages is that the money is then spent in 
Uruguay. As Bertolotti pointed out, “The collection [of money] on that account 
[peacekeeping] is, in fact, a source of genuine income which substantially supports in 
high degree the reactivation of the domestic economy.”367 Indeed, a press article argued 
that nearly USD 2,500,000 have monthly impacted the Uruguayan domestic economy. 
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This has had positive effects in both small store holders and tax revenues. The fact that 
enlisted men usually live in the less developed areas of Uruguay caused that 52% of the 
“UN money” has been spent in paying personal debts in locations where less than 30% of 
the Uruguayan people live. In this regard, 97% of the enlisted men and 87% of their 
families consider the participation in peacekeeping as “very positive.” 368 
Moreover, Rial argues that since Uruguay began participating in international 
peacekeeping in 1991, USD 140 million has entered the Uruguayan economy.369 As an 
example of the effect of “UN money” (refunds and peacekeeping wages) on the domestic 
economy in 2002, the “peacekeeping income,” which according to Rial was USD 20 
million,370 exceeded the income from both lamb meat exports (USD 18.4 million) and 
mineral products (USD 16.4 million).371 
The field that needs to be improved is the exploitation of commercial links with 
countries where a Uruguayan peacekeeping force has been deployed. The lack of 
increased trade or business with those countries demonstrates that this issue has not yet 
been properly addressed. According to Rial, Uruguayan foreign relations have not 
profited from the participation of the military in peacekeeping. For example, after 
successful operations in Cambodia, Uruguay has no diplomatic relations with that 
country, or with Mozambique, Angola or the DRC. The Uruguayan embassy in South 
Africa is in charge of taking care of what happens in those African countries where a 
consulate is honorarily served.372 Uruguay should consider more seriously the fact that in 
all those countries, enormous economic interests have shaped their existence. Uruguay 
should have used the military deployments as a tool for projecting not only foreign 
policy, but also commercial concerns. 
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An Army paper suggests that peacekeeping operations might constitute a window 
of opportunity for Uruguayan trade and the establishment of medium and small 
enterprises.373 The paper deals with the UN purchasing system and provides a list of 
goods and services frequently purchased by the UN. The “hook” of selling services and 
goods to the UN relies on the UN’s seriousness and a low risk involved in the 
commercial transactions.374 According to Rial, Uruguay sold the UN some water 
purification units (an Army-state owned Water Enterprise joint project) designated for 
post-conflict countries.375 On that account, a press article argued that the state-owned 
Water Enterprise (OSE) earned about USD 2,500,000.376 Additionally the state-
owned/private shared capital Air Line Enterprise (PLUNA) earned nearly USD 2,000,000 
for having transported Uruguayan peacekeeping troops overseas.377 González is more 
cautious about the prospects of selling more water purification units or other 
services/goods, because for him, the UN is often influenced by powerful interest 
groups.378 
Moreover, the UN peacekeeping wages, plus the fifty percent increase in the 
Uruguayan Army regular salary, helped military personnel in general and the enlisted 
men in particular improve their social status in specific areas, such as housing. This has 
caused the military personnel to repeatedly volunteer for peacekeeping.379 In addition, 
because there is a slight difference in what the UN pays depending on each mission’s risk 
assessment, there have been increasing numbers of volunteers for those riskier missions 
(better paid) at the expense of volunteers for the safer ones (worse paid).380 Another 
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benefit mandated by Uruguayan law is that time spent serving in peacekeeping missions 
is considered double time.381 
Institutionally, the military has also benefited from its personnel’s economic 
improvement. Before participating in peacekeeping, many enlisted men, and increasingly 
more officers, had been moonlighting in order to improve their economic situation. This 
negatively impacted the esprit de corps and service loyalty. Economic improvement on 
account of peacekeeping had a twofold effect. It contributed to the welfare of personnel 
and reinforced their commitment to the military profession.382 As a result, the command, 
which had been forced to reduce discipline and professional requirements in order to 
retain personnel, was able to increase readiness and began trusting its troops again. In this 
sense, by selecting personnel to be deployed to a peacekeeping mission, the command 
has a “carrot” to offer to their troops in times when other economic or professional 
benefits are scarce. 
Other externalities were also militarily beneficial. Perhaps the most important was 
to develop a consolidated doctrine for peacekeeping logistical support. As noted by the 
Army Commander in Chief in his 196th Army anniversary speech 
This experience [logistic support for peacekeeping] is something which at 
the beginning resulted in a severe challenge, but today it has evolved into 
an acquired capability that surpasses even the comparative parameters 
with highly developed countries across the world.383 
In this sense, Elgue argues that for the Uruguayan Army, the first peacekeeping 
operations constituted a “test-case” for Army logistics, because the initial support relied 
on the Army’s allowance.384 A good by-product of this fact in regard to the UN refund 
system is that it compels the state to maintain military gear in good shape in order to be 
deployed on time. By the same token, weapons and procedures need to be tested prior to 
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deployment. For a country with a small defense budget like Uruguay, this represents a 
way to maintain troops and equipment in a good condition of readiness. Having personnel 
available to relieve a deployed peacekeeping unit creates the need for constant training, 
which at the end of the day improves the general readiness of the military. 
The dark side of peacekeeping, especially UN Chapter VII operations, is the 
eventuality of suffering casualties. However, statistics indicate that Uruguayan casualties 
are extremely low. This is in part because Uruguay has participated primarily in Chapter 
VI operations. To suggest participation in Chapter VII might imply a larger number of 
casualties. But, as Army Colonel Gaspar Barrabino points out, every peacekeeping 
operation has its risks, regardless of which Chapter applies. In this sense, he says that 
Uruguayan personnel have been involved in many firefights and some have died. He 
concludes that risk is part of military activity.385 General Fígoli addressed the same topic 
in 1996, but the interesting insight in his analysis was to note that traffic accidents 
(among vehicles of any sort) are a frequent cause of deaths in peacekeeping 
operations.386 Indeed, almost ten years later, a newspaper article revealed that traffic 
accidents have been the main cause of Uruguayan casualties in peacekeeping missions. 
The current leftist Minister of Defense expressed her concerns but it was demonstrated 
that the places where peacekeepers drive literally lack the minimum standards for driving 
safely, due to poor road conditions, permanent crossing of any type of vehicles, animals, 
people and a complete absence of the rule of law.387 
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C. UN CHAPTER VII OPERATIONS, URUGUAY’S IMAGE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARENA, THE DOMESTIC MILITARY IMAGE AND 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
1. International and Domestic Image 
By broadening military participation in UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations, 
both the government and the military would be “allies” in projecting the state foreign 
policy into Third World regions in conflict, where the expertise and empathy of a 
“stable” and “credible” developing country (Uruguay) would be appreciated. Indeed, the 
Uruguayan military has already been successfully managing issues related to post-
conflict support operations. That happened in cases such as Cambodia and Mozambique, 
which are considered successful by the UN. 
In both cases, Uruguayan troops were responsible for improving security 
conditions and overseeing the electoral process. In Uruguay, elections are held and 
overseen by political and electoral authorities, but the Uruguayan military has 
responsibility for the security of the poll stations. Although this specific task is not 
political at all, it allows the Uruguayan military to become familiar with the set up and 
management of a poll station. This experience has been extremely valuable in post-
conflict environments where establishing an electoral process followed the peace 
settlement.388 Indeed, General Bertolotti named his expectations regarding Army 
capabilities and morale in his 196th Army anniversary speech, “We want an army that is 
motivated because it values the professional work it does, and the professional work it 
will continue to do, to meet the requirements of the civil society it serves.”389 
I argue that peacekeeping contributes to the image Bertolotti wanted the 
Uruguayan society to have about the Army. Moreover, academic literature pertinent to 
the Army is consistent with the positive image of the country that peacekeeping has 
created, and especially with the positive image of the Army within the society, an issue 
that seemed to have Bertolotti worried. This is exactly what Julián González argues. For 
him, peacekeeping missions constitute an opportunity to gain prestige. But most 
important, although he is critical of the Uruguayan commitment to peacekeeping 




operations due to their financial cost and the loss of domestic readiness, he recognizes 
that those missions have contributed to the country’s prestige in the international 
arena.390 The most critical argument in this regard comes from Juan Rial. He says that 
international prestige should be carefully analyzed. Rial argues that the press in New 
York has lately undermined the Uruguayan Army’s “prestige” citing a lack of response to 
violent incidents in the Eastern DRC as evidence of the Army’s weakness.391 The fact of 
the matter was that the Uruguayan Army did not have the mandate to use force other than 
for self-defense.  
I argue that the problem occurred when the Uruguayan parliament was discussing 
whether or not to authorize troops to use force when the UN changed MONUC’s mandate 
to “full” Chapter VII. But the issue existed and in order to maintain the prestige already 
earned, the Uruguayan politicians need to demonstrate no domestic hesitation about what 
activities the troops are allowed to perform. Under current circumstances, Chapter VII 
will be the framework for future peacekeeping operations. If politicians do not realize 
that changes have occurred when addressing peace and international security, there will 
be no future opportunities for the Uruguayan military to participate in peacekeeping 
operations. Analyzing the current world context is essential to understanding that 
traditional peacekeeping has evolved into robust peacekeeping. This evolution makes it 
necessary for the military to adapt its doctrine in that regard. This is what Bertolotti tried 
to transmit when he said 
These agendas [military strategy, Army missions, doctrine, deployment 
and equipment] must be designed while keeping in mind that globalization 
is the reality of our contemporary world and the context in which we live. 
We must take account of this reality when we establish goals and 
objectives, and the paths that lead to them. If we do not understand this, if 
we do not realize that the regional and global reality is very different from 
that which existed thirty years ago, if we remain attached to outlooks and 
schema from the past, if we naively believe that things are as we would 
like them to be or as we obstinately believe they still are, and not as they 
really are, we run the risk of eroding the credibility, harming the 
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usefulness, or diminishing the chance that the nation will insert itself in 
the real world in which all these situations manifest themselves.392 
In other words, from this extract of Bertolotti’s speech, we can deduce that 
because the regional context has become more stable on account of the confidence 
measures that South American countries have developed in the last decade, former threats 
in the region have become unlikely. Therefore, the South American military (especially 
the armies) should emphasize their commitment to peacekeeping. As explained in the 
previous chapter, peacekeeping by no means constitutes a threat to a regional neighbor, 
and to close regional links for peacekeeping is a political decision, like the ones adopted 
to improve regional trade. 
It may seem as if the country’s image is suffering, but evidence suggests the 
opposite, especially concerning the major Chapter VII Uruguayan commitment, the UN 
mission in the DRC. The Uruguayan Navy has received many congratulations and 
demonstrations of gratitude for their participation in the DRC mission. In fact, the 
Uruguayan Navy riverine companies in the DRC are so valued by the community that the 
local media said the youth adopted Spanish as a third language (in addition to Lingala 
and French).393 Furthermore, the UN Deputy for Kindú (a DRC city alongside the Congo 
River), stated that with the re-deployment of the Uruguayan Navy riverine company to 
the lakes region, the Kindú population would miss the wide array of services the Navy 
carried out. On that account it was known as the “Si” (yes) company, for it did all it was 
asked.394 Then, MONUC’s magazine said that after four years of presence in the Congo 
River, ensuring safer navigation, performing search and rescue and helping people in 
danger alongside the banks of the river, the Uruguayan Navy riverine company enjoys 
enormous respect among the local population.395 Finally, the UN Force Commander in 
the DRC also expressed his gratitude for the riverine companies. He lamented having just 
two units. The Uruguayan Navy riverine companies were responsible for opening the 
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Congo River, the main inland line of communication. In doing so, the riverine companies 
made it possible for local riverine traffic, such as “pushers” (big flat cargo crafts) full of 
commercial loads and people, to navigate the river. More than 1600 kms were opened for 
free and safer navigation. Also, the riverine companies saved more than 4500 people 
from dying in the waters of the Congo River. Even the less literate people appreciated 
these accomplishments.396 Lately, the Uruguayan Navy riverine company deployed in 
Lake Albert engaged in a firefight with rebel groups. That occurred while carrying out a 
raid to rescue Guatemalan Special Forces that were surrounded in desperate situation 
after successive ground and air extraction had failed.397 In addition, the UN Force 
Commander noted that the Uruguayan Army troops constituted his reserve force in light 
of their demonstrated skills and cohesion.398 So, the Uruguayan military has been doing 
well in peacekeeping, especially concerning its most important and costly (for both 
Uruguay and the UN) peacekeeping operation (DRC), which is in fact, a Chapter VII 
mission. 
2. Domestic Civil-Military Relations 
One of the measures that contributes to good civil-military relations is 
peacekeeping. According to Desch, peacekeeping has been suitable for countries that fit 
his low internal-low external “threat matrix.”399 The following diagram shows the 
evaluation of Uruguay’s threats and their effect on civil-military relations. 
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  External Threats 
  High Low 
Internal  High Poor Worst 
Threats Low Good Mixed 
 
Figure 12.   Desch’s Threat Matrix. Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of 
Location and Intensity of Threats (Uruguay’s assessment is highlighted) 
(From: Desch). 
 
The Uruguayan threat matrix requires assessing an adequate military doctrine in 
order to ensure good civil-military relations.400 This constitutes an unexpected window of 
opportunity, because, as we saw, General Bertolotti has asked for the design of an 
“upgraded” Army doctrine.401 What Bertolotti seemed to address was the Army’s need to 
evolve into a postmodern institution after having successfully accomplished its traditional 
peacekeeping role.402 According to Moskos, et al., the postmodern military is 
characterized by organizational changes (exactly what Bertolotti asked). One of those 
changes refers to the use of the military under international mandate (i.e., peacekeeping), 
legitimized by supranational entities (i.e., the UN).403 Indeed, Moskos, et al., argue that 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, which may be tantamount to saying 
“humanitarian intervention” or the “responsibility to protect” approach, constitute a 
major part of current military doctrine worldwide (again, this reminds us of Bertolotti’s 
concerns about doctrine).404 
The leftist government promised an open debate on national defense policy. This 
has not happened yet. Nevertheless, domestic issues might make consensus-building 
difficult. On the one hand, the left is still anchored in old concepts of power relations and                                                  
400 Desch, 116. 
401 Bertolotti.  
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homeland defense. As we saw, the main leftist document on armed forces and national 
defense evidences a distrust of any continental or international Uruguayan military 
commitment.405 Julián González, a co-author of that document, argued against an 
increment of what he calls “functional denaturalization” of the military. He said that 
“non-substantial” duties such as peacekeeping conspire against readiness for the 
military’s main role, which is defense of the homeland.406 On the other hand, the military 
has improved its participation in peacekeeping, is proud of this improvement and 
demands to continue participating.407 So, different domestic approaches will result in an 
active and vehement debate and civil-military relations may suffer.408  
However, a good indicator of the evolution of leftist military doctrine was 
recently noted. Because the left is currently in power, it was faced with the dilemma of 
whether or not to initiate the message to parliament asking for authorization to allow the 
Navy to participate in the 2005 UNITAS operation (involving the U.S. and other regional 
navies). The dilemma was posed insofar as the left had systematically opposed 
Uruguayan participation in that operation. Two things happened. First, the leftist 
government sent the request to parliament asking for its approval. Second, the two 
parliamentary chambers (Senate and House of Representatives) approved the request. 
Therefore, the Uruguayan Navy is now taking part in the 2005 UNITAS with the support 
of an unexpected favorable leftist vote. Yet, not all leftist members of parliament gave 
their support. Many of them opposed Uruguayan participation, so internal divisions 
undermined the former leftist cohesion.409  
Meanwhile, the leftist government is carrying out excavations in military 
installations, looking for the remains of the disappeared people, a tragedy that occurred 
under the dictatorship in power from 1973 to 1985. The Commanders in Chief of the 
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services submitted official reports with information about where to find those remains. 
The problem with these excavations is that no remains have yet been found. This lack of 
findings has divided public and political opinion, though the Commanders in Chief are 
still loyal to the president and he still trusts them. However, if remains are not located in 
the near future (two months have passed since the excavations began in August 2005), 
civil-military relations may deteriorate.410 Despite this unfavorable environment for good 
civil-military relations, I think that this is precisely the window of opportunity needed to 
achieve consensus on UN Chapter VII peacekeeping, the same way authorization was 
finally obtained for UNITAS participation. By the same token, the Commanders in Chief 
have demonstrated good will by collaborating with the government in the effort to clarify 
the destiny of the disappeared people. 
In the meantime, Uruguay should not remain outside what is occurring in today’s 
world. For the military, this means participation in peacekeeping in order to consolidate 
its acquired experience and to exploit this experience in further peacekeeping or 
humanitarian missions, which as we saw, will be set up under Chapter VII. For example, 
extra-regional powers such as China and Spain have become involved in the Chapter VII 
mission in Haiti. China attempts to show its presence in a region where many countries 
recognize Taiwan as the only legitimate “China.”411 Spain participates with a combined 
Spanish-Moroccan unit. Spain’s objective is to evaluate the behavior of a combined 
Christian-Islamic military battalion.412 Finally, the main command positions in Haiti are 
held by the Southern Cone of South American countries, except for Uruguay, which 
rejected being part of the “deal.” As a result, the majority of the command positions were 
assigned to countries with less troop contributions than Uruguay, including Paraguayans 
and Bolivians, who do not “supply” troops.413 
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Now is a good time to separate issues in Uruguay; the internal problem of the 
disappeared people must be separated from future external engagements, particularly in 
Chapter VII peacekeeping operations. If that is possible, the current leftist government 
will consolidate its power and leftist governments may rule Uruguay for quite some time. 
Thus, the left should be first interested in defining peacekeeping as a major military role 
and then dedicate the always exiguous budget to its social programs, such as education, 
health, housing, jobs and what the government called an “emergency plan,” which is still 
far from being satisfactory. Doing so would make it possible for the government to exert 
Huntington’s “objective control,”414 which, without having been stated in those terms, 
has been one of the main banners of the leftist political discourse on national defense and 
armed forces. 
D. SUMMARY 
Uruguay has become accustomed to participating in Chapter VI peacekeeping 
operations because they fulfill the traditional principles of Uruguayan foreign policy, 
such as preventive diplomacy, peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-intervention and self-
determination. However, Chapter VI peacekeeping missions have become scarce. The 
world has changed and the rise of internal conflicts and state collapse created harder 
conditions for implementing peace agreements within the borders of a collapsed country. 
Boutros Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi Report foresaw the current 
peacekeeping trend; the former by arguing that consent might not be strictly necessary 
and the latter by arguing that robust peacekeeping forces would be needed to fulfill the 
UN mandate. Recently, the responsibility to protect approach paved the way for 
justifying humanitarian intervention when risk of ethnic cleansing, mass killings or 
genocide exists. A disimpassioned interpretation of those UN documents would allow 
Uruguay to commit troops to UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations without violating 
either its traditional foreign policy principles of preventive diplomacy and peaceful 
resolution of conflicts or the leftist ideals of multilateralism and international solidarity. 
The responsibility to protect approach relies on the sovereignty of the state, so it does not 
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undermine the principle of non-intervention. Only in cases of extreme humanitarian 
atrocities (when the sovereign state is not able or willing to protect its own people) may 
military intervention be justified by the international community.  
Future peacekeeping operations will likely be set up under Chapter VII, allowing 
the Uruguayan military to participate will make it possible for servicemen to train in 
realistic environments. This will allow the Uruguayan peacekeepers to gain improved 
skills, knowledge and experience, which they can impart to recruits when they return to 
their units of origin. In addition, by not stopping their commitment to peacekeeping, 
which means participating in Chapter VII operations, the Armed Forces can upgrade their 
military gear. This is especially important in light of current budget cuts. Moreover and 
most important, military personnel would improve their economic situation, satisfying 
essential needs such as housing. In addition, the “UN money” paid to those personnel will 
mostly be spent in the domestic economy, contributing to economic revitalization. 
Finally, broadening military participation in peacekeeping operations, including 
Chapter VII missions, will have positive effects on the image of the country in the 
international arena. This has already been tested in the biggest and most important 
commitment (DRC) Uruguay has experienced since it began participating in 
peacekeeping. In the case of Haiti, Uruguay is committed with regional partners. 
However, rigid abidance by traditional foreign policy principles has impeded the military 
from achieving better command positions. Less committed countries have filled those 
positions. 
Good domestic civil-military relations in Uruguay depend on several important 
issues. First and foremost, the government’s promised debate on national defense must 
take place. By doing so, the goal should be to let the military become more professional, 
which is one of the “demands” the military has been making in the recent past and is 
consistent with the postmodern world. To a great extent, that professionalism means 
continued participation in future peacekeeping operations, which again, will mostly be 
held under Chapter VII. Second, the leftist government should arrive at a strategy for 
resolving the issue of the disappeared people once the excavations are completed. 
Separating this domestic argument from the externally oriented commitments to Chapter 
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VII peacekeeping will be the path towards crafting objective civilian control of the 
military. The left made moves in this direction when it recently approved Uruguayan 
Navy participation in the 2005 UNITAS operation. Taking similar steps in regard to 
Chapter VII peacekeeping will allow the military to enjoy the benefits of participation, 
while the leftist government will be able to fulfill its social promises on education, health, 
housing, job opportunities and the serious implementation of the “emergency plan.” Both 
strategies, the social (education, health, etc.), which is civilian in character, and the 
military (Chapter VII peacekeeping), which is essentially professional, will allow the left 
to fulfill their electoral political platform while keeping the military controlled and busy 
with their professional affairs. In the end, the Armed Forces would also be collaborating 
with the government by projecting the country’s foreign policy, the traditional Uruguayan 
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V:  CONCLUSIONS 
Uruguay deserves to have a debate on its national defense. This debate 
must be undertaken with greater serenity and over a longer period of time 
that we have dedicated to it so far. 
Senator Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro (Tupamaro Leader,           
former guerrilla fighter and current Chairman of the                        
Defense Committee of the Senate)415  
 
The possibility of using force in peacekeeping is what has most worried the 
Uruguayan authorities. Using force was considered a violation of the Uruguayan foreign 
policy principles of preventive diplomacy, peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-
intervention and self-determination. This concern has increased as UN peacekeeping 
operations have become more coercive, as suggested in the Brahimi Report in 2000. In 
this regard, having considered the new UN approach and the Army’s willingness to be 
deployed, the Uruguayan government sent troops to missions where limited use of force 
was authorized. The UN has lately established its most important peacekeeping missions 
under Chapter VII. This means that peacekeeping units are authorized to use force to 
fulfill the UN mandate. This issue resulted in the loss of domestic consensus on 
peacekeeping, especially between the historical political parties, which governed the 
country since its independence, and the left, in power since March 2005. This discussion 
becomes more important insofar as Uruguay has increased its participation in 
peacekeeping. At present, a significant number of Uruguayan troops are committed to the 
UN Chapter VII missions in the DRC and Haiti. It is likely that future peacekeeping 
operations will be established primarily under Chapter VII. Based on that assessment and 
on the political discussion that is taking place in Uruguay, this thesis addressed the 
following question: should the Uruguayan Armed Forces be committed to UN 
Chapter VII peacekeeping operations? 
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The research was conducted following the levels of analysis framework. In so 
doing, the international, regional and domestic/bureaucratic levels were studied. Chapter 
II addressed the international level to identify what made the Uruguayan military 
change its role throughout time up to its current peacekeeping role. The objective 
was to dissagregate the causal variables that explain the different roles the Uruguayan 
Armed Forces have performed and their effects on the other two levels. The analysis was 
divided into three time periods; the Cold War, post-Cold War and post-September 11, 
2001. Each period was characterized by a main event. In corresponding order, the events 
analyzed were the Bipolarity, the New World Order and the War on Terror. It was 
possible to see how the military has carried out disparate missions according to the main 
event of each period. From the “classic” territorial defense to fighting violent, domestic 
leftist groups. From hemispheric defense to traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping, such as 
the cases of the Sinai Peninsula, Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique. Then, from 
Chapter VI missions to sort of “limited” Chapter VII missions (known as “Chapter Six 
and a Half”) in the cases of the DRC and Haiti. Finally, from these current commitments 
to the current political discussion on whether or not to commit Uruguayan troops in the 
foreseeable future to Chapter VII missions. This analysis served as the basis for better 
understanding why the Uruguayan governments used the armed forces to improve the 
image of the country in the international arena. The study also described how the military 
adopted its current peacekeeping role as a means to improve its domestic image, its 
training and re-equipment and the well-being of its personnel. These factors explain why 
the military looks forward to continued participation, even in Chapter VII operations. 
Chapter III addressed the regional level. The research assessed the current 
situation in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Ideological affinity among the Southern 
Cone countries caused the leftist government in Uruguay to include defense and security 
issues in the regional agenda, with the possibility of achieving a consensus on 
peacekeeping. The objective of the analysis was to identify to what extent ideological 
affinity in the region would make a peacekeeping partnership possible. Such knowledge 
would help determine whether a regional partnership would trump rooted nationalism, 
which traditionally has undermined the integration process. Thus, at the regional level the 
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question was whether the rise of leftist regimes in the Southern Cone of Latin 
America creates conditions for a peacekeeping partnership. The research 
demonstrated that despite economic integration in the region, each country was trying to 
increase its leverage in the international arena independently. Therefore, the military in 
the Southern Cone of Latin America still waits for politicians to lead the process of 
military integration, as democracy mandates.  
An assessment of each of the Southern Cone countries was required in light of 
each county’s foreign and defense policies, approach to peacekeeping and position on 
other regional security issues.  
The study showed that Argentina recognizes the importance of recovering its 
influence in the region. It considers itself the most experienced South American country 
in security issues due to its involvement in the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982), the First 
Gulf War (1990-1991), the U.S. intervention in Haiti (1994) and its past (1992) and 
current involvement in the Balkans. Argentina acknowledges how important its strength 
is for inserting the region into the international arena. Argentina consistently expresses its 
commitment to democracy, regional integration and preservation of peace and 
international security as state policy. In this regard, Argentina abides by the concept of 
cooperative security within the region and its commitment to both Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII peacekeeping missions. Argentina demonstrates its willingness to improve 
trust and cooperation in the region by allowing Chilean troops to be part of its task force 
in Cyprus and by foreseeing the commitment of an Argentine-Chilean joint peacekeeping 
unit to Haiti in 2006. It seems that Argentina is waiting for a “window of opportunity” to 
regain the prestige it enjoyed not so long ago. 
Concerning Brazil, the research demonstrated that this country is still trying to 
consolidate its hegemony in South America. Brazil wants regional support for its role as 
“leader,” which arose again under Lula’s rule. In this sense, Brazil does not support 
Chapter VII operations, although it demands a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council.  
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Regarding Chile, the study showed that this country is still considering pending 
border issues and wants to exert influence in the international arena without constraints. 
Chile’s Socialist government is pursuing the achievement of national objectives as a state 
policy, above partisan ideologies. For Chile, the defense policy constitutes a tool for the 
projection of power and support of its diplomacy. In this regard, Chile now participates in 
Chapter VII operations. Further expectations rest on the eventual deployment of an 
Argentine-Chilean joint peacekeeping unit to Haiti in 2006. If successful, this effort will 
contribute to strengthening trust between the two countries.  
Finally, the analysis showed that Uruguay still needs to adopt a position 
concerning regional security issues. The leftist government has not yet provided clear-cut 
definitions in that regard, although its political advisors harbor distrust and skepticism 
about participation in peacekeeping, especially when use of force is required. National 
defense arguments and the peacekeeping approach in Uruguay do not necessarily reflect 
the military’s point of view. Neither do they reflect the current leftist point of view. 
Uruguay still does not have a state policy on peacekeeping. If the leftist government 
finally embraces its advisors’ recommendations, Uruguay’s approach will be closer to 
Brazil’s than to any other country in the region. Both countries have stated their 
objections to Chapter VII operations and to having extra-regional countries involved in 
Latin American security issues. 
We can therefore state that the Southern Cone of Latin America is not yet 
prepared for a peacekeeping partnership. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have different 
approaches regarding peacekeeping and competitive objectives on regional leadership. 
Regional cooperation seems to be a means to achieve individualistic ends. Brazil is the 
“natural leader” and is now leading this “race.” But Argentina and Chile do not want to 
be considered “secondary actors.” Argentina shows the most “integrationist” approach 
but is viewed as “risky” by other countries. Chile does not adhere to all polices specified 
in MERCOSUR, although it still tries to close links with Argentina on peacekeeping. 
Uruguay fears deviating from its rooted principles. Although political discourse promotes 
a form of military cooperation, nationalism is still strong enough to undermine a steady 
integration process. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are not yet prepared to deepen 
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the existing level of commitment. Neither do they seem willing to yield sovereignty to a 
“regional peacekeeping force” or to give up rooted foreign policy principles in favor of 
achieving regional standards for peacekeeping. Creating a peacekeeping partnership is a 
political decision that Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay should make insofar as the 
four countries are now sharing a peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The ideological 
convergence in the region constitutes a basis for establishing a dialogue on this issue.  
The regional level of analysis demonstrated that Uruguay is the only country in 
the Southern Cone that is not competing for regional leadership; likewise, its leftist 
government is the one which has to work the most in designing a peacekeeping policy. 
When the left took over the government in March 2005, a debate on this issue was posed, 
but is still pending. As a result, Chapter IV focused on the domestic/bureaucratic level 
and addressed the main question of this thesis: should the Uruguayan Armed Forces be 
committed to UN Chapter VII peacekeeping operations?  
In previous chapters the research showed that Uruguay has traditionally 
committed troops to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations because they fulfill the 
traditional principles of Uruguayan foreign policy, such as preventive diplomacy, 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-intervention and self-determination. However, the 
rise of internal conflicts and state collapse created harder conditions for implementing 
peace agreements within the borders of a collapsed country. Boutros Ghali’s An Agenda 
for Peace and the Brahimi Report indicate that UN Chapter VI missions have become 
unlikely; the former argues that consent might not be strictly necessary and the latter 
argues that robust peacekeeping forces would be needed to fulfill the UN mandate. This 
assessment made it possible to pose the question: how consistent are Chapter VII 
peacekeeping operations with the current political and military situation in 
Uruguay? To address this issue in support of the main thesis question, the objective of 
Chapter IV was to propose a policy for Uruguay’s participation in peacekeeping 
operations that is consistent with 1) the Uruguayan foreign policy principles of preventive 
diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts; 2) the current leftist government ideals of 
multilateralism and international solidarity; 3) the military needs for training, re-
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equipment and personnel’s welfare; and 4) the need to improve the image of the country 
in the international arena and domestic civil-military relations.  
The analysis demonstrated that a disimpassioned interpretation of An Agenda for 
Peace and the Brahimi Report would allow Uruguay to commit troops to UN Chapter VII 
peacekeeping operations without violating either its traditional foreign policy principles 
of preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of conflicts or the leftist ideals of 
multilateralism and international solidarity. The problem of designing a Uruguayan 
peacekeeping policy is how to cope with the rooted principle of non-intervention. This 
research found that recently, the responsibility to protect approach, identified in August 
2000 by an international independent commission appointed by the UN Secretary 
General, paved the way for justifying humanitarian intervention when risk of ethnic 
cleansing, mass killings or genocide exists. The responsibility to protect approach 
establishes that only when the sovereign state is unable or unwilling to protect its own 
people from humanitarian atrocities may military intervention be justified by the 
international community. It is a “default” option when the UN Security Council 
determines that a state has failed in accomplishing one of its essential functions or “raison 
d’etre.” Therefore, by relying on the sovereignty of the state, this approach does not 
undermine the principle of non-intervention.  
This thesis has consistently argued that future peacekeeping operations would 
likely be set up under Chapter VII. The research proved that allowing the Uruguayan 
military to participate would make it possible for servicemen to train in realistic 
environments. This would allow the Uruguayan peacekeepers to gain improved skills, 
knowledge and experience, which they could impart to recruits when they return to their 
units of origin. In addition, by not stopping their commitment to peacekeeping, which 
means participating in Chapter VII operations, the armed forces could upgrade their 
military gear. This is especially important in light of current budget cuts. Moreover and 
most important, military personnel would improve their economic situation, satisfying 
essential needs such as housing. In addition, the “UN money” paid to those personnel 
would mostly be spent in the domestic economy, contributing to economic revitalization. 
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Chapter IV also argued that broadening military participation in peacekeeping 
operations, including Chapter VII missions, would have positive effects on the image of 
the country in the international arena. This has already been tested in the biggest and 
most important commitment (DRC) Uruguay has experienced since it began participating 
in peacekeeping. In the case of Haiti, Uruguay is committed with regional partners. 
However, rigid abidance to traditional foreign policy principles has impeded the military 
from achieving better command positions. Less committed countries have filled those 
positions. 
Finally, Chapter IV showed that good domestic civil-military relations in Uruguay 
depend on several important issues. First, the government’s promised debate on national 
defense must take place. In this regard, the Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan Army 
stated that the government should define goals, objectives, and policies of the military in 
accordance with the challenges of the postmodern world, which would make the military 
more professional. To a great extent, that professionalism means continued participation 
in future peacekeeping operations, which again, will mostly be held under Chapter VII. 
Second, the leftist government should arrive at a strategy for resolving the issue of the 
disappeared people once the excavations are completed. Separating this domestic 
argument from the externally oriented commitments to Chapter VII peacekeeping will be 
the path towards crafting objective civilian control of the military.  
This thesis harbored optimism, by showing that the left moved in this direction 
when it recently approved Uruguayan Navy participation in the 2005 UNITAS operation. 
Taking similar steps in regard to Chapter VII peacekeeping will make both the 
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